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The structure of this chapter is similar to the preVIOUSchapter. After this
introduction, findings for the key category of information are explained in 5 separate
sections. Contextual factors are then summarised, before findings are compared to
literature on information, to cultural theory and to cross-national empirical research
into management control. Conclusions for the chapter are then summarised.
J 0.1. J The key category afin(ormatjon
This key category identifies differences between managers from mainland China,
Czech Republic and the UK in how they see information as important to providing
control assurance.
While all 30 axial respondents saw information as important to management control,
differences in these views were not identified as being significant to the cultural
research findings until the closing stages of the fieldwork. However, at that stage it
appeared that some of the comments, made by some axial respondents and the wider
body of interviewees, added further insight to the patterns that managers from the 3
countries in their perceptions of gaining control assurance.
These differences in control perceptions referred to informal communication of
information not to formal information systems. This reflects much standardisation of
formal information and control systems across countries by each of the two MNCs:
differences appeared in what was not standardised. Furthermore, most of the
discussion by interviewees and their control concerns referred to gaps between
formal systems and to informal communication of information.
10. J,2 Intervjewees
Because this key category was not identified until near the end of the fieldwork,
many axial respondents were no longer available for further discussion. Therefore
the views of only 20 out of the 30 ax~_alre~pon~~ntsare included in this key category.
Nevertheless a further 37 intervieweesgave yi,'ewsthat were included in selective
.'.... ' .
coding for this key category. Some variety in background of the total 57
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interviewees for this key category was achieved, as indicated in Table 10.1, although
views of only 4 interviewees from CoY in the UK were included. Nevertheless, as
will be shown in Chapter 13, a sufficient number of views were gathered from both
MNCs to demonstrate that the findings for this key category do not represent
differences in corporate rather than national culture.
Location ~ ~ Mainland ~ Of which: Location
Qrgsmi~atiQ[) Cbi[)e~e .Ma1e Eemale IQ!a1
UK: CoX 6 6
CoY 1 2 1 4
Other 2 2 1 3 2 15
Prague: CoX 1 6 5 2
CoY 2 3 2 6 1
Other 3 3 17
Beijing: CoX 2 5 7 10 4
CoY 5 1 2 4
Other 4 3 1 24
Elsewhere: Other 1 1 1
---- --- ----
TOTAL 14 14 18 11 43 14 57
==== ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Table 10.1: Interviewees for selective coding on information
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10.1. 3 Overvjew diagram
An overview of the key category of information and its sub-categories is given in
Figure 10.1. As with the overview diagrams for other key categories, this shows
only differences in perception between managers from mainland China, the Czech










Figure 10.1: Differences in perceptions of lnformatlon'i?
10.2 Chinese avoidance of personal attention
A number of comments illustrated reluctance by Chinese people to appear
conspicuous from volunteering information or ideas (interviews # 855, 879, 1215),
the implication being that to stand out is to risk losing face. Mainland Chinese
people were described as less forthcoming than those in Hong Kong, speaking out
only if they trust the person they are speaking to (interview # 801).
69 The use of boxes, ovals and arrows in this diagram follows the convention used and
explained for Figure 7.1.
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Related to reluctance in communication because of fear of losing face, is the
mainland Chinese virtue of studied modesty (interview # 846), based on a desire of
not wanting to stand out as better than others. This was reflected in the words of
another interviewee:
"We are influenced by Confucius who said you should be obedient and modest.
Also proverbs we were told by our elders when we were young, and are still
told by mothers today to their children, such as,
yu shi wu zheng
'Hold oneself alooffrom the world', stand alooffrom success (and you will be
safe);
ren pa chu ming, zhu pa zhuang
'Men fear fame, like pigs fear getting fat' "(interview # 1215).
These views are represented in Figure 10.1 by the box labelled 'Avoid Attention'.
As this figure indicates, there are implications for feedback and hence for
management control. This is examined after considering availability of information.
10.3 Availability of public information
Differences in availability of public information were identified, from tight secrecy
in China, through lesser secrecy in the Czech Republic, to relative openness in the
UK. For example, in mainland China accounts for unlisted companies are not
published and, at the time of the field work, court decisions were not available
(interviews # 594, 684, 885). Also there was no public register of property holdings,
which made checking ownership and mortgages impossible (interviews # 684, 885,
702). In the Czech Republic, accounts of unlisted companies are also generally not
available (interviews # 264, 354), but some court decisions are published at least
locally (interview # 312, 354). There is also a Czech public land register, although
there may be doubts about title and mortgages (interviews # 282, 483). There are
therefore more possibilities for checking on the assets and liabilities of companies in
Czech Republic than in mainland China. In the UK, Companies House makes
company returns on all companies available to the public, court decisions are
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published, while land ownership and securities can be verified. This was observed to
impact upon the extent that external information could be relied upon, for example,
in setting credit limits for new customers (interview # 288, 528, 822, 885, 1018).
This increased the necessity in the Czech Republic and more so in mainland China of
gaining control assurance through informal communication channels. It also
increased challenges of working between gaps in what was possible with formal
control systems.
Public information may be viewed as transparent if it conveys information that
allows the nature of the underlying subject to be understood. Lack of this
transparency in the Czech Republic is illustrated by the anecdote of a local Czech
auditor who qualified a bank's audit report by reference to what he put in his
unpublished letter to the bank's management. This lack of publication would
probably have led in the UK to criticism of the auditor by the Stock Exchange and
his profession, if not also by the Bank of England as bank regulator'", The Czech
National Bank accepted that the auditor had truthfully done his job, but from then on
required to see all such auditors' letters to Czech banks, thus still leaving Czech
securities markets unaware of reasons for audit qualifications (interview # 1064).
In commenting on transparency, an interviewee pointed out (interview # 1221) that in
China and the far East people accept information more at face value, such as a profit
forecast given by a Chief Executive, without requiring independent verification.
This does not necessarily mean that Chinese investors believe such information to be
more accurate, than would British investors. The point being made by the
interviewee was that Chinese investors would tend to rely more on the Chief
Executive's reputation, which would be ruined ifhis or her profit forecast turned out
to be wrong or misleading. Of course even in the UK credibility can be destroyed by
unreliability. This parallels a comparison made by another interviewee between
British business people relying on audited accounts, whereas locals in mainland
China generally do not trust them, seeing them as prepared and audited specifically
for tax purposes and bearing little information content for other purposes (interview #
885).
70 The Bank of England was still the UK bank regulator at the time of the field. The FSA
became the UK bank regulator on 1 June 1998.
244
Chapter 10: Information
Unwillingness of Czech public officials to provide information was attributed to
attitudes from the Communist era (Prague Post # 414). At the same time, there was
evidence of frustration by Czech people at this lack of public transparency. For
example the press reported with respect to a scandal about funding of a Czech
political party:
"Every citizen of the Czech Republic is entitled to know the truth. " (Prague
Post # IJ01).
An interviewee (interview # 279) blamed lack of transparency for the rise of financial
fraud known locally as 'tunnelling', which was receiving criticism in the press
(Central European Business Weekly # 393; Prague Post # 540). Havel, the President
of the Czech Republic, called on Parliament for more transparency:
"I am deeply convinced that the more transparent, the more clearly structured
and more understandable a legal system we will have, the greater will be the
chance that it will be respected. " (WWW # J 099).
10.4 Availability of information between organisations
This pattern of information maintained in the public sector is reflected in the
availability of credit information from the private sector. Credit reference agencies
are appearing in mainland China, where they have to work from relatively little
information (interviews # 594, 702; documents # 705, 966, 969 and 979). An
interviewee pointed out that one of the difficulties faced by credit agencies in
mainland China is unwillingness of Chinese companies to expose information about
themselves to strangers (interview # 885).
In the Czech Republic a few agencies are established and have a slightly wider range
of information to work from (phone call # 72; interviews # 312, 354; documents #
315, 327, 357 and 360). While some information on unlisted companies is available,
it is limited and Czech companies are reluctant to divulge information about
themselves to strangers (interviews # 264, 354). Interestingly Czech law prevents
disclosure of personal information on individuals, such as directors' dates of birth
(interview # 312). This perhaps reflects the importance of the individual within
Czech culture, as shown above for self interest (Figure 7.1), for individual
responsibility (Figure 8.1), and for loyalty to oneself (Figure 9.1).
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In the UK credit reference agencies are well established and have considerably wider
sources of information (documents # 48 # 229 # 230; interview # 69; WWW # 28).
Whereas banks in the UK provide credit references (document # 57; manual # 48),
they do not in mainland China and the Czech Republic. It was explained that
mainland Chinese banks treat such information as confidential: knowledge and
understanding about their clients is seen as proprietary, and is important to how
banks make money, while clients do not want others to know about them (interviews
# 765, 777). It is also claimed that banks' Chinese clients are not transparent in
telling their bankers about themselves (Far East Economic Review # 625), while
customers do not like to divulge information.
The relatively greater exchange of information between British, as opposed to
Chinese or Czech, organisations was illustrated by an anecdote of how a UK
financial regulator, the SFA, used information from a quite separate agency,
Companies House, to ensure that regulations were being followed (interview # 1134).
It was also illustrated by the apparent readiness of customers to give copies of their
internal management accounts to their suppliers (interviews # 108, 1302, 1317).
This pattern of availability of information between organisations further impacted on
how much external information could be used by formal management control
systems. In the more extreme situation of mainland China, this severely restricted
how much formal systems could be used (interviews # 822, 885), and it appeared that
greater reliance was placed on informal information networks between organisations
(interview # 978) ..
In dealing with internal fraud, Chinese organisations apparently have a much
stronger preference, than do Western organisations, for accepting resignations by
culprits than for involving the authorities and thereby losing face (interview # 930).
10.5 Internal and interpersonal availability of information
10.5. 1 Chinese auitudes
At the personal level, a Hong Kong Chinese interviewee said he found it strange how
Western people on a Friday evening like to go to a bar, to talk after work, to tell
stories. He prefers to play tennis or mah-jong.
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"Why do they like to expose themselves so much, to say what they are thinking
and feeling?" (interview # 803).
If this is a preference for secrecy, a further example showed how mainland Chinese
managers prefer not to be in a position where information can be used as evidence
against them. Chinese members of a joint venture were described as liking critical
internal audit findings to be communicated verbally, rather than being put in writing;
they receive the message but are not threatened by written evidence (interview # 15).
The Chinese tendencies for low availability of information within organisations,
between organisations, and in the public sphere, are illustrated by the box in Figure
10.1 labelled 'Low availability'. Among 20 interviewees, all of them by number,
and four fifths by weight of opinion, were of the opinion that mainland Chinese
people assume or expect information to be narrowly held, that is not made widely
available",
Low availability of information appears to have implications for flow of feedback
information, which is illustrated in Figure 10.1 by the box labelled 'Fewer
suggestions, less feedback given'. Mainland and Hong Kong Chinese managers
were of the view that indigenous mainland Chinese organisations often suffer serious
lack of feedback information to policy makers on how policy is being implemented
(departmental lunch # 683). This may arise from lack of sufficient relationship
between multiple levels of bosses and subordinates, and from general reluctance to
pass on negative information. Furthermore, subordinates may be encouraged to
make suggestions for improvement only where they can be sure that the suggestion
will work (interview # 1119). This was connected to Chinese reluctance to step
outside one's comfort zone (interview # 933; Fax # 1389). The giving of less
feedback has a parallel in the significantly lower preference for monitoring of control
by mainland Chinese axial respondents, than by Czech or British axial respondents,
identified in their diagrams of credit control (Table 6.2).
Apart from situations described above involving loss of face, lack of modesty, or
potentially dangerous disclosure of secrets, there were a number of examples where
Chinese managers and business people communicated more than might be expected
71 The other one fifth of opinion was unclear on this.
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by Czech or in some cases British people. Chinese managers remarked on how
Chinese staff often check with their boss before making decisions, even for those
matters that are clearly within their authority (interviews # 771, 832).
Secondly, among senior Chinese executives within a management team there may be
a very short, direct, feedback cycle. This depends upon a clear understanding of
what is required, and that bad as well as good news needs to be communicated in
both directions. This communication may be more rapid, direct and frank than is
typical among Western senior managers (interview # 15).
Thirdly, networks of Chinese contacts can transmit informal information remarkably
quickly. After threatening a non-paying customer in Inner Mongolia, a manager
heard about it the next day from an apparently unconnected source in Beijing
(interview # 786).
Therefore it appears that Chinese reluctance to be open with information may be
reversed where it is a matter of maintaining valuable relationships. This
communication within a relationship, whether between people in different
organisations or between boss and subordinate, may be part of the process by which
the relationship is maintained. These opposing tendencies of general secrecy and of
information exchange in order to maintain relationships are illustrated in Figure 10.1
by the boxes labelled 'Secrecy outside relationships' and 'Information to maintain
relationship'. These opposing tendencies appear to indicate that Chinese managers
tend to see information not as a public commodity, but as losing value when it is
widely held. Therefore, narrowly held information within an exclusive in-group can
be valued where it enhances the knowledge based influence of that in-group.
10.5. 2 Czech attitudes
Czech people tend to be relatively secretive compared to British people (interview #
1077). Among 10 interviewees, 8 by number and nearly half by weight of opinion
thought that Czech people assume or expect information to be narrowly held, that is
not made widely available. About two fifths of the weight of opinion was undecided.
2 interviewees and nearly an eighth of the weight opinion was that Czech people
expect openness in information.
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As example of the moderate trend towards Czech secrecy, it was said that Czech staff
are unwilling to keep their bosses informed. This was attributed to fear of revealing
problems, which, in the previous Communist regime, might raise a lot of problems
for oneself (interview # 423). The pattern of Czech availability of information, being
greater than Chinese but less than British, whether within organisations, between
organisations or in the public sphere, is illustrated in Figure 10.1 by the box labelled
'Some availability of information'.
It was claimed that Czech people tend not to understand why insider dealing is
wrong, as for them information is exclusive, that is personal, rather than a potentially
public commodity (interview # 1019). This may however, also be attributable to
perceiving morality in personal terms rather than in terms of roles.
So, in contrast to the pattern for Chinese attitudes to information, it appears that there
tends not to be a softening of Czech preferences for secrecy where a relationship
between people is involved. Indeed, the law against publication of personal
information (interview # 312) may suggest that secrecy is all the more important
where it involves personal identity.
10.5. 3 British attitudes
All among 7 British interviewees thought that information should be widely
available. The opinion was that monitoring within an organisation should be done
with free flow of information, that is in a way that is generally open or transparent to
all. For example, one of these said that some British managers, similar to some
Chinese managers, like to keep their boss informed so that there are "no surprises"
(interview # 1158). In this case, unlike the Chinese example of keeping bosses
informed, the objective appeared to be to maintain information flows and avoid
surprises rather more than to maintain relationships. From the superior's point of
view it was said
"I think (British managers) need to demonstrate that people have done what
they are supposed to do. .... ought to be able to follow some kind of audit trail"
(interview # 1125).
This British interest in an audit trail probably sits less comfortably with Chinese
concern that there be no potentially incriminating evidence. It was illustrated in an
extreme form by an observation in quite a few British, as well as in many American,
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banks. Apparently supervisors in these banks can send staff, who are working on a
spreadsheet in a networked computer, a message that part of their work is wrong
(interview # 1134).
This flow of information in British organisations may also be more extensive than
required for monitoring. League tables plotting manager's, including senior
managers', performance were pinned up in a UK office beside the coffee machine,
where all staff could not fail to see them (observation # 1291). This was despite
them often causing some embarrassment to managers whose performance appeared
below norm (interview # 1297.2). In contrast, these same league tables were
calculated and used in the organisation's Prague office, where they were referred to
as 'Tables of Shame' but were not posted for all staff to see (interview # 1089). It
appeared that such league tables were not produced for the organisation's Beijing
office (interviews # 768 and 882).
A further mention of British preference for transparency was the view that the
assumptions on which critical decisions were made should be transparent, so that
others could monitor the decisions (interview # 1149).
There may be some connection between British general preferences for transparency
and the British tendency to regulate affairs by means of roles rather than through
personal relationships or relying on principles and personal responsibilities. It was
suggested above (9.7 Roles in organisational structure) that the key elements of
regulation through roles are what actors in a role are expected to do, and their
interests in performing that role. To these might be added transparency of
information, both in order to illuminate the interests that they bring to the role so that
conflicts of interest can be avoided, and in order to monitor their performance in that
role. The latter is part of British meanings for accountability (discussed in 8.3.1
British views). A third of the weight of opinion among British interviewees saw
accountability as a combination of a responsibility owed to somebody, Le. in a role,
together with information or explanation on how that responsibility has been
fulfilled. This proportion of opinion rose to over half for information or explanation
with responsibility not necessarily owed to somebody.
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The wide British availability of information, whether within organisations or
between organisations, is illustrated in Figure 10.1 by the box labelled 'Greatest
availability of information' .
10.6 Accuracy and truth
10.6.1 Chinese qUitudes
It was said that, whereas Westerners may tend to look for absolute truth, Chinese
people look for relative truth dependent upon the particular situation (interview #
786) and upon relationships with people (interview # 930). This is illustrated in
Figure 10.1. Among 7 interviewees, all by number thought that Chinese people tend
to see truth as relative; only one among these 7 had a shade of uncertainty in their
opinion. While a Western person might expect absolute truth in a business partner, a
Chinese person would expect his or her business partner to give support rather than
to stand on principle (interview # 1212). Information may therefore be withheld or
modified in order to maintain the relationship or to protect the provider of
information (interview # 804).
This was also illustrated with an explanation of what happens when auditors ask a
selection of an audit client's customers to confirm trade debtor balances owed to the
audit client. It was maintained that the accuracy of this information given to auditors
in mainland China is not rated very high because Chinese customers, valuing their
relationship with their supplier, that is with the audit client, confirm whatever figure
the supplier wants confirmed. These figures, 'confirmed' by Chinese organisations,
are seen as for audit purposes only, and customers are not held to them by suppliers
seeking debt recovery (interview # 765).
Similarly, as explained above, not much credence is given by investors, lenders and
suppliers to audited accounts of unlisted Chinese companies because these are
prepared only for tax purposes (interview # 885). Furthermore it was said that in the
case of audited accounts of banks, bad debt provisions are only allowed under
mainland Chinese accounting standards if within the 1% general provision allowed
for tax purposes, and the alternative of total write off is seldom taken (interview #
981). And finally, mainland China's bankers apparently do not pay much attention
to the accuracy of financial information they are given by borrowers because of its
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low quality: in some cases the opening balances cannot be reconciled to the closing
balances from the previous financial statements (interview # 981).
It was reported that for construction of a joint venture factory in Shenzhen, southern
China, an independent Singaporean engineering firm questioned stability of the
ground. Yet construction went ahead on the basis of a Chinese Government soil
survey which proved to be less than accurate (Economist # 1266).
The researcher was warned that Chinese people would tell him what they think he
wanted to hear, not what they really think (interviews # 645, 786). This was borne
out during the field work, when Chinese interviewees were more prone than Czech
or British interviewees to appear to give replies that they thought the researcher
wanted to hear (interview # 960, 819).
/ Q 6. 2 Czech attitudes
In contrast, there were Czech concerns about accuracy (document # 477) and truth.
For example (interview # 1029),
"You cannot have liars in your department".
An interviewee referred to the phrase
Pravda zvitezi, Truth will prevail',
which he attributed as the words of the Czech martyr Jan Hus dying at the stake in
1415, and as adopted by both Masaryk, the first president of Czechoslovakia, and the
last, Havel, now president of the Czech Republic (interview # 480). These words
popularly attributed to Jan Hus appeared to have considerable significance to Czech
people. Interpretations by interviewees were as follows. A man will be judged
according to how good he is, rather than according to whether he followed the
prevalent religious practice of the time of buying indulgences (interview # 480).
'Truth will prevail' is a statement of religious conviction in the face of severe
persecution (interview # 1297.2). In it 'truth' means ethical behaviour, so Jan Hus
would have accepted that he was a heretic, and hence unethical, if his accusers could
prove it from the scriptures; 'Truth will prevail' therefore represents a Czech search
for morality and personal truth (interview # 10/9). The words of Jan Hus were also
quoted as "Pravda nadevse" implying truth above all principles (interview # 570).
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These meanings of truth as true to God, to the scriptures, to one's convictions, or to
oneself, are forms of absolute truth. That is, immutable by change of situation or of
interpersonal relationship. This absolute truth is illustrated in Figure 10.1. Among
10 interviewees, 9 described Czech attitudes to truth in absolute terms. Just 1 of the
10, and a seventh by weight of opinion, was uncertain in their description of this.
Absolute truth is probably reflected in the moral undertones to responsibility for
Czech people. It will be remembered that the Czech view of responsibility tended to
be understanding what one as an individual should do as a duty to oneself, to one's
immediate community and possibly to society at large (8.2.2 Czech views).
Truth, in the sense of being honest to oneself, was reflected in the complaint of an
interviewee about an internal newsletter publicising a new organisational structure:
"The words attributed to me were not mine; they had been put to me by
someone from (head office), and I said 'OK if you want'. But they were not
what I really thought. The worst was that in these words I was supposed to
have said, that 1 would get to work with (others from other countries), but
nothing has happened ........ Now we hear all this about the new organisation
that will come .... that it is much better and hence the old was bad, but can
we believe it? II (interview # 1068).
This complaint was accompanied by a comparison to the previous Communist
regime. A similar comparison was made when a budget was imposed so that
unrealistic details had to be used in order to arrive at the imposed total:
"it isjust like Communism; I can get the right answerfor you ";
while those Czechs who did not joke were upset by the need for dishonesty
(interview # 555). Both of these examples show how concern for truth was
expressed as a rejection of practices under the previous Communist regime.
Examples were also given of frustration with business plans set to please bosses
rather than to spell out truthfully what was known to be inevitable (interview # 291),
and of paucity of honesty by managers in explaining matters to staff (interview #
1068). Staff in some companies were dissatisfied with how little information was
given to them (interview # 561). In another case
"They will not explain why there is no salary increase when at the same time
saying we have done well. It would be better to say that we have not done
well, then we would know where we stand and we might try harder to
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improve the situation ... We have these meetings to explain ... we put our
questions in writing, but the really difficult questions are not answered"
(interview # 1035).
These reactions to lack of honesty are illustrated in Figure 10.1. Yet, at the same
time it was admitted that Czech people could lie just as frequently as other people
(interviews # 555, 567).
10.7 Transparency, trust and relationships
10.Z 1 Chinese attitudes
The view expressed by an interviewee, that trust is more important to Chinese people
than transparency (interview # 801), is an example of a view probably widely held
that Chinese control mechanisms rely more on implicit relationships between people
than on explicit and clear reporting of information.
A Western manager said how an investment proposal, which his Chinese subordinate
persuaded him to approve, turned out one year later to bear no relation to the
proposed plan; "It was a pack of lies!" he exclaimed. A Chinese interviewee
suggested that the proposal might have been justified, although it was misleading in
its inaccuracy. if it had for example built a relationship and thereby created
opportunities (interview # 993). Another interviewee's explanation for this was that
the Western boss and Chinese subordinate had probably not developed mutual
thinking and understanding. In this case, the Chinese subordinate would be reluctant
to trust his Western boss with his feelings, which would not be understood (interview
# 801). This may be an example of the Western boss not being established as a
member of the subordinate's in-group.
Chinese reliance on trust in relationships more than on apparent certainty of
transparent information appears to be consistent with Chinese attitudes to
relationships and contracts with external parties. It will be remembered that
mainland Chinese managers tended to place more reliance on relationships, including
those involving guan xi or ren qing, than on contracts (7.2 Chinese views). As a
further example, it was explained how Chinese purchasers prefer complex
arrangements with multiple importers, rather than transparent arrangements, in part
to confuse Chinese Customs authorities (interview # 684). Therefore, it seem to be
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clear within the data of this study, that Chinese managers tend to look for
relationships on which to build control assurance rather more than for transparent
information.
/0. 7.2 Czech attitudes
It will be remembered that Czech managers tended to place greater reliance on
contracts than on relations with external parties, to assume self interest in these
relations and to place low trust people outside their organisation (7.3 Czech views;
7.4.1 Trust and relationships). While Czech people were compared to British people
as generally trusting nobody (interview # /0/9), there may be more trust within
Czech organisations than in the market place (interview # 56/). Czech trust within
organisations was linked to status of seniority within the organisational hierarchy,
that is a more senior manager was deemed more trustworthy (interview # 1089).
10.7.3 British attitudes
The British views, described so far in this chapter, are illustrated in Figure 10.1 by
the box labelled 'Transparency'. These views include the importance of being open
with information (documents # 48, 57, 229, 230; WWW # 28; interviews # 69, 108,
147, 1134, 1158) and being open to scrutiny (interview # 1/49) by all even where
this may cause embarrassment (interview # 1297.3). As explained above (9.3.1
British views and empowerment), British views on empowering subordinates appear
to be based upon some degree of reciprocal trust. In some cases this trust may be
backed up by monitoring and independent verification (interviews # 879, 1125).
Openness and transparency is also implicit in providing explanation or information
on how responsibilities have been fulfilled, which was included in more than half by
weight of opinion of British interviewees' understanding of accountability (8.3.1
British Views).
The British views on the importance of transparency and widely held information
may now be used to develop further the findings on information and relationships
inherent in roles. Views on transparency indicate a British tendency to see openness
with information as enhancing its value. Firstly, transparency may increase the
opportunities for recipients to challenge the accuracy or relevance of information,
thus enhancing its value as a reliable addition to knowledge. Secondly, wide access
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to a piece of information may increase opportunities for the information to be used as
part of valuable knowledge. This contrasts with what may be a Chinese tendency to
see the value of information enhanced by the narrowness with which it is held.
It is submitted here that most British people would put greater priority to truth and
transparency than to trust in relationships with other people. This neither belittles the
reverse order of values, nor imply that British people are more naive than say Czechs
or Chinese to assume that information communicated transparently is accurate.
Just as it has been suggested above that transparency of information may be
necessary for roles to contribute towards control assurance, so also roles may be
necessary for transparent information to contribute to control assurance. In this, trust
may playa part. On the assumption that transparent information is of limited value
to British managers unless they can place some trust in its accuracy, the role of the
information provider takes on importance. This role identifies the levels of integrity
(interviews # 549, 1128) and timeliness that information providers are expected to
achieve. In many cases, recipients recognise that the role of the information provider
affects interests in providing the information and influences their own interpretive
perspective (interview # 114).
10.8 Cultural and other contextual factors
This section summarises and discusses cultural and other contextual factors, in order
to outline the context for these views on the importance of information for control
assurance.
J 0 8. J Chinese context
Very low availability of information was seen in mainland China. It was seen that
this restricted the extent that external information could be relied upon for
management control systems.
Reluctance to provide information was related to Chinese fear of losing face and to
traditional Chinese modesty. Low public availability of information and disclosure
of information between organisations was also related to regulation, to government
agencies for publication of ownership and of court cases and to markets. These
factors are illustrated in Figure 10.1.
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Restricting availability of information only to in-groups appears to be related to
Group Orientation (5.1 Mainland Chinese culture - 2. Group orientation) and hence
to Collectivism. Cragin found Collectivism to be much greater in mainland China
than Hofstede found for the UK (Table 5.2). Trompenaars found it to be much
greater for mainland China than the UK or the Czech Republic (Table 5.3).
Seeing truth in relative terms may be a feature of Particularism, which was found in
the cultural survey to be significantly greater for mainland Chinese culture than
Czech culture (Table 6.1). Collectivism and Particularism, with also their
counterparts of Individualism and Universalism, are therefore included in Figure
10.1.
/0. 8.2 Czech context
Czech Regulation, government agencies and markets have been identified as factors
in the lower availability of information in the Czech Republic than in the UK. These
factors are illustrated in Figure 10.1. Where information is not generally available
outside an organisation, expectations are restricted in terms of what external
information can be relied on for operation of management control systems (interview
# 291). This was seen in the smaller extent that the credit reference agency reports
were used in the Czech Republic (manual # 309; interview # 339) than in the UK
(manual # 48). It also affects the willingness of people to disclose information
(interview # 264). Also interviewees identified attitudes, remaining from the
previous Czech Communist regime, that did not encourage publication of
information. No doubt these factors are themselves both partly the result of cultural
factors, and in turn intervene in the influence of culture on perceptions of
management control.
For example, Czech cultural values ofIndividualism (Table 5.3) and Universalismf
(Table 6.1) may have combined with historically embedded philosophies, such as of
Hus, Masaryk and Havel, to work as factors towards a moral concern for truth. The
Czech views of truth to oneself, and for some people truth to their God, are also
72 Universalism is the view that what is right is not dependent on particular situations




consistent with Individualism. These cultural dimensions are included as contextual
factors in Figure 10.1
Therefore, using the analysis of change adopted by Seal et al. (1995), interpretive
schemes of these Czech managers working for Western MNCs include beliefs shaped
by historical events, embedded Czech thinking and Czech cultural values. Czech
managers have faced immense change starting with the Velvet Revolution of 1989,
which allowed a return to interpretive schemes from before 1938 and foreign
domination. They faced further change when starting to work for foreign MNCs,
which brought new design archetypes of Western management and management
control systems. These changes were manifest in tangible elements, such as Western
style budgets and collection of trade credit (interviews # 312, 354). Second order
change has been introduced by these two environmental jolts, leading to change of
interpretive schemes as well as of design archetypes and tangible subsystems. This
analysis shows how these changes in economic, market and organisational
environment may have affected deep seated beliefs and values. However, traditional
Czech values of universal truth were still found in the managers' interpretive
schemes.
It therefore appears that there has been a complex interplay of cultural values,
philosophies of truth, and social and market changes, in the context for the Czech
views found here on the importance of truth to control assurance. It is not hard to
imagine attitudes of Czech managers working for foreign MNCs, such as found here,
having some impact on Czech markets, on cultural values of Czech people in
general, and on Czech society. Indeed Vhlcil (1996) identifies such influences on
Czech industrial relations, while Firth (1996) found influence of foreign owned joint
ventures in mainland China on management accounting in Chinese state owned
enterprises. This would complete a cycle of interaction between cultural and other
social factors on attitudes to management control, and of management control on
cultural and social factors (Bhimani, 1999). It would challenge assumptions of uni-
directional views of deterministic causation typical of realist ontology for research
into cross-national management control (see 2.5.3 Determinism).
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10.9 Relating findings on information to the literature
The findings here on attitudes to information are compared to literature on
differences between national cultures and countries in attitudes to information. This
point therefore marks a break in avoiding reference to existing theory, apart from
references to theory for explaining the context of the findings. The purpose from
here in this chapter is to corroborate the findings and to relate them to existing
knowledge.
However, before comparing specific findings to existing literature, it is interesting to
compare the scope of findings to literature. It was noted above that findings for this
key category of information have emerged concerning informal communication, not
formal information systems. This was because the grounded theory research
approach was sensitive to what managers considered to be important to providing
control assurance. It appears that they were more concerned with informal than
formal control methods. This appears to be consistent with the views of Jones and
Dugdale (1995, page 321) that:
"Although traditional formal controls may remain in place they are seen as
less relevant to current needs ".
/ 0.9. / Codification olin/ormation and High or Low Context Communication
Boisot and Child (1988 and 1996) found lack of codification of information in
mainland Chinese prices, markets and administrative regulations. They attribute this
at least partly to High Context Communication. Accordingly, transactions tend to be
conducted on a personal ad hoc basis rather than standardised and in large numbers
through impersonal markets.
Hall (1977) contrasts High Context Communication culture, typical of oriental
cultures and exemplified by Chinese culture, to Low Context Communication that is
typical of Western cultures. In High Context Communication, much of the message
is understood from the context or from how the message is communicated. Whereas
Low Context Communication requires the message to contain a greater volume of
relatively context independent information. Low context communication reduces to
codes a greater extent of meaning, which High Context Communication leaves to be
understood by implication. Chinese languages are particularly high context. In
contrast to using an alphabet of 26 letters in the English language, or 31 in the Czech
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language (Poldauf, 1986), Chinese written language uses many thousand ideographs
or characters, each of which indicate a meaning. Chinese is also extremely rich in
homophones; these are words with different meanings but identical pronunciation,
such as 'beach' and 'beech' in English. In Mandarin Chinese or Putonghua, the
official language in mainland China and which is indigenous to Beijing, virtually
every spoken word represents several written characters, each with a different
meaning. For example, xi with the first tone is the spoken word for 48 written
characters, including Wmeaning West, IN. meaning to inhale, ~ meaning all or
entirely, ~ meaning rhinoceros, and ~ meaning tin (Wu, 1985). Therefore, as with
all homophones, the meaning when heard has to be inferred from the context.
The implications, as Hall (1977) explains, extend far beyond the spoken language: it
affects communication and behaviour. Boisot and Child (1996) refer to lack of
codification of information in mainland China as explanation for slow progress
towards western style markets that require high codification of information; instead
transactions and markets are mediated through personal relationships rather than
codified information supported by legally sanctioned rights. High Context
Communication, such as in Chinese cultures, suggests that management control in
these societies may be less likely to use market control mechanisms (Ouchi, 1979),
which rely on high volumes of codified information. Redding and Martyn-Johns
(1979) claim that Chinese businesses in South East Asia operate with very little
formalised information.
Examples referred to in this study of relatively codified information included audited
company accounts, standardised bank references, credit reference agency reports,
and ownership of land and of mortgages recorded in public registers. The research in
this study provides some empirical evidence of high availability of such codified
information in the UK, rather less availability in the Czech Republic, and least in
mainland China.
Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming) provide more up to date information, than that
collected in this field work, on availability of published trade credit control
information about companies in mainland China. This is reproduced in Table 10.2.
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in 1beU~ in mainland Cbina
Published Audited accounts published Accounts published only for
accounts and available from a public listed companies. Accounts of
registrar other enterprises prepared
primarily for tax purposes
Information from Sometimes willing to provide Normally secretive
customers management information.
Bank references Widely used Banks only state the balance
given to suppliers on an account, not give a
reference on credit worthiness
Credit rating Well established Agencies are appearing; many
services have relatively limited sources
of information, understanding
the local situation is critical.
Table 10.2: Availability of information for trade credit control
(Emmanuel, et aI., forthcoming)
The British concern for transparency, in order to provide control assurance, requires
a relatively higher communication of information than the Czech concern for truth.
Chinese concern for relationships appears to imply context rich information that is
relatively difficult to codify. Therefore findings here of a pattern from British
openness with information, through less concern for openness by Czech managers, to
Chinese relative secrecy outside relationships, is consistent with literature on High or
Low Context Communication and on codification of information.
10.9.2 Transoarency or secrecv
... Si-
Chow et al. (1995; also Roberts et aI., 1998) use the cultural model of Gray (1988) to
explain relative secrecy and limited disclosure in Chinese financial accounting. For
example, there is no requirement to disclose either market value of investments or
liabilities secured on a company's assets, and obtaining information on the state-
owned sector has been almost out of the question. The tendency of the Chinese
government towards secrecy is noted by Child and Lu (1996), while Carver (1996)
compares secrecy of Chinese neibu regulations to transparency expected in the West.
Clarke (1996) reports that mainland Chinese courts and police appear to face
extraordinary difficulties in getting access to records of bank accounts. Within
predominantly mainland Chinese owned business enterprises, Emmanuel et a1.
(forthcoming) found that a preference that information be narrowly held, which is
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only partially explained by size of company, whereas British managers prefer that
information be published.
Child and Lu (1996) show that information flows for mainland Chinese management
are mainly vertical with little horizontal flow, compared to multi-directional flows
for Western management. Harrison and McKinnon (1999) explain that Chinese
hierarchy blocks free flow of information within organisations: subordinates are less
likely to volunteer opinions as they will face the full wrath of their boss if wrong.
Beamer (1998) reports how Chinese staff may be reluctant to inform their boss of
problems, because the messenger tends to be associated with the problem, while the
boss alone is credited for the solutino. Schein (1993) points out that concern for face
can lead to withholding any information that could disturb the social order. Chowet
al. (1999a) show that concerns for face, for the influence of their bosses, and for
interpersonal relationships, discouraged Taiwanese managers from open exchange of
negative information. However their study also showed an extensive view among
these Taiwanese managers that open sharing of information between colleagues is
good for the company.
Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming) also found that British managers more than Chinese
managers tend to rely on independence of source for information reliability, and to
attach greater importance to transparency for information usefulness.
Therefore this literature is consistent with the findings here of British managers
tending to view transparency as important, in contrast to Chinese managers tending
to be less open with information outside relationships.
10.9. 3 Czech attitudes to truth
Findings here of Czech concern for truth in information used for management
control, are consistent with a deep vein of literature on general Czech concern for
truth, which was discussed in 5.2.3 Truth. In addition Sucher et al. (1998, pages 4 to
5) report on "closed dealings and lack of transparency" in the Czech economy, which
is consistent with what was found in this study. They explain how the regulatory
requirements for publication of audited accounts by Czech companies was
developing through 1996, and that all but registered investors in publicly quoted
companies found it difficult to obtain audited accounts of companies, and even in
these cases information was usually incomplete. They attribute this situation to "a
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residue of the traditional enterprise attitude to secrecy from before the Velvet
Revolution of 1989" (ibid. page 18), to lack of penalties for non-filing of annual
reports, and to confusion arising from rapid legislation since 1989.
10.10 Relating findings on information to cultural theory
Whereas the previous section related findings to literature on attitudes to
information, this next section relates findings to cultural theory, in particular to
Hofstede's (1991) and Trompenaars (1993) cultural dimensions and to implications
claimed by theorists for these dimensions. These subjects have been separated both
because of the extent of prior literature and theory, but also because the sections have
slightly different objectives. That for the previous section was to corroborate
findings on information, and to relate these to existing knowledge. This section aims
firstly to corroborate the cultural dimensions identified as part of the context
described for these attitudes and perceptions, and secondly to see how far existing
cultural theory is supported by findings in this study.
10.10. 1 High - Low Context Communication - need to communicate
High Context Communication has been linked by Hofstede (1991) to Collectivist
cultures and Low Context Communication to Individualist cultures. Trompenaars
and Hampden-Turner (1997) link High Context Communication to Diffuse culture
and Low Context Communication to Specific culture. These theoretical positions are
consistent with the findings here of greater British than Chinese concern for
transparency and high availability of codified information. This is because British
culture was found to be more Specific than Chinese culture (Table 6.2), and
Trompenaars found it to be more Individualistic (Table 5.3). However, the pattern
found here for Czech transparency and availability of information falling between
that of British and Chinese cultures appears not to support links with these cultural
dimensions so clearly. Although the cultural survey (Table 6.1) found Czech culture
to be less Specific than British culture, the difference was not significant, while in
Trompenaars' findings (Table 5.3) the difference was negligible. Furthermore, he
found Czech culture to be considerably more Individualistic than British culture. An
association between transparency and Specific culture is supported by the
corroborative statistical tests, which will be described in Chapter 13. These found a
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correlation, although not significant, between Specific - Diffuse and transparency
(Table 13.7)
Boisot and Child (1988 and 1996) attribute lack of Chinese codification of
information to Particularism, and to propensity for both hierarchies of personal
authority and networks of personal relationships, as well as to High Context
Communication. They may therefore add the cultural dimension of Universalism -
Particularism to the explanations for openness and transparency. While being
supported by the measurement here and by Trompenaars for British and Chinese
culture, it does little to explain the Czech pattern, because Czech Universalism was
found here to be greater than British (Table 6.2) and found by Trompenaars to be
similar to Chinese Particularism (Table 5.3).
10.10.2 WiWngness to communjcate information
Several theorists (Trompenaars 1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997;
Chow et al. 1999a) maintain that Collectivism may be associated with general
sharing of information. However, the findings here suggest that this may tend to
apply for mainland Chinese managers only if the sharing is within established
relationships.
Hofstede (1991) links Collectivism with greater sensitivity to the giving of bad news.
This is supported by qualitative findings here and by Trompenaars' measurement of
Chinese Collectivism (Table 5.3). This sensitivity appears to be part of concern for
saving face, the literature on which has been discussed above (8.5.1 Responsibility).
It was shown that association between concern for face and Collective, Ascribed and
Diffuse culture are consistent with measures of Chinese culture. This association of
both Ascribed - Achieved and Diffuse - Specific cultural dimension with secrecy
rather than transparency are supported by correlations found in the corroborative
statistical tests (Table 13.7). Although that with Diffuse - Specific was not quite
significant, that with Ascribed - Achieved was very significant (p = 0.002).
It seems logical that concern for secrecy and avoidance of attention would be higher
in high Uncertainty Avoidance cultures. Gray (1988) postulates that high secrecy in
financial accounting systems is more likely to occur in cultures of higher Uncertainty
Avoidance and Power Distance and of lower Individualism and Masculinity. This is
supported by Cragin's (1986) finding of very high mainland Chinese Uncertainty
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Avoidance. Gray's addition of Power Distance to the factors, and the findings here
for high mainland Chinese Hierarchy (Table 6.2), help explain Czech availability of
information and preference for transparency falling between that of British and
Chinese society.
10.10.3 Value o..(and use/or in/ormation
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) suggest that the value and use to which
information on industries is put may vary between Achieved and Ascribed status
cultures. In the former, information on achievements, such as past performance of
industries, shows where there is success and is valuable to guide reaction. In the
latter, information on industrial capabilities is valued because it may be useful for
proactive action. This comparison is one between deviation reducing use of
feedback information, and deviation enhancing use of feed forward information
(Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 1993 and 1997). It may also give further
insight to Chinese preference for secrecy compared to European preference for
openness and British concern for transparency. Within an Achieved culture,
information, like people, may gain status from standing up to wide scrutiny and
challenge. It may gain in status from remaining as an accurate record of facts in the
face of comparison to other information sources, and from surviving those who seek
to falsify it. It gains status with publication. In contrast, in an Ascribed status
culture, information may gain status for the potential value it offers to the holder; this
value may be dissipated if the information is spread widely. This conjecture is
consistent with the findings of the cultural survey (Table 6.1) and with Trompenaars'
findings (Table 5.3) of status in British culture being relative Achieved, in Chinese
culture being relatively Ascribed, and falling between these in Czech culture. It is
also consistent with the significant correlation found in the corroborative statistical
tests (Table 13.7) between absolute truth and the Achieved - Ascribed cultural
dimension.
10.10.4 Truth
Smith and Berg (1997) point out that concern for saving face may be an opposing
cultural attribute to concern for honesty. In which case, concern for absolute truth
may be associated with the opposite poles of cultural dimensions from those
associated with face. This is consistent with the findings here of Czech compared to
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Chinese culture being significantly more Specific (Table 6.1), and with
Trompenaars' finding of it being more Individualist, Achieved and Specific (Table
5.3). This is supported by the correlation found, although not significant, between
Specific culture and absolute truth, and by the significant correlation found between
Achieved status and absolute truth, in the corroborative statistical tests (Table 13.7).
Concern for truth, which was found here to be a distinguishing characteristic of
Czech managers' perception of control assurance, has been linked by Hofstede
(1991) to low Power Distance, Individualism, high Uncertainty Avoidance,
Christianity particularly Catholicism, Western logic and short term orientation for
Confucian Dynamism. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) link concern for
truth to Universalism and Protestant Christianity. The Czech concern for truth,
found here and strongly supported in literature, is consistent with Hofstede's
postulated link between truth and Individualism and with Trompenaars' measure of
Czech Individualism (Table 5.3). It is also consistent with Trompenaars' postulated
link between truth and Universalism and findings here of high Czech Universalism
(Table 6.1), although not so consistent with Trompenaars' measure of Czech
Universalism (Table 5.3). While Czech lands were officially and predominantly
Catholic under the Hapsburgs, the views of Jan Hus (13469 - 1415) have had a
lasting influence on Czech thinking and identity (Krejci, 1990; Pynsent, 1994).
Besides being an exponent of truth, Hus inspired and showed the way for Luther and
Protestantism (Masaryk, 1978a and 1978b). Czech adherence to Catholicism fell
with the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when 20% of the Czech population left the
Catholic Church in the early 1920s, although many returned with popular reaction
against repression following the Prague Spring of 1968 (Krejci, 1990). Today most
of the population is not religious, with nominally fewer Catholics at 39% than the
48% nominal Anglicans and other Protestants in the UK (CIA, 1999;
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). It would therefore probably be misleading to look
to religion to explain Czech concern with truth today. Instead the thinking and
philosophies of Hus, Masaryk and Havel may be better indicators, as well as cultural
dimensions of Individualism as measured by Trompenaars (Table· 5.3) and
Universalism as measured here (Table 6.1).
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This comparison of findings to cultural theory therefore gives some mixed support
for cultural dimensions postulated by theorists as explanations for the attitudes and
perceptions represented by these findings.
10.11 Relating findings on information to empirical research
Horovitz (1980) compared the sort of information and use of information in West
German, French and British companies. Ahrens (1996) describes some differences
between German and British brewers in the use of information in accountability.
This study explores new ground in extending comparison to countries where
availability of information and concepts of accountability are less widespread.
Birnberg and Snodgrass (1988) found that homogeneity of Japanese compared to US
culture leads to greater emphasis and resources spent on implicit communication.
They conclude that perhaps Japanese companies need information to aid decision
making throughout the organisation, whereas US companies need information for
controlling behavioural congruence. This is because there is wider acceptance of
corporate goals and greater propensity for co-operation than in US companies.
Findings here, although put in terms of secrecy and transparency, and discussed in
terms of High and Low Context Communication, add weight to cultural comparisons
of explicit or implicit information.
Chow et al. (1999a) found Taiwanese Chinese managers to be less open and sharing
of information in face to face meetings than were Australian managers. They
attribute this to differences in corporate cultures, and to national cultural attributes of
face, Individualism, and Power Distance. Their finding has a parallel here in
reluctance of mainland Chinese, compared to British and Czech, managers and staff
to offer information, at least where that is not within an in-group, although it is less
clear that Individualism is implicated.
Further support is provided by Morris et al. (1998), who found that MBA students in
mainland China were more likely to adopt an avoiding conflict style in conflict
management, than were US, Philippine or Indian MBA students. This is consistent
with Chinese staff and managers being reluctant to challenge or put forward




Horovitz (1980) and Ahrens (1996) identify use of different sorts of information for
management control by German and British managers, in terms of whether it is
quantitative or qualitative, financial or operational, and whether it refers to past
events or future projections. The findings here extend these differences to whether
information is valued for being transparent or merely accurate, or whether it might be
used to maintain a relationship. This study also extends empirical research on the
types of information used for management control to outside Western Europe.
Therefore, while the narrow range of existing research limits the comparisons that
can be made with this study, some consistency can be seen, and this study extends
the findings of prior research. However, an explanation in terms of the cultural
dimension of Individualism (Chow et al. 1999) could not be supported by the present
study.
10.12 Conclusions on information
Wide recognition was found of the importance of information to management
control. Yet distinct patterns emerged between managers from different countries in
perceptions of what sort of information provides control assurance.
There was a pattern of British managers preferring and expecting wide availability of
information. In some cases this was beyond what was needed for monitoring;
transparency was itself seen to be important in providing control assurance. In
contrast Chinese managers tended to prefer information to be narrowly held.
Chinese examples of rapid voluntary communication tended to be within established
relationships. Czech managers' attitudes to availability of information generally fell
between the British and Chinese preferences, as illustrated in Figure 10.1.
However, truth in information and communication generally seemed more important
than transparency to Czech managers' control assurance. In contrast to Czech
expectation of absolute truth, mainland Chinese managers tended to expect relative
truth. A pattern was therefore seen of British managers tending to look more to
transparency for control assurance, where Chinese managers would tend to look
more to relationships, and Czech managers would tend to look for absolute truth.
Comparison of findings to existing literature showed considerable consistency.
Discussion of the context for these findings showed complex interaction between
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cultural, historical, social and market factors. However, explanations in terms of
cultural dimensions, whether by cultural theorists or in prior empirical research, were
not always supported by the findings of this study.
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11.1 Introduction
The structure of this chapter is similar to previous chapters on key categories. After
this introductory section, findings are explained in 3 sections. Contextual factors are
then summarised, before findings are compared to literature, to cultural theory, and
to empirical research. The chapter closes with a summary of conclusions.
11.1 1 The keV category oJ/aw. rules and procedures
This key category is concerned with differences, between managers of the 3 national
cultures, in attitudes to matters ranging from the rule of law to internal procedures,
and how these differences affect their control assurance.
Among the 30 axial respondents, preferences for procedures as a control element
show a significant difference between national cultures (Table 6.2). Procedures were
included in the diagrams of perceptions of credit control for 10 out of 11 British and
by 7 out of 10 Czech axial respondents, but by only 3 out of 9 Chinese axial
respondents. Furthermore, in the course of the field work, it appeared that Chinese
attitudes to the rule of law, legal process and regulation tended to be rather different
from British and Czech attitudes, and that these had a key bearing on perceptions of
what provides control assurance. Attitudes to the law, and to external and internal
rules including procedures were therefore chosen as a key category for inquiry and
selective coding.
11. /. 2 Interviewees
Selective coding for this key category drew on the views expressed by all 30 of the
axial respondents and by a further 43 other interviewees. These are analysed in
Table 11.1.
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LQcatiQn ~ ~ Mainland ~ Of which: Location
Qrgani~atiQO Cbine~e ~ Eemale IQ1g1
UK: CoX 12 10 2
CoY 6 2 1 7 2
Other 1 1 1 1 23
Prague: CoX 1 8 7 2
CoY 3 6 3 10 2
Other 2 5 6 1 28
Beijing: CoX 2 7 6 9 6
CoY 0 4 1 2 3
Other 1 1 21
Elsewhere Other 1 1 1
--- ----
TOTAL 26 20 16 11 54 19 73
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Table 11.1: Interviewees for selective coding on law, rules and procedures
]1.].3 Overvjew diagram
An overview of the key category of law, rules and procedures is given in Figure 11.1.
As with the overview diagrams for other key categories, this illustrates only
differences in perception between managers from mainland China, the Czech
Republic and the UK.
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LAW&
PROCEDURES
Figure 11.1: Differences in perceptions oflaw, rules and procedures 73
11.2 Chinese attitudes
J 1.2. 1 Low respect (or law
Interviewees commented on the relatively low regard by Chinese people, compared
to Westerners, for the rule of law (interview # 801). One interviewee said that in
China it is people who rule, ren zhi A ff:t , not the law, fa zhi t!ff:t (interview #
J 119). This is used as a label for the box 'People more than rules' in Figure 11.1.
Consequently personal vengeance is more prominent than in most Western countries
(interview # 930), and as an interviewee commented (interview # 855):
"the legal system is not established so (Chinese people) use common sense".
Greater Chinese regard for people than for the rule is reflected in the tendency to rely
on personal relationships more than on contracts (6.2.1 Trust, relationships and
73 The use of boxes, ovals and arrows in this diagram follows the convention used and
explained for Figure 7.1.
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contracts). Reliance on relationships is an example of how mainland Chinese
managers gain control assurance without placing great reliance on laws, regulations
and rules.
Interviewees attributed these attitudes to the different historical development of
China compared to Western Europe and USA, where legal systems have developed
over centuries. An interviewee expected development of legal institutions and
cultural attitudes in China will take many years, perhaps even a century (interview #
1116). On the other hand, changing attitudes, under the influence of television soap
operas such as LA Law, were associated with increasing litigiousness as evidenced
by rising divorce rates in mainland China (interview # 993). There is also increasing
familiarity of mainland Chinese business people, discussed above, for contracts
following examples set by Western companies (interviews # 981, 885, 987).
In contrast to Chinese attitudes, foreign joint ventures fear they are more liable to be
made examples if they transgress, so they have a much stronger feeling that they
must abide by the letter of the Chinese law (Economist # 1006).
1/.2.2 Problems with courts
Besides greater regard for people than for the rule of law within mainland Chinese
society, there was evidence of problems with using its legal system.
Some interviewees thought that Chinese courts could be biased against foreigners,
show favouritism to local interests, be short of judicial experience in commercial
matters, be reluctant to hand down judgements preferring instead the parties to reach
agreement through mediation, and be reluctant to enforce judgements. Two of them
referred to and supported the arguments of Clarke (1996) on the difficulties of
enforcing Chinese court judgements (interview # 684), which were reflected in
comments on the difficulty of collecting debts through the courts (interviews # 777,
702). The story was recounted of a Belgian who won an action for return of the
purchase price for property near Beijing that he had ostensibly been sold for US
$400,000. One year later he had received only 15% of his award, while the
defendant had transferred money into a new company in order to escape the court
order. The court then suggested that he might accept lower damages (interview #
684; China Business Summary # 687). Both CoX and CoY very seldom, if ever,
seek redress through the courts or arbitration in China (interviews # 645, 684).
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However, in addition to these limitations of the Chinese courts, a Chinese dislike of
public dispute appeared to reduce Chinese reliance on legal remedies for
management control, which is explained next.
11. 2, 3 Using relationships and mediation rather than public disDute
Chinese dislike of resolving disputes through the courts was discussed above in
connection with regulating business relations with external parties (7.2.1
Relationships and contracts). Reasons included the importance to mainland Chinese
managers of guan xi and ren qing relationships, and the likelihood that taking people
to court would destroy relationships (interviews # 756, 771, 777, 804, 1155).
Further reasons emerged indicating fundamental distaste for confrontational dispute
processes that underlie Western ideas of legal process. Firstly, there was the feeling
that to admit in public to a dispute results in loss of face.
"It is very shameful for both parties if they have to go to arbitration, making it
very difficult for them to co-operate in future. The court is even more serious
...it's shame .... They don't like to expose the problem to the public II (interview
#771).
Secondly there was the feeling that mediated solutions are preferable to imposed
solutions. Mediation is deep seated within the mainland judicial system (interview #
684). Both of these reasons are consistent with relationships between people being
of greater importance to mainland Chinese people than the rule of law.
This preference for using relationships and mediation is illustrated by the box
'Mediation and relationships' in Figure 11.1. It represents an alternative to
confrontational legal processes as a way of gaining control assurance when disputes
threaten achievement of objectives for the organisation.
11.2,4 Plethora ofregylations
There appears to be a paradox however between these preferences for using
relationships and private negotiation and, on the other hand, a Chinese propensity to
issue large volumes of regulations (interviews # 786, 879). This is illustrated by the
box 'Masses of rules' in Figure 11.1. An interviewee commented that the road safety
rule book is 5 inches thick (interview # 930). Regulations and procedures within
organisations were described as tending towards ever more detail (interview # 777).
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This paradox is deepened by Chinese managers tending to feel that procedures
usually involve too many people, are seen as taking too long and as a waste of time
(interview # 771). There is a Chinese tendency to dislike cold regulation within
organisations, which is discussed next.
11. 2. 5 Feeling and relationshjp more than internal rules and procedures
There was repeated mention that Chinese people follow, or prefer to follow,
instructions where there is the warmth of a personal relationship, rather than
following cold regulations (interview # 15, 1155,). This is illustrated by the box
'Resent procedures without feeling' in Figure 11.1. Examples included the
following:
"Managers have to rule from the heart; its meaningless to just tell them. More
important who gives the policy than whether the rule is good. Chinese respect
the person, Westerners respect the law. " (interview # 801)
"Chinese staff want to help their manager, understanding is more important
than rules. " (interview # 1320)
"Employees have their own thoughts, feelings and way of life. To ignore this,
that is making a system inhumane, is terrible. " (interview # 777)
"It is more important who sets the procedures, than what the procedures are. "
(interview # 1119).
The verb 'to lead' Ling Dao ~J!Jif-, is preferred by Chinese people to 'to control'
Kong Zhi 1£ itJIJ, as the latter implies controlling the person (interview # 876), and
nobody likes being just told what to do (interviews # 1155, 855). These views on
preferring directions from a person, given with feeling, and dislike of anonymous
rules are examples of the Chinese preference for rule by people not laws.
However, this dislike of anonymous rules may be unexpressed. It was remarked that
Chinese people are taught to do obey a person in authority, and not to express their
own opinions or object (interview # 876).
"In China people will implement a system that they do not like, but resent it
without speaking out" (interview # 777).
Dislike of procedures is reflected by the infrequent mention of procedures by the 9
Chinese axial respondents in axial coding, which was noted at the beginning of this
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chapter. It also appeared in analysis of weights of opinion among 13 interviewees,
which showed only a little more than one third of the view that Chinese managers see
procedures and internal regulations as important to providing control assurance.
Several explanations appeared for a Chinese tendency to issue lots of procedures in
the face of this cultural dislike for regulation. Firstly, it appeared that procedures
were looked to where there was lack of leadership and relationships were not
working (interview # 717). Secondly, a manager may tend to prefer the organisation
to issue a procedure, if there is any risk that a personal approach, using his or her
relationships with staff, may not work. This is therefore a tactic to reduce risk of
losing face (interview # 879). This may also reflect the greater concern for people
and relationships than for rules: whereas failure in the use of personal relationships
would undermine a Chinese managers' influence for maintaining management
control, regulations can be referred to when appropriate in order to bolster control by
means of people and relationships. Therefore, managers or officials may feel they
have to issue regulations in large number and great detail if they are insufficiently
confident of the strength of their relationships for gaining control assurance. There
is, thirdly, the ambiguous nature of much Chinese regulation together with human
interpretation, which opens flexibility for how it is applied; this point is returned to
below in section 11.2.7 Mitigating the impact of regulation and punishment. It was
explained that a natural consequence, of gaps appearing in regulations and
procedures through their application, is for further regulations to be developed in
ever increasing detail (interviews # 639, 981).
11.2. 6 Punishment to sup..Qort rules or regulations
Probably connected to this low regard for bare rules, and possibly with both a
plethora and dislike of rules, are the views about the importance of punishment
(interview # 930) or of the material advantages of following rules. For example, an
anecdote was told of an employee of a Western company in mainland China being
fired for a misdemeanour; three Chinese employees wrote to the company's
management protesting:
"We are honest, we thought the company is honest too. Someone does
something wrong but you do not punish him, youjust let him go. "
When asked later what the company should have done, they replied
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"Anything, strung him up on a tree, but not let him go!" (interview # 786).
They thought that dismissal was so lenient that it did not amount to punishment for
the transgression. Again, an anecdote was told of how a Westerner in Beijing, who
left a new purchase in a taxi, was most surprised to have it returned personally by the
taxi driver. This was done because the Westerner complained to the taxi authorities
that the driver had not used his meter and the driver, fearing to lose his taxi licence,
wanted a letter from the passenger dropping the complaint (interview # 786). A
comparison was made between taxi drivers in mainland China not wearing seat belts
because the fine is low, to drivers in Singapore, where fines are high, who do obey
the seat belt regulations (interview # 933). As a further example, iron regulations
and harsher penalties were reported to be a key part of renovating management of a
Chinese State owned bank (China Daily # 1003). These Chinese views are
represented by the box labelled 'Punishment' in Figure 11.1.
11.2. 7 Mitigating the impact oiregu/atjon andpunjshment
Several patterns of Chinese action appeared, which could be seen as reactions to
facing large volumes of regulations together with harsh penalties and disinclination
to speak out against the regulations or those in authority. These were seen as
reactions by junior staff, or by managers or officials who administered regulations, or
even by those who set the regulation. In the latter cases, mitigating actions were
means to enhance control assurance either for managers' and officials' personal goals
or against unforeseen but undesirable consequences. They are described under the
next two headings of Flexible Interpretation and Ambiguity as escape routes, and are
illustrated in Figure 11.1.
Flexible interpretation:
Laws and regulations may be uncomfortable for Chinese people when they are set by
those in high authority, out of reach from the influence and relationships of those
affected. Impact of these regulation may be mitigated through interpretation by
officials who administer it. Flexibility from interpretation in how regulations are
applied can thus increase either with the geographic distance from where the
regulations are set (interview # 777), or the distance that procedures are cascaded
down the hierarchy of an organisation (interview # 649). In either case,
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interpretation by people may divert the regulation from its purpose. Among
examples given was horse racing in mainland China, where gambling is illegal.
People at race courses queue to buy tickets for them to predict which horse will win.
These are not gambling bets but predictions based on knowledge of the horse and
conditions. This interpretation of the law defeats its purpose while satisfying a
demand for gambling (interview # 1221).
As a variation on flexible interpretation, there were examples where the purpose of
regulations was avoided while their details were complied with (interview # 981).
Chinese lawyers apparently tend to follow legal procedures rather than the spirit of
the law (interview # 741). In another example, Chinese staff took a pragmatic
approach to procedures in a way that defeated the purpose for the procedures. They
asked a British manager to counter sign a cheque for US$ 30,000. He asked what the
payment was for, but they refused to say, so he refused to sign. "But its very
important" they pleaded. "What is it for?" he asked again; they replied "We cannot
say, its secret, we are not supposed to be doing this" (interview # 657).
One interviewee appeared to give a counter example, when explaining that what
matters in China is whether the spirit of regulation is followed. So long as the spirit
is followed there can be some flexibility in how it is applied, such as through
interpretation by those who administer it (interviews # 639, 981). However, this
interviewee had particular experience in USA that may explain this exceptional
attitude in mainland China.
Ambiguity as escape routes:
A Chinese tendency for ambiguity may be another reaction to regulation and
punishment. Ambiguity may be used by both those who set regulation and those
who administer it.
Chinese legislation appears to be prone to ambiguity, because of loopholes and use
of terminology that is neither consistent nor defined (interview # 741). This seems to
reflect an underlying Chinese assumption that it is dangerous to commit oneself to
principle, which may later conflict with dictates of particular situations or
relationships.
278
Chapter 11: Law, Rules And Procedures
Others explained how authorities do not like to give oral, let alone written,
clarification of regulations. They recounted how a Western Finance Director refused
to authorise an investment in a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) until the tax authorities
had confirmed the tax exempt status of the investment. The tax authorities would not
do this, and the impasse continued until the project was cancelled. In the eyes of the
Chinese narrators of this story, what was remarkable was the Westerner's
expectation that Chinese authorities would commit themselves to applying what was
required by law (departmental lunch # 683).
11.2.8 Abuse and corruption
Chinese reliance on relationships above contract and low reliance on the rule of law,
can be criticised by Westerners as examples of 'crony capitalism'. For example, a
foreign partner in a joint venture complained that "vendors were ripping us off, the
government was robbing us blind, key employees were on the take" (Economist #
1266).
As stated above, both CoX and CoY have strict business principles which make it
clear that favouritism and corruption is unacceptable (documents # 181, 1233).
Nevertheless, interviewees recognised the impact of corruption in other
organisations. For example, a bank credit officer may be inclined to waive rules
about recoverable collateral, when the borrower is a director or major shareholder of
the bank (interview # 777). Again, there was the complaint that people who have
good friends in the Police or courts may avoid punishment and are not afraid to break
the law (interview # 933).
11.2.9 Summary of Chinese attitudes to law. regulation and procedures
These examples given by interviewees of Chinese attitudes to laws and procedures
may be summarised. Chinese people often have greater respect for people and
personal relationships than they do for impersonal procedures or regulations and the
rule of law. While the rule of law may be poorly supported by effective legal
institutions, greater respect for people and relationships appears to be deeply rooted
in cultural values; this links back to preference for relationships over contracts (7.2.1
Relationships and contracts). In the absence of personal feeling to support a
requirement, legislators and regulators may perhaps issue requirements in extensive
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detail. At the same time, regulations may be supported by expectations of
punishment or inducements of material advantage.
Inquiry among 14 interviewees into why or when procedures might be acceptable to
mainland Chinese staff showed more than a third of weight of opinion indicating
feeling on the part of those who set or administer the procedures. This view
appeared as distinctive Chinese opinion about procedures. More than a fifth of the
weight of opinion indicated authority or sanction to support the procedures. Among
the variety of other views, promotion of efficiency and seeing procedures as
inherently acceptable each received nearly an eighth of the weight of opinion.
It appears that Chinese people, when subject to control by rules or procedures, find
ways to mitigate regulatory intent and maintain their own agenda. This may be
through flexible interpretation or by following the detail but ignoring the regulatory
spirit. Finally, it appears that protection from the consequences of impersonal rules
may also be sought by those who issue or administer rules. They may do this either
by setting the requirements ambiguously, or by refusing to determine how they
would be applied in the future.
In order to gain control assurance, mainland Chinese managers may tend to place
considerable reliance on people and personal relationships. They may also issue a
large number of detailed rules and procedures.
11.3 Czech attitudes
11. 3. 1 The law. public regulation and ethics
Czech opinions on laws and regulations appear to have a few similarities to these
examples of Chinese attitudes. It was noted that there still exists a mass of rules
following the overthrow in 1989 of the Czech Communist regime (interview # 387),
which was noted for vast numbers of petty regulation and procedures (interview #
1053). This is illustrated by the box labelled 'Mass of rules' in Figure 11.1.
Prominently lit notices on the platforms of the Prague metro list 40 regulations
covering carrying of livestock, bicycles and packages by number and size etc.
(observation # 1083). A Czech interviewee commented that although the researcher
was perhaps the only passenger who had read the notice, some passengers managed
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to comply by contriving curious handbags for 'carrying' dogs as big as Alsatians
(interview # 1092).
Yet a Czech tendency appeared for high regard for legal rights. The latter was
illustrated by an interviewee who parked his vehicle where it blocked the entrance to
a neighbour's garage. His neighbour rang the doorbell and complained vociferously,
insisting that he had a permit for his garage. The same interviewee found a polite
notice on his vehicle when parked not very well outside his house in the UK; he had
reason to believe that a neighbour had left the notice. It pointed out that the parked
vehicle made it difficult for a gentleman to get his car out (interview # 1089).
Whereas the Czech reaction had been forthright recourse to legal rights, the British
diffident response was to question by implication whether the interviewee were a
gentleman. A typical Chinese response might have been a referral to relationships,
such as an accusation of selfishness and of not thinking of neighbours (interview #
1218).
Czech sources expressed frustration with lack of legal certainty (WWW # 1099;
interview # 291), illustrated by the box 'Want legal certainty' in Figure 11.1. This
arises from removal of administrative controls of the previous Communist regime
(interview # 1059), lack of practical experience by legislators who had rapidly
created much legislation since 1989 (interviews # 1026, 1029), inefficiency and
backlog of cases in the commercial courts with queues of typically 2 year for a case
to be heard (interviews # 254, 312, 483, 519, 1029; Prague Post # 540, 582 and
585), lack of experience by judges and lawyers (interviews # 312, 519), and
uncertain functioning of legal organisations such as the land registry (interviews #
282, 483). Both interviewees and the press commented on the lack of enforcement
of laws (interviews # 1019, 372, 312, 1035; Fleet Sheet # 420), and on nefarious
practices by those who use whatever wide means they can get away with to gain
advantage in the market economy (interviews # 354, 1059, 1026, 567, 405, 1026,
312, 378; Prague Post # 585 and 591). Examples of these nefarious practices
included 'tunnelling' of investment funds or a taxi charging CzK 8,500 (US $250)
for a ride of less than 1 kilometre, and outright fraud and corruption (interviews #
282, 561; Prague Post # 414, Fleet Sheet # 420, Financial Times # 1020; Central
European Business Weekly # 1027). These attitudes are illustrated by the box
'Resent immoral practices' in Figure 11.1.
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Underlying both this resentment of unethical practices and frustration with lack of
legal certainty, appeared to be a high regard for the rule of law, as indicated in Figure
11.1. In most of these cases of frustration, there was forthright disgust at the lack of
ethical behaviour, justice and truth (interview # 561; Central European Business
Weekly # 1024). These appear to be specific examples of the more general desire for
the truth, which was discussed above (10.6 Accuracy and truth - Czech attitudes).
Infringement of laws appears to be not only Individualism taking advantage of
modem market opportunities, but also force of habit from the pre-1989 communist
era when:
"If you were not stealing from the State, you are stealing from your family"
(interviews # 387, 405, 279, 372, 1047).
This example of a Czech amalgam of self interest with responsibility to oneself and
individual based morality was taken a stage further against one's immediate family
by a Czech interviewee. In answer to the dilemma, whether it is preferable to do
what you think is right, but which everyone else thinks wrong, or to do what
everyone else thinks is right but you think is wrong, the interviewee replied:
"I would do what I think best in taking responsibility, even if I think that is
irresponsible to my family, telling myself it is my freedom ..... I will do the thing
properly" (interview # 1064).
This individual based morality is also reflected in the Czech concerns for absolute
truth and for truth to oneself, which compared to Chinese concern for relative truth
dependant upon particular relationships with people (10.6 Accuracy and truth).
Individual based morality is indicated in Figure 11.1. It was also illustrated in the
comment that:
"Czechs are very law abiding, but a law they don't like they will break it"
(interview # 255).
It is therefore interesting to compare these concepts of individual and communal
morality. Among 13 interviewees the predominant view was that Czech people tend
to see morality and truth in individual terms. In contrast, 12 interviewees
unanimously indicated concern for communal morality among mainland Chinese
people.
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Despite the legal uncertainty in both mainland China and the Czech Republic, this
Czech pattern of attitudes contrasts strongly with Chinese attitudes. Weight of
opinion among 17 interviewees overwhelmingly indicated Czech concern for the rule
of law. In contrast, the predominant opinion among 8 interviewees indicated that
mainland Chinese managers do not rely on respect for the rule of law. This is
supported by a similar pattern concerning legal process or use of mediation and
relationships for resolving disputes. The unanimous view among 12 interviewees
was that Czech people expect legal processes to be used, whereas the predominant
view among 5 interviewees was that mainland Chinese people expect mediation and
relationships to be used.
Czechs generally appeared to feel a moral obligation to respect the law and to do
what is right (interview # 1278), while many outside CoX and CoY selfishly pursue
individual benefit, either within or outside the law, resulting in disgust by their
compatriots. The Chinese pattern, as described above, is of respect for personal
relationships more than for law. It appears that whereas Chinese people generally
aspire to communal morality within their in-group, Czechs generally aspire to
individual morality.
11.3.2 Internal procedures
Czech attitudes to internal procedures seemed to be somewhat different from their
attitude to the law and public regulation. It was apparently a common view that
procedures should have been thrown out with the Communists in 1989 (interview #
1053).
Several interviewees expressed Czech frustration with procedures that had not been
explained and justified (interviews # 1053, 1064), or said that the purpose for
procedures must be understood before they will be complied with (interview # 1039).
Similarly, no patience was expressed for a procedure drafted in a way that defeated
its purpose (interviews # 1026, 1035, 1039). An interviewee described how a new
control system would be resisted, argued against and even obstructed, until it was
quite clear why it was needed, how it would work and that compliance was insisted
on (interview # 1056). While there was preference for internal rules that are clear
(interview # 477), this clarity may be symbolised by what is written rather than
verbally agreed (interview # 267).
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This appeared not to amount to a simple dismissal of procedures: 7 out of 10 Czech
axial respondents included procedures in their perception of control (Table 6.2);
weight of opinion among 17 interviewees was evenly balanced on whether Czech
managers see procedures as contributing to control assurance. However for at least 2
axial respondents manuals were for creating awareness and understanding by staff of
control, rather than for dictating how things should be done. Besides reports of some
Czech managers having no concern at all for procedures (interview # 405), there
were also stories of Czech managers outside CoX and CoY being happy to have
volumes of procedures that no one paid any attention to (interviews # 1095, 1089).
While there was some comment that Czech staff like to have procedures, this was
also linked to the protection of being able to point to possessing a procedure while at
the same time not putting it into practice (interview # 1077). There was also a
comment that some staff in Czech companies follow procedures slavishly. The
explanation was that in these organisations, which excluded CoX and CoY, staff may
be held personally responsible for discrepancies in stock or cash balances (interview
# 405). This reinforces the pattern of Czech staff tending to see responsibility in
terms of a personal duty, both as an explanatory contextual factor, and as a
consequence of a cultural attitude of individual morality.
There was also reported a Czech dislike of being forced to do things, illustrated by
negative reactions to a directive that staff should put on a cabaret show at a
Christmas party (interview # 567). This contrasted with enthusiasm and commitment
to a voluntary cabaret act, which involved much personal risk and embarrassment
(observation # 1097.3). And there were reports of Czech preference for working
without the constraints of procedures and controls (interview # 1077), in which
situation managers would rely on staff knowing and following their responsibilities
(interview # 1026). There was frustration at time consuming procedures (interview #
1064) or excessive administration (interview # 1068).
While the importance to Czech people was stressed of explanation why procedures
should be followed (interview # 1053), understanding by those who set procedures
appeared also to be important. This came out in a dislike of procedures being
imposed from abroad by those who do not understand the local situation (interview #
1047).
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Analysis of weights of opinion among 12 interviewees as to why or when procedures
might be acceptable to Czech staff showed a little less than half indicated either
understanding of why the procedures should be followed or understanding of the
local situation by those who set the procedures. These views of understanding
emerged as distinctive Czech patterns of opinion. A little more than a third gave
promotion of efficiency. Promotion of efficiency as a reason for accepting
procedures implied understanding by the people asked to follow the procedures that
compliance would promote efficiency. The remaining fifth of the weight of opinion
gave a variety of views, such as that procedures are accepted if supported by
responsibility on the part of those who follow them, or by authority on the part of
those who enforce them, or by the threat of sanction, or that procedures are
inherently useful.
These Czech tendencies in attitudes to regulation and procedures appear to amount to
a general desire for freedom of action (interview # 1019) within a regime that is
accepted, understood, clear and impartial. It is illustrated in Figure 11.1 by the box
labelled 'Freedom within understood principles'. This seems to make a contrast to
the Chinese tendency of preference of freedom of action maintained through
ambiguity and opacity.
It appears that, whereas many interviewees at CoX and CoY sites in Prague said that
Czech people have a low opinion of procedures, it was also recognised that
procedures play an important part in the control frameworks of CoY and CoX.
Accordingly, it seemed that Czech staff working for these MNCs make the best use,
that they can rationalise, of imposed control systems. Whereas 7 out of 10 Czech
axial respondents in CoX and CoY included procedures in the view of management
control, this was done by only 3 out of 9 Chinese axial respondents (Table 6.1). It
may be that, while CoX and CoY have had some success in explaining and justifying
procedures to their Czech staff, explanation carries less weight with Chinese staff,
who instead look to relationships and feeling from the boss that asks them to comply.
That is, whereas procedures may be justified within the logic of control assurance
looked for by many Czech managers, procedures tend to fit less easily into Chinese
frameworks of control assurance that rely more on personal relationships than
impersonal rules.
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11.4 British attitudes
11.4.1 The law
Fieldwork inquired less into British attitudes to the rule of law and ethics than into
other matters. There were too few specific references to British attitudes to the rule
of law for a weight of opinion to be calculated. However,2 managers stressed the
importance of ensuring that customers honour their contracts, both on the ethical
ground that agreements should be honoured, and in order to send a clear message to
the market that their company expects nothing less (interviews # 159, 225). Also, it
will be remembered from the discussion of regulation of external business relations
(7.4.2 Contractual relations) that British managers tended to rely on both contracts
and relationships. Furthermore, many of them preferred to resolve disputes through
negotiation, but were prepared to enforce their position by reference to contracts and,
depending upon industry practice, use of the courts. Underlying these findings
appears to be respect for the rule of law, which is illustrated by the box 'Rule of law'
in Figure 11.1. This however was not as pronounced as the Czech concern that the
rule of law should be respected, as illustrated both in the stronger Czech than British
reliance on contracts above relationships and in the outspoken Czech concerns about
the rule of law.
11. 4. 2 Internal Drocedures
As discussed, 10 out or 11 British managers, among the 30 axial respondents,
included procedures in their perceptions of management control.
Among 14 British interviewees, the predominant weight of opinion was that
procedures and similar internal regulations contribute to control assurance. This
compares to 17 interviewees who were evenly divided on whether Czech managers
see procedures as contributing to control assurance. The weight of opinion among
13 interviewees was nearly two thirds that Chinese managers tend to see procedures
making no contribution to control assurance. This British attitude is illustrated by
the box 'Procedures important' in Figure 11.1.
Inquiry into why or when procedures are acceptable to British staff showed half of
the weight of opinion among 14 interviewees that procedures are liked and inherently
acceptable. This was a distinctly British characteristic. An example was that the
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presence of some procedures was seen as good for the certainty they give staff
(interview # 1197, and see below 11.4.3 Corporate knowledge - the 'unlearning
organisation). Procedures were also seen as enabling staff to do their jobs in face of
uncertainty from frequent moves of staff between jobs (interview # 1353).
Interviewees linked procedures to empowerment and to roles (interviews # 1302,
1323, 1353).
Statistical tests for alternative hypotheses, which will be discussed more fully in
Chapter 13, identified a significant company effect on perceptions of the importance
of procedures and internal regulations to control assurance. However, the pattern
between interviewees from the 2 MNCs was not as significant as that between
interviewees from different countries. This is illustrated in Table 11.2.
Cultural groupings
National MNCs Locations Sites Functions Seniority Gender
44 interviewees 0.000 0.070 0.046 0.017 0.137 0.548 0.424
in all ••• • •
employments
23 interviewees 0.005 74 0.025 0.025 0.535 0.381 0.463
in CoX only •• • •
19 interviewees 0.040 74 0.506 0.506 74 0.398 0.699
in CoY only •
Statistical test Kruskal- Mann- Kruskal- Kruskal- Kruskal- Kruskal- Mann-
Wallis Whitney Wallis Wallis Wallis Wallis Whitney
Table 11.2: Significance of differences in patterns of importance of procedures
and internal regulations'S
Although procedures and internal regulations were seen as important within both
MNCs, greater attention appeared to be given to them in CoX. Rerunning the
statistical tests within each MNC, in order to control for corporate effects, shows a
74 Data fell into only 1 cultural group, e.g. all of these CoY managers were from the service
function. A test for a singificant difference by the cultural grouping was therefore
meaningless.
7S Numbers within this table represent the statistical probability that the opinions come from
a single homogenous population, not from different cultural groups. The strongest pattern
for each property is indicated by showing the probability in bold. Key: * - significant at
level of p < 0.1, .* - significant at level of p < 0.01, *•• - •• - significant at level of p <
0.001
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significant difference in perceptions of the importance of procedures and internal
regulations between interviewees from different countries. Within each MNC,
British interviewees had the strongest tendency of seeing perceptions and internal
regulations as being important to control assurance, followed by Czech interviewees,
with Chinese interviewees having the lowest tendency of seeing them as important.
Where procedures were seen as important, British interviewees also recognised that
exceptions should be allowed if justified to those in charge (interview # 117, 147).
Some interviewees preferred general policies over more detailed procedures
(interview # 1173, 1179).
While British staff might complain a little (interview # 1089) or at least politely
about an unpopular procedures, they would comply if it has the support of senior
management and everyone else is following it (interview # 1152). The typical
reaction of a British person asked to follow a procedure was described as questioning
it, if he or she thought it unnecessary, or to do something equivalent and better. In
contrast, many Far Eastern people would follow the procedure without question. The
typical British reaction, depending on the risks of the business area, may however be
moving towards total compliance, even where thought unnecessary, in face of the
increasing litigiousness of British society (interview # 1221).
The impression gained by the researcher from the totality of the study, of typical
reactions to conflicts between procedures and personal agendas is as follows. In this
situation a British employee of these MNCs would tend to follow the procedure, or at
least feel guilty for not doing so, while at the same time challenging the logic and
justification of the procedure. A Czech employee would tend to refuse to follow the
procedure until it had been explained and justified. Whereas a Chinese employee
would tend to follow the letter of the procedure, but perhaps in a way that achieves
their own agenda and not necessarily achieves the purpose for the procedure.
A British manager pointed out that while procedures are important, their
effectiveness is totally subject to the integrity of staff who use them. (interview #
254).
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11.4.3 CorDorate knowledge - the 'unlearning organisation'
It has already been said that procedures were liked where there is uncertainty from
frequent staff moves (interview # 1353). This is one among a set of examples of high
regard for procedures by British managers who were concerned about loss of
corporate knowledge through rapid change. As people leave the organisation or are
moved between jobs, and as jobs and systems are changed or 're-engineered',
knowledge of who is supposed to do what, when and why, is lost. Knowledge of
how systems work, or were intended to work, is also lost (interviews # 114, 147,
1138). This was described as the 'unlearning organisation' (interview # 117). With
this knowledge is also lost understanding by staff of what is reasonable, thus
undermining effectiveness of monitoring input, operations or output (interview #
1149; document # 138). Managers, expressing this disquiet, showed anxiety at loss
of control assurance based upon corporate knowledge, as indicated in Figure 11.1.
This dissipating corporate knowledge was seen in the form of experience and also
procedures in a wide sense of written and systematic regulation of how business
operations are supposed to work.
11.4.4 Policjes and ~ide/jnes
Some British interviewees mentioned policies in connection with providing control
assurance (interviews # 603, 1095, 1173, 1179), and distinguished them from
procedures, to an extent that was not apparent among Chinese and Czech
interviewees. For these British interviewees, policies set parameters or limits within
which activities may be done, direction for the business, and the risks or the types of
. business that may be entered (interviews # 1173, 1197). Policies therefore may
define an area of discretion (interview # 4). They are generally broader in scope, and
refer more to business objectives and standards, than do procedures (interviews #
1143, 1188). In contrast, procedures tell staff how and when to do a task (interview #
1197). These explanations were consistent with definitions of policy and procedures
included in international and British policies of one of the two MNCs (documents #
188 and 189):
"Policy controls are the general principles and guides for action which
influence decisions. Procedures prescribe how actions are to be
performed consistently with policies JJ (document # 189). .
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A British manager commented that an effective way of managing different cultural
attitudes to management control is to set international policies within which local
indigenous management may establish their own procedures and control systems
(interview # 4). This approach, which may no doubt be effective in many situations,
of course depends upon local staff interpreting, accepting and complying with the
policies in a way that is consistent with intentions of the international management.
An example of such inconsistency was given by a British manager with expatriate
experience in Africa: local management had set their own policy that accorded with
expectations of international management; however, some months later, so many
exceptions had been allowed that it had turned into a "rubber policy" (interview #
165).
A unifying theme to British views on policies, procedures and the rules of law
appears to be that conduct should be regulated by principles, but that there is
advantage in deciding each case on its merits, albeit without transgressing those
principles. It is illustrated by the box 'Pragmatic use of principles & procedures' in
Figure 11.1. This mixture of pragmatism and principle is consistent with the reliance
on a variable mix of contracts and relationships seen in Chapter 7 on regulating
external business relations.
11.5 Culture and other contextual factors
This section summarises and discussed cultural and other contextual factors for laws,
rules and procedures and how they contribute to managers' control assurance.
Concern for general principles and for the rules of law may be related to the cultural
dimension of Universalism. The contrasting concern for people and relationships
suggests Particularism (Appendix A). This is consistent with the cultural survey,
which found Czech culture to be significantly more Universalist than mainland
Chinese culture (Table 6.1). It found British culture to be more Universalist than
mainland Chinese culture but not significantly so. Universalism and Particularism
are therefore included in Figure 11.1.
High Uncertainty Avoidance, as measured by Cragin (Table 5.6), may help explain
mainland Chinese reluctance to constrain future executive action with unambiguous
laws, and preference both for flexible interpretations. For this reason, Uncertainty
Avoidance is included in Figure 11.1.
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The individual morality and communal morality indicate Czech Individualism (5.2.2
Individualism) and mainland Chinese group orientation (5.1. Mainland Chinese
culture - 2. Group orientation) respectively. This is consistent with the considerably
greater Individualism found by Trompenaars for Czech culture than for mainland
Chinese culture (Table 5.3.) Individualism and Collectivism are therefore also
included in Figure 11.1.
Procedures are situation specific. Perceptions that they are important to control
assurance may be associated with Specific culture. As British culture was found in
the cultural survey to be more Specific than Czech culture, and to be significantly
more Specific than mainland Chinese culture, it too is included in Figure 11.1. This
is supported by a correlation in the corroborative statistical tests between the Specific
- Diffuse cultural dimension and procedures and internal regulations (Table 13.8). It
is also supported by a significant correlation between Specific - Diffuse and people
liking procedures.
The finding of a tendency among Czech staff to object to procedures until the staff
understand the reason for the procedures and how they will achieve that purpose, is
probably a manifestation of both Individualism and Internal Locus of Control. This
is consistent with the very high Czech Individualism found by Trompenaars (Table
5.3) and the Internal Locus of Control found in the cultural survey (Table 6.1) to be
higher, although not significantly higher, for Czech than for mainland Chinese or
British cultures. This finding is probably also a negation of unconditional acceptance
of control by other people and of hierarchy. This does not appear clearly from the
findings of the cultural survey (Table 6.1), perhaps because of the conditional nature
of Czech attitudes to hierarchy, which was discussed above (9.8.2 Czech views).
However, objecting to procedures until the reason for them is understood was found
to correlate significantly with Internal Locus of control and significantly but
negatively with Locus of Control in Other People (Table 13.8). Internal Locus of
Control is therefore included in Figure 11.1.
The pattern of opinions concerning laws is obviously closely related to the state and
strength of legal structures, such as legislation and courts, in each of the three
countries. Other contextual factors mentioned by interviewees include examples set
on television and by Western organisations in mainland China, Chinese concern for
face, effects of the Communist regime in the Czech Republic remaining from before
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1989, uncertainty felt by British people during organisational change, and the
increasing litigiousness of British society.
11.6 Relating findings on laws, rules and procedures to the
literature
This section starts to relate findings on laws, rules and procedures to existing
literature on these topics. Later sections refer more specifically to cultural theory
and empirical research.
I/. 6.I Chinese legal system
Several of the findings here, including mainland Chinese preference for mediated
solutions over legal confrontation, are reflected in the discussion by Clarke (1996) of
enforcement in mainland China of civil court decisions. He describes low status of
judges and officials among mainland Chinese bureaucracies, low enforcement rates
for court judgements, and partiality of judgement arising from government and Party
influence over local courts and judges. Local courts may therefore be obliged to bow
to local interests in order to safeguard their salary bonuses, appointments, and
resources, and also in order to secure sufficient support for enforcement of their
judgements. Partiality of judgements and difficulties in enforcing judgements
discourage litigation: not only may winning parties fail to achieve the intention for
court judgements, but they may fail to recover their litigation costs.
Clarke (1996) describes how these problems of partiality and low rates of
enforcement encourage parties to continue traditional means for resolving disputes.
These traditional means include parties seeking a common superior with whom they
engage in ad hoc bargaining; this is therefore resort to hierarchical solutions. At the
same time, those in authority use specific executive directives for particular problems
rather than relying on legal institutions to enforce general solutions.
"The problem of local government interference appears to remain substantial.
Chinese courts are not, along the Anglo-American model, powerful arbiters of
last resort who can decide important questions involving powerful state
leaders. Instead, they are in practice just one bureaucracy among many with a
limited jurisdiction. When a court is on the same administrative level as a
defendant, it simply lacks the rank to enforce" (ibid, page 52).
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This is consistent with low regard, found here among Chinese managers, for the rule
of law as an overarching principle. Accordingly, mainland China is not yet
achieving the potential for greater uniformity of legal process and consistent
authority over other bureaucracies that is expected of Western legal institutions. The
Chinese legal system is part of a larger problem of partiality and Particularist
solutions. Clarke attributes continuing lack of general applicability of law in China
to institutional factors. Firstly, without sufficient economic reform and a 'level
playing field' in markets, applying general rules without recognition of particular
circumstances would be unfair. But this supports Particularist solutions that obstruct
development of a market economy. Secondly, Chinese courts do not fit into Chinese
thinking on power and authority. They lack sufficient vertical authority, or tiao ~,
because without constitutional separation between executive, legislative and judicial
arms of the State, they are just another bureaucracy. They also lack horizontal
authority, or kuai *,because of the pervasive influence of the Communist Party of
China. Finally, the universal authority of legal "rules that purport to operate
horizontally, across bureaucracies, and to bind all citizens and institutions equally"
(ibid. page 85) is alien to Chinese thinking.
Findings here that Chinese managers see rule as by people rather than by law or
regulation is reflected by Ch'ng (1997):
"China has never been a civilisation with a tradition which stipulates that the
rule of law should be held above the rule of men." (ibtd., page 65; also Kapp,
1997; Beamer, 1998)
"Confucian tradition prefers moral to legal mechanisms of restraint.
Confucius believed that the rule of law is inferior to the rule of men: but only by
men who set appropriate examples of behaviour. " (Ch 'ng, 1997, page 67).
Or as put by Confucius (1997, 2.3):
"If you govern them with decrees and regulate them with punishments, the
people will evade them but will have no sense of shame. If you govern them
with virtue and regulate them with rituals, they will have a sense of shame and
flock to you. "
The use of ambiguity found here has a parallel in Clarke's (1996) finding that the
Chinese legal system is unwilling to ensure finality of legal process. Many avenues
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are open for courts and litigation parties to reopen or to continue cases in order to
accommodate particular circumstances. Ch'ng (1997) attributes Chinese legal
ambiguity to law being seen as nothing more than administrative guidelines:
"Chinese laws are often very poorly drafted and worded The vagueness and
ambiguities have so far been tolerated by the Chinese authorities which view
the laws as a set of administrative guidelines subject to the interpretations of
the bureaucrats; as such, officials are expected to exercise discretion
depending on the circumstances. " (Ch 'ng, J997, page 65).
11.6.2 Private law jn Chjna and the West
Carver (1996, page 11) contrasts
"the private law regimes of Western business dependent on their belief in a
civil society, and the lack of recognition of aprivate law regime in the China of
the J990s. "
Central to the Western concept of civil society is the concept of privacy of
individuals and how social bonds can tie the individual to society. To this she relates
a Western philosophy of management as "implied and express attitudes of
organization towards employee, consumers, suppliers, owners government and
society" (ibid. 16), which in tum involves management in creation, recognition and
enforcement of rules. She attributes Chinese crony capitalism 76, which places a
premium on connections and guan xi rather than skill, to paucity of Chinese private
law. Interestingly, she traces the differences between China's 'arbitrary
authoritarianism' and the Western legal foundation for civil society, to historical
76 While it may, following collapse of Far Eastern markets in 1998, be fashionable to
criticise 'crony capitalism', the interpretive stance of cultural relativism (Hofstede, 1991) is
taken here. Accordingly, each perception is seen as valid in its own context. The challenge
for Western minds is to respect and understand the views from a different culture, without
necessarily abandoning the values and basic assumptions representing their own cultures.
This may be easier if it is remembered that while all systems have their strengths,
weaknesses and failures, such terms as 'relationship banking' or 'relationship marketing'
have had a respectable following in the UK (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Sykes, 1994; FT
Mastering Management Review, 1999).
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roots. She points to how Western legal systems arose from Roman justice and the
bonding of Christian morality with law, which arose both from establishment of
Christianity as the state religion and through ecclesiastical law.
Certainty and transparency of Roman law developed from the 12 Tables of 450 BC,
which were set up in the market place in response to calls for publication of the law
(Nicholas, 1962). A parallel may be drawn with the certainty and availability of the
twelve commandments and publication of Judaic law in the books of Leviticus
(1978), Numbers (1978) and Deuteronomy (1978). Both of these civil and religious
traditions for publication of the law have, no doubt, influenced traditional attitudes in
both the UK and the Czech Republic. In contrast, Confucian thinking was hostile to
the concept of law, basing good government on the moral character of rulers and
administrators rather than on systems of government (de Bary, 1960). Chinese law
still has a tradition of secrecy (Carver, 1996). This contrast between certainty and
transparency of European legal traditions, and a tendency towards secrecy of Chinese
law is reflected in the findings described here for attitudes to information (10. 7
Transparency, trust and relationships, and 10.9.2 Transparency or secrecy).
Low Chinese regard for the rule of law and greater respect for rule by men,
encourages business on the basis of personal relationships (Kapp, 1997). Whitley
(1999) posits that low trust in institutions such as legal systems, together with trust in
direct personal knowledge or recommendations, is likely to be related to paternalist
authority relations within organisations. He describes such patriarchal control as
characterised by institutionalisation of inequality in status and competence between
superiors and subordinates, and sometimes in moral expectations such that superiors
take responsibility for the interests of their subordinates. He also links both low
regard for the rules of law and high regard for rule by men to low reliance within
organisations on formal rules and procedures. His theory seems to be borne out by
findings here concerning Chinese attitudes to law, procedures and those described in
Chapter 9 for internal relations.
J 1.6. 3 Czech legal system
The Czech Republic has made rapid progress towards the Western European market
mode of economy. Its constitution emphasises the independence of its judiciary
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(E.I.U., 1999). Although much legislation has been passed, problems with its legal
system remain, as reported by (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999, page 10):
"The court system is still short of resources. Civil cases such as those involving
nonpayment of debts, bankruptcies and tax matters can take many years to be
heard, and judicial expertise in such matters is very limited Thus, the courts
do not yet represent a realistic channel through which disputes such as those
between taxpayers and the authorities can be satisfactorily resolved".
The Czech Republic is clear that the rule of law should be respected. Havel (1997,
page 2), the Czech President, argued before Parliament for:
"the rule of law,· the moral order behind that system of rules, that is essential
for making the rules work"; and further (page 3) for
"clear, sound and universally understandable rules, and when such rules are
generally respected ... an all embracing cultivation of the moral order. "
Although he (ibid., page 1) deplored the current level of corruption:
"The prevalent opinion is that it pays off in this country to lie and to steal: that
many politicians and civil servants are corruptible; that political parties -
though they all declare honest intentions in lofty words - are covertly
manipulated by suspicious financial groupings. "
However, China also has intentions to improve its legal system:
"We should continue to press ahead with the reform ... and improve the
socialist legal system, governing the country according to the law and making it
a socialist country ruled by law" (Jiang, 1997, page5).
Findings in this study suggest that while, both countries have considerable hurdles to
overcome in legal reform, Czech managers expect greater respect for the rule of law,
and have higher expectations for what this might mean for control assurance, than do
Chinese managers.
11.64 Weber's ideal I)!pe afbureaucracv
Weber's ideal type of 'bureaucracy' was compared to British perceptions of roles
and mainland Chinese paternal hierarchies (9.10.5 Literature on roles). The
importance found here of procedures to many British managers brings in the rules
element of Weber's ideal bureaucracy. Unlike law, procedures are specific to a
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particular task or position in an organisation. This contrasts with instructing staff,
which was generally important to Czech managers (9.3.2 Czech views). Procedures
also have more possibilities of horizontal co-ordination, which contrasts with vertical
command of Chinese paternal hierarchies: procedures may be developed outside a
vertical line of command; they also set out what staff in different departments and
functions may expect from each other.
It appears that a tendency for British managers to rely on roles and procedures is
consistent with Weber's ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1947; Parsons, 1949). Indeed
one British interviewee linked procedures to roles: "People can say 'It's not my
procedure, so it's not my role, take your task somewhere else' " (interview # 1153).
Procedures together with the roles, acting like the rules and offices of Weber's
bureaucracy, may act as counterbalancing constraints to empowerment. It is
interesting to note that Weber's ideal bureaucracy is inconsistent with not only
Chinese paternal hierarchy", but also with Czech dislike of procedures.
11.7 Relating findings on laws, rules and procedures to cultural
theory
The purpose of this section is, firstly, to corroborate the cultural dimensions
identified as part of the context for these findings on laws, rules and procedures.
Secondly, it is to see how far existing cultural theories are supported by these
findings.
11.7.1 Hofstede's theories
Hofstede (1991) links high regard for the law, and how much organisation members
think that internal rules and procedures should be followed, to high Uncertainty
Avoidance. He refers to the equal application of laws in the ancient Roman Empire
and the lack of equality before the law in the Chinese Empire. He uses this
comparison to explain the roots of high Uncertainty Avoidance among cultures with
a Latin based language, such as Portugal, Belgium, France, Spain and Italy,
compared to lower Uncertainty Avoidance of Chinese speaking cultures of Taiwan,
77 Parsons (1949) contrasts Weber's concept of bureaucracy to administration in imperial
China.
297
Chapter 11: Law, Rules And Procedures
Hong Kong and Singapore. Unfortunately, this argument does not accommodate the
very high measurement of Uncertainty Avoidance for mainland China by Cragin
(Table 5.6).
Hofstede (1991) also implicates the Individualist - Collectivist cultural dimension
and High or Low Context Communication in cultural attitudes to laws. He points out
that, in Individualist Low Context Communication cultures, rules tend to be explicit
and written, whereas in Collectivist High Context Communication cultures, such as
Japan, they tend to be implicit and rooted in tradition. This theory does appear to be
consistent with the empirical findings here of higher British than Chinese concern for
the rule of law and its implications for providing control assurance. This is because
Trompenaars (Table 5.3) found mainland Chinese culture to be Collectivist in
comparison to British culture and Czech culture to be even more Individualist than
British culture. Also Chinese language is considerably higher context
communication than English or Czech (see above, 10.10.1 High - Low Context
Communication - need to communicate).
Hofstede (1991) associates Individualism also with equality of legal rights for all
individuals, whereas differentiation in legal treatment between groups is more likely
to be accepted in Collectivist cultures. The findings here of Chinese expectations for
flexible interpretation of rules and preferences for mediation give some support to
this position. For example, equality might be avoided by mediation or flexible
interpretation appropriate to the particular circumstances or people. This however




In contrast to Hofstede (1991), Trompenaars (1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 1997) has a single cultural dimension of Universalism - Particularism to
explain attitudes to the law. Universalist cultures have a high regard for the rules of
law and for universal principles, whereas in Particularist cultures interpersonal
relationships and the dictates of particular circumstances are seen as more important.
The significantly higher Czech than Chinese Universalism found in the cultural
survey (Table 6.2) appears to explain the finding of the qualitative analysis that
Czech managers have greater concern than their mainland Chinese counterparts for
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rules and moral principles. However, this is not supported by Trompenaars' measure
of Czech Universalism, which is very similar to his measure of mainland Chinese
Particularism (Table 5.3). The higher British than Chinese Universalism, found both
here and by Trompenaars (Tables 6.2 and 5.3), is however consistent with relative
attitudes to the rules of law and procedures. This theoretical link between
Universalism - Particularism and attitudes to the law, corroborates the identification
of this cultural dimension among contextual factors (Il.5 Culture and other
contextualfactors).
Trompenaars and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) also relate Universalism
to internal regulations necessary to support worldwide systems. They describe how
the reaction, of a manager in Particularist Venezuela to a job evaluation system, was
to question whether he or the system should decide which of his subordinates should
be promoted. One might imagine therefore that it is in Universalist cultures that
standard worldwide systems and procedures might be welcomed as providing control
assurance.
Trompenaars and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) bring in the dimension
of Specific - Diffuse to explain attitudes to internal instructions. It was shown above
(9.12 Relating findings on internal relations to cultural theory) that this is not
supported by findings on expectations that bosses should instruct their staff.
However, they maintain that, while in Specific cultures clear precise and detailed
instructions ensure better compliance, or allow staff to dissent in clear terms, in
Diffuse cultures ambiguous or vague instructions allow responsive interpretations
and exercise of judgement. This is supported by findings here of a Chinese
propensity to issue vague rules and expecting flexibility through interpretation, of
Czech staff reluctantly accepting procedures when they understand the purpose for
them, and British staff and managers tending to like procedures for the reduction in
uncertainty that they offer. This fits with the findings in the cultural survey (Table
6.2) of British culture being Specific, Chinese culture being Diffuse, and Czech
culture falling between the two. It also corroborates inclusion of British Specific
culture among contextual factors for the finding of British preference for procedures.
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11. 7.3 Hall's theory ofHi~ or Low Context Communication
Hall's theory (1977) of High or Low Context Communication is used by Boisot and
Child (1996) to help explain low codification of information and low reliance on
legally sanctioned rights in mediation of Chinese transactions. Chinese High
Context Communication would explain a lower need in Chinese compared to British
society for codified law, and a lower reliance on written procedures by Chinese
managers compared to British managers. It does not, however, explain apparent
Chinese propensity to issue high volumes of regulations and procedures.
In summary, Trompenaars' cultural dimension of Universalism - Particularism and
Hofstede's ideas on Individualism - Collectivism give better explanation for these
findings concerning attitudes to the law than Hofstede's dimensions of Uncertainty
Avoidance. Trompenaars' Specific - Diffuse dimension gives some explanation for
preferences for procedures and corroborates this as a contextual factor. His theory
also corroborates Universalism - Particularism among the contextual factors.
However, no prior theoretical explanation was found to corroborate Individualism as
a contextual factor for Czech individual morality.
11.8 Relating findings on laws, rules and procedures to empirical
research
A number of cross-national empirical studies of management control have inquired
into procedures and other forms of internal written rules and policies. Child and
Kieser (1979) found, when comparing West German and British companies, that
greater reliance on standard procedures was associated with company size, but not
with the country. This might suggest that the tendency seen here for British
managers to favour written procedures may not be found throughout Western
Europe.
Kelly et al. (1987) found no significant difference between Japanese and US
managers in their attitudes to written procedures. However, Chow et al. (1996)
found that Japanese profit centre managers, compared to their US counterparts, are
subject to tighter procedural controls. Chow et al. (1999b) researched the use of
written policies, rules, standardised procedures and manuals in US and Japanese
firms in Taiwan and indigenous Taiwanese firms. They found that the Japanese
firms used these significantly less than did the indigenous Taiwanese and US firms.
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There has therefore been no consistent pattern in procedures as part of management
control, found by earlier studies between US and Japanese managers and companies.
Formal control may be identified with perceptions of control that see clear rules and
procedures as making an important contribution towards control assurance. The
review of empirical research (2.3.3 Types of control in different national cultures -
Formality of control) found little consistency in findings on formality of control,
either in terms of the countries or cultural dimensions that might indicate greater or
lesser formality.
Prior empirical research therefore appears to give little reference for comparison to
the findings of this research. This study has moved exploration of the subject
forward. This is in terms not only of comparing a new set of countries, but making
more detailed inquiry into attitudes to internal rules and procedures, and in relating
these to cultural and other contextual factors, such as attitudes to the rule of law.
11.9 Conclusions on law, rules and procedures
Findings from selective coding for this key category of law, rules and procedures
show that mainland Chinese managers tended to rely on people and interpersonal
relationships, rather than on respect for the law and on rules and procedures, for
providing control assurance. Nevertheless, they may issue a relatively large volume
of rules and procedures. This may be where they have insufficient influence through
interpersonal relationships, or are unsure of these. Where rules and procedures are
used, those who issue and administer them may seek to protect themselves by
recourse to ambiguity and flexible interpretation. In these cases control assurance
may be supported by severe punishment.
Czech managers appeared to place considerable reliance on respect for the law,
understanding of universal principles, and individual morality. Like mainland
Chinese managers, they tended not to regard procedures favourably, seeing them as
constraints. Where procedures were issued, there appeared to be a general Czech
tendency, although not identified within CoX and CoY, for them not to be used.
Furthermore staff subject to procedures, including staff in CoX and CoY, tended to
object to procedures until they clearly understood the reason for them.
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In contrast, British managers tended to see procedures as contributing to control
assurance. They also tended to see policies as contributing to control assurance,
which they distinguished from procedures. Respect for the law, policies and
procedures appeared to represent pragmatic use of principles and procedures
designed for specific activities and positions. Figure 11.1 illustrates these findings of
patterns in differences between mainland Chinese, Czech and British managers in
their perceptions of how law, rules and procedures contribute to control assurance.
These findings were seen to be consistent with considerable literature comparing the
Chinese to Western legal systems. Differences are thought to arise from cultural,
philosophical and historical factors. Findings are also related to rapid change in the
Czech legal system. Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy was referred to in order to
show a link between British perceptions of procedures and of roles, and to contrast
these British to mainland Chinese perceptions.
Mixed support was found for these findings from cultural theory. Empirical cross-
national research into management control appears not yet to have advanced to the
point where it can provide comparison to these findings.
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12.1 Introduction
The structure of this chapter is similar to previous chapters on key categories.
However, after this introductory section, findings are explained in just 2 sections.
The reason is that this chapter contrasts the views of Chinese managers to the views
together of Czech and British managers, as relatively few differences were identified
between Czech and British views. Contextual factors are then summarised, before
findings are compared to literature, to cultural theory and to empirical research.
Conclusions for the chapter are finally summarised.
12.1.1 The key category ofsvstems logic
Various opinions on some aspects of system dynamics, such as different sources and
effects of change, had been captured and tabulated during the axial coding.
However, on further inquiry in selective coding they indicated insufficiently clear
differences between managers from different countries to warrant further inquiry.
They were therefore abandoned as a key category.
However, patterns in various other categories concerning systems, control processes
and planning emerged from interviews. Identification of these was stimulated by
some remarks by interviewees (interviews # 993, 996, 997) in the final full day of
fieldwork in Beijing. These reminded the researcher of comments made earlier by
other interviewees in Beij ing (interviews # 741, 80 J, 912), and kindled further
inquiry with Chinese interviewees in the UK. They were identified as a key category
during the final stage of fieldwork in January 1998 (Table 4.2). Further data was
accumulated by reference to existing interview transcripts.
This key category contrasts perspectives on management control in terms of process
to perspectives of control in terms of context and opportunities. The name for this
key category, 'Systems logic', is chosen to embrace both of these perspectives.
'System' is therefore used in a wider sense than "a set of interrelated elements ... set
of interdependent variables" (Reading, 1997), or "a group of related elements
organized for a purpose" (Parker 1984). The perspectives of context and
opportunities within this key category indicate an open systems meaning, with its
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concern for transacting with the environment and adaptation to changing conditions,
as well as for transformation of inputs into outputs and regulation of the system
(Nicholson, 1995).
Control assurance in this key category includes identification of business
opportunities and planning as well as of execution of business activities. This
followed from theoretical sampling stimulated by comments of interviewees, as
described above. It did not intentionally follow any prior theories of management
control embracing strategy and planning (Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1994; Simons,
1995).
12.1. 2 Interviewees
Data for this key category was identified from interviews with 29 of the 30 axial
respondents and from a further 26 interviewees. The 55 interviewees whose views
contributed to this key category are analysed in Table 12.1.
Location Bri1i.s.h ~ Mainland .Q1he.r Of which: Location
Organisation Cbioese ~ Eern~le IQ1a1
UK: CoX 9 2 9 2
CoY 6 2 1 7 2
Other 1 1 21
Prague: CoX 1 7 6 2
CoY 1 5 4 2 14
Beijing: CoX 3 6 5 9 5
CoY 4 1 2 3 19
Elsewhere Other 1 1 1
--
TOTAL 20 12 14 9 38 17 55
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
Table 12.1: Interviewees for selective coding on systems logic
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12.].3 Overview diagram
These categories are illustrated with some contextual factors in Figure 12.1. This












Several interviewees, in discussing planning of activities, compared European
sequential attitudes to time with Chinese synchronous attitudes (interview # 876).
For example:
78 The use of boxes, ovals and arrows in this diagram follows the convention used and
explained for Figure 7.1.
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"British people have to go through steps 1,2,3,4,5. Chinese people can go
straight from 1 to 5" (interviews # 1155, 1209, 1215).
This direct rather than sequential thinking was related to relatively greater emphasis
on imagination by Chinese philosophers such as Lao Zi (1994) and Zhuang Zi
(1964)79. This contrasts with greater use of deductive logic by ancient Greek
philosophers (interview # 1215). Another comment was that:
"A Chinese company may start 25 projects at once, whereas a Western
company would select 1 or at most 3. " (interview # 741).
However, it was also said that Chinese fear of stepping outside their 'comfort zone'
may discourage them from working on more than one task at a time (interview # 879;
document # 931).
Chinese managers were described as being able to plan faster than British managers,
as the latter attempt to identify all alternatives and consequences. The faster Chinese
approach was attributed to Chinese education where more is learnt and less debated
than in the British education system (interview # 1119).
A further observation by an interviewee about synchronous and sequential attitudes
to time was that US and British managers may project an image of dynamism, of
getting things done, whereas Chinese managers tend to cultivate an image of relaxed
power and influence. This was illustrated by an image of Chinese managers
appearing relaxed as they walk with cigar and mobile phone, which contrasts with an
image of Western managers hurrying about with their brief cases (interview # 741).
The implication is that success according to a sequential view of time requires rapid
progress through a number of successive tasks or milestones. In contrast, success for
someone with a synchronous view of time depends upon being able to co-ordinate
79 This refers to the Chinese founders of taoist philosophy, Lao Tzu (1994) and his follower
Chuang Tzu (1964). Their names are spelt in this dissertation with the pinyin method, as
now used in mainland China, rather than the more traditional Wade-Giles method used in
these English translations. Lao Zi is thought to have been a contemporary of Confucius
(Watson, 1964) around 500 BC, and Zhaung Zi to have lived from 369 to 286 BC (de Barry,
1960) which makes him a contemporary of Mencius.
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concurrent activities, or being in a strong strategic position from where opportunities
can be selected.
The cultural questionnaire had a question to measure sequential and synchronous
views of time (Question 34 in Appendix D). Although the differences in responses
between Chinese, Czech and UK survey respondents was not significant (Table 6.1),
the 35 Chinese responses tended to be more synchronous than were the 34 Czech or
30 British responses. It should be noted from Table 6.1 that there was a significant
difference between CoX and CoY survey respondents. Those working for CoX
tended to give more sequential responses than CoY respondents. This appears to
relate to the nature of their businesses: management of tasks for marketing, supply,
stockholding and delivery of physical products by CoX may be more sequential than
provision of service by CoY, which may involve more simultaneous consideration of
multiple factors such as time, cost and service quality.
The qualitative analysis of interviewees' opinions was sorted again by company in
order to check if they showed greater disparity between MNC than country of up-
bringing. There was no appreciable difference in these opinions from CoX and CoY.
Relatively low Chinese regard for sequential views of time are probably reflected in
the view that planning in detail beyond the near future is futile (interview # 741). As
an illustration of this view an interviewees quoted the following couplet:
Yu qiong qian It mu,
Geng shang yi ceng lou
from the Tang poem 'Deng Guan Que Lou' by Wang Zhihuan (Xu et al. 1987). It
was explained as meaning that success only comes from looking at the broad vista
from an upper floor, not by looking at details in the basement (interview # 1155).
Besides Chinese people tending to have a more synchronous view of time than do
British managers, they were described as having a longer time horizon. For example,
the Chinese Government was for many years after 1949 happy to leave Hong Kong
and Macao as European colonies (interview # 1221):
II Why rock the boat? We know they will revert to China in the fullness of time".
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This is consistent with the view expressed in the Tang poem quoted above, which
implies an eternal cycle time. Its implication can be that a broad or long term view is
important in order to identify context and opportunities.
This tendency for low reliance on detailed long term planning is depicted in Figure
12.1.
12.2.2 OQQortunities
A number of interviewees illustrated Chinese concern for business opportunities
more than for the process necessary for achieving them (interview # 1155). For
example, a Chinese bidder put in a bid for a construction contract, thinking that the
price could be worked out later. The bidder won the contract and then later sued for
compensation of US $850,000. For this Chinese contractor, the opportunity of
securing the bid was more important than the detail of how much the work would
actually cost. Furthermore, Chinese lawyers apparently pay relatively little attention
to procedure and more to end results (interview # 993).
The example may be remembered of a Western manager complaining that an
investment proposal by his Chinese subordinate "was a pack of lies!", when it turned
out one year later to bear no relation to the proposed plan (interview # 927). A
Chinese reaction to this anecdote was that the opportunities expected for the future
may be more important than whether the implementation one year into the project is
proceeding according to plan (interview # 993).
Chinese interest in opportunities, more than in process, is illustrated in the anecdote:
"In a feasibility study all thejigures may be fudged so that it comes out with
an answer that will be accepted; (the project) will be implemented next year
and completed the year after when the position will be different, when we will
anyway find another way to make lots of money" (interview # 741).
While this illustrates an optimistic view of economic conditions, it is also another
illustration of the Chinese disdain for planning in detail beyond the immediate term.
This Chinese tendency to be more concerned about opportunities, than in processes
for achieving them, has a parallel in the tendency for regulatory ambiguity and
flexible interpretation (11.2.7 Mitigating the impact of regulation and punishment -
Ambiguity as escape routes). These parallel tendencies appear to reflect concern for
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keeping options open so that promising opportunities may be pursued as they arise,
rather than for commitment to a specific course of action. That is to value the
contextual strength and flexibility of a position that offers advantageous
opportunities, over the sequential logic of commitment to a robust plan.
It also has a parallel in valuing information that is kept private, rather than using the
process of public challenge to enhance its value. Information that is not widely
known may potentially be used for competitive advantage if circumstances permit.
12.2 3 Contextual and zynthesising thinking
Concern for long term opportunities, rather than in detailed long term planning for
how to realise them, may be related to a Chinese tendency to look for pragmatic
solutions within the particular context, rather than conceptual thinking in terms of
universal principles (interview # 930). For example, while discussing the design of
management control systems, it was said that Chinese people tend not to be
interested in concepts (interview # 996), and not to look for how concepts or rules
might apply in other situations (interview # 786). This is connected to the Chinese
assumption that how laws and regulations should be applied in particular situations
should be interpreted flexibly so that they are appropriate for the particular
circumstance (interview # 639). It was also related by an interviewee to the low
regard for the rule of law in mainland China (interview # 1215).
An explanation for Beijing taxi drivers not wearing seat belts, in contravention of the
law, was that they believe in their own driving skill, that traffic is slow because there
are so many cars, and they trust in their own fate and good fortune (interview #
933)80. Accordingly Beijing taxi drivers tend to see their situation in terms not of
general concepts for traffic and safety, but of their particular situation.
This contextual thinking is shown in Figure 12.1 by the box labelled 'Context not
universal principles'. It was related to the Chinese tradition of synthesis as another
80 The researcher's opinion, based on personal observation while in Beijing, was that driving
skill of taxi drivers was not high, traffic was not always slow, and when slow it was seldom
safe. Seat belts were seldom useable. Attempts to use the seat belt when in the front
passenger seat were usually met with instructions from the taxi driver either not to fasten it,
or that it was only necessary to drape it across one's body when passing a policeman.
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explanation for the Tang couplet quoted above from 'Deng Guan Que Lou'. This
may be contrasted to the European tradition of analysis and reductionistic thinking
(interview # 1155). Whereas European thinking usually moves from general
concepts to analytical details, Chinese thinking tends to move between pragmatic
solutions and synthesis of relationships within a context. Pragmatism was therefore
another feature of mainland Chinese attitudes to planning and management control.
12.2.4 Pragmatism
In discussing pragmatism of Chinese attitudes to management control, an interviewee
pointed to Deng Xiao Ping's pragmatic solution of 'one country, two systems', for
absorbing Hong Kong into the People's Republic of China. This was a denial of any
overarching concept (interview # 1221).
An interviewee agreed with a description for Chinese people as 'social pragmatists',
and explained how a Chinese business person would expect a business partner to
support him, rather than let him down by insisting on a point of principle. This
interviewee gave as an example question 1 of the cultural questionnaire (see
Appendix D), concerning whether to give evidence against a friend in a traffic
accident. According to this interviewee, the typical Chinese answer would probably
be that the friend would be supported if he or she were a business partner or close
associate, but not if there was no such close relationship (interview # 1212)81.
An obvious facet of this tendency for pragmatism is interest in solutions. For
example, Western consultants were making a presentation of their recommendation
to a Chinese company. The Chinese clients asked the Western presenters to cut the
'fancy slide show', not to update 'the pretty schedules', but just to deliver the
solution. The Western consultants were concerned that, without following their
process and the client understanding the new system, quality of the recommended
solution could not be assured (interview # 912).
81 As it happened, responses to the two parts of this question by people from mainland China
were 68% in favour of supporting the friend, whereas 51% of Czech responses and 72% of
British responses were in favour of testifying against the friend.
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This interest in pragmatic solutions is probably also reflected in the Chinese
propensity for flexible interpretation of laws and regulations that may be inconsistent
with their purpose (11.2.7 Mitigating the impact of regulation and punishment -
Flexible interpretation).
12.2.5 Process
Concern of Western managers for control processes has been contrasted here with
characteristic concern of Chinese managers for opportunities and pragmatic
solutions. Mainland Chinese managers were described as generally having low
interest in processes (interview # 1119), in achieving these solutions and in
systematic planning (interview # 876). Itwas remarked that Chinese managers focus
on the ends more than the means (interview # 1155). An interviewee pointed out that
control in the sense of a process is seen as cumbersome by Chinese managers.
Furthermore, they tend not to think in terms of processes such as depicted in the
diagrams used in the axial coding of this research as illustrated in Appendix C
(interview # 993). The link between low interest in control processes together with
concern for pragmatic solutions was made with the explanation that a Chinese
manager would not look at meaningless threats if he or she knows how to achieve the
goal or solution (interview # 1119). It is illustrated in Figure 12.1 with the box
'Opportunities & pragmatic solutions more than process'. This links all of the boxes
for control elements for Chinese perceptions of systems logic.
A Chinese tendency for low concern for process is reflected in the paucity of
feedback information in Chinese organisations (departmental lunch # 683), and
reluctance of staff to provide it (interview # 1119), which was discussed above
(l0.5.1 Chinese attitudes). It is also reflected in the diagrams of the 30 axial
respondents' perceptions of credit control. Chinese axial respondents had a
significantly lower preference for monitoring control than did British or Czech axial
respondents. They also had a lower preference for intervention as a result of that
monitoring, although the difference was not significant (Table 6.2).
An explanation of education has already been mentioned for a faster Chinese than
Western approach to planning (interview # 1119). It was explained how there is
relatively more learning of received wisdom in Chinese education, compared to
debate in Western education (9.9 Cultural and other contextual factors). The view
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was put forward that the Chinese educated mind has a greater tendency to jump
straight to what is seen as the correct solution, and to spend less time with logic
supporting that and alternative answers (interview # 996).
12.2.6 People. attitudes and relationships more than process.
The Chinese tendency to see control processes as cumbersome (interview # 993) was
reflected in several discussions, which indicated that Chinese managers tend to see
control in terms of people, attitudes and relationships rather than of processes.
It was said that the Chinese view of control is by people, in contrast to the Western
(or at least Anglo-Saxon) view of management control as a process or mechanism. It
is who is in control that is important, just as in China it is rule by people not by the
law (interview # 1119).
Besides the people who control, there were references to those who are controlled:
"Westerners believe in a system, Chinese believe in human beings: a good
system cannot replace the intelligence of a good guy" (interview # 801).
The anecdote was told of a manager in an indigenous Chinese company who relied
for control assurance on the quality of his staff and was unconcerned about whether
they were doing their work in the best way (interview # 789). Also it was said that,
in order to give flexibility to how the application of rules may limit long term loans,
a bank's Chinese credit officer would be inclined to issue rolling loans, rolled over
every year, to good borrowers whom the credit officer knows (interview # 981). This
perception of control in terms of people, opens possibilities for control through the
use of relationships, including interpersonal relationships, rather than through
process. It reflects also findings of Chinese tendencies to rely more on interpersonal
relationships than on contracts and procedures (7.2.1 Relationships and contracts;
11.2.5 Feeling and relationship more than internal rules and procedures).
The human dimension of management control was illustrated in the view that control
is an attitude:
"Control is awareness not a system; it is only effective when it is in people's
minds" (interview # 997).
In reporting these findings to Western managers of CoX and CoY, considerable
sympathy was shown for the view that having the right people and attitudes are
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important to effective management control. However, these Western managers
would not have been prepared to forego their control processes to rely primarily on
having intelligent people with the right attitude (presentations # 1263 and 1290).
This Chinese control concern for people and relationships, more than control as a
process, is illustrated in Figure 12.1. This box labelled 'People more than process' is
linked to 'Opportunities and pragmatic solutions more than process', because they
both indicate alternatives to process, and may be complementary rather than
exclusive alternatives.
In explaining these findings, concern of Western managers for control processes has
been contrasted both to Chinese managers' concern for opportunities and also their
concern for control through people. These concerns can be grouped logically into a
single sub-category of three alternatives, namely opportunities, people and processes.
This single sub-category with 3 dimensions was used in analysing weights of
opinion. Among 13 interviewees, the weight of opinion about Chinese views of
management control was about equally divided between concern for context and
opportunities, for people and for process. Among 35 interviewees, the weight of
opinion concerning non-Chinese views of management control was three quarters for
concern for process, one quarter for people and virtually no mention of opportunities.
Among these, British concern for process was slightly higher than Czech concern.
Czech concern for people was higher than British concern and not so different in
weight of opinion from the Chinese concern. Although negative case analysis
suggested that seeing control in terms of people may reflect location effects in all 3
locations (13.2.1 Qualitative negative case analysis - Differences by location), a
significant correlation was found between this category and Diffuse culture (Table
13.8). So the evidence for national culture as an explanation is at least as strong as
location effects.
The possibility is recognised that this analysis of weights of opinion may
overestimate the Chinese perception of management control as a process. The
researcher became aware of Chinese perceptions of control in terms of people and
opportunities only on the last full day of fieldwork in Beijing. Therefore data on
most Chinese interviewees' perceptions for this sub-category were not gathered from
specific discussion of these alternatives, but from what they said or omitted
throughout their interviewees. The course of discussion in each interview was
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shaped by the researcher's emerging theoretical sensitivity, the interviewee's
perception of management control and his or her interest in the research. Late
inclusion in the researcher's theoretical sensitivity, of recognising the possibility that
Chinese interviewees might not see management control in terms of a process,
therefore introduced a bias.
There were comments and indications that training and the experience of working
with a Western MNC had affected some Chinese interviewees' ways of thinking
(Training meeting # 651; interviews # 804, 819, 840, 876, 930). This was apparent
with relatively inexperienced staff adopting attitudes to control processes, conceptual
thinking and planning more typical of Western thinking. In contrast, some of the
stronger views on control in terms of opportunities and people came from mainland
Chinese managers with longer experience working with Western organisations
(interviews # 801, 993, 997, 1119, 1155). Therefore deep seated values and
perceptions of national culture appear to have a long lasting influence that, with time
and reflection stimulated by experience, can reassert themselves above adoption and
perhaps enthusiasm for new ideas learnt from training and employers.
12.3 Czech and British views
Czech and British views of systems and processes do not appear to be very different.
Much of their control assurance tends to be concerned with whether systems work, as
illustrated in Figure 12.1. It appears that threats and opportunities tend to be seen
more as relating to the process, and whether given objectives will be achieved, than
to opportunities for new objectives. Both Czech and British views of time and
planning appear to be sequential rather than synchronous. The low concern by
Chinese managers for detailed long term planning was contrasted to Western views,
that projects and processes should be planned in sufficient detail to provide some
assurance that intended objectives will be achieved (interviews # 741, 786, 996).
Czech, more than British, interviewees appeared to emphasise understanding
(interviews # 483, 528, 1026, 1029, 1071, 1350) and knowing (interviews # 1350,
1374, 1329) whether the system works. Where a British manager mentioned
understanding, it was understanding the business rather than the control system or
framework (interview # 117). Another British manager saw seeing the control
system work as being important to control assurance, which implied that 'knowing'
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or 'understanding' would not be sufficient until evidence was received that it was
working (interview # 1347). A clear and consistent system plan (interview # 291) or
process design, with attention to planning of sequential steps (observation # 343;
documents # 426, 429; interview # 1039), responsibilities and monitoring (document
# 474) appeared to be more important for Czech managers than for Chinese, or
possibly even British, managers. The Czech concern for people was an emphasis on
personal integrity and staff understanding their duties. It was therefore rather
different from the Chinese concern for relationships with people.
There appears to be a link between this Czech need to understand that the system
works and instructing staff so that they understand what is expected of them, which
was discussed above (9.3.2 Czech views). There may also be a connection with
Czech desire for legal certainty. Just as assurance that a system works, and will
continue to do so, depends upon some certainty that universal rules determine
workings of the system, so also assurance that a legal system and institutions operate
effectively depend upon certainty of some legal rules.
In contrast, the impression gained of British managers' control perceptions was of
greater emphasis on a wider mix of control elements such as accountabilities,
procedures, authorities, teamwork, organisational structure and roles, and transparent
as well as accurate information (interview # 117). British, more than Czech,
managers therefore appeared to give attention to a balance of checks and supporting
processes. Several British managers, but only 1 Czech manager, described this
balance in terms of a control framework or an overall picture of management control
embracing multiple systems and control elements82 (documents # 189 and 880.
interviews # 879. 117, 1125, 1197, 1374). These views of a control framework
embraced a variable mix of systems and control elements. One manager saw a
control framework as including the control environment, management understanding
risks to the business, staff understanding what they are supposed to be doing, and all
using common sense. This manager distinguished a control framework from a
formal control system, which may be a "glittering carapace" of manuals, procedures
82 The Czech manager's explanation of a control framework was in terms of knowing that
the business and transactions are proceeding according to plan. It did not appear to embrace
a broad mixture of multiple systems and control elements.
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and display of a system (interview # 1197). Another manager stressed attitudes to
control as part of a control framework (interview # 1125)83. Control frameworks
seemed to represent a more pragmatic approach than the quality of design and
understanding sought by Czech managers.
12.4 Cultural and other contextual factors
Interviewees made direct reference to a number of contextual factors. There were
references to sequential and synchronous views of time, to synthesis and analysis in
thinking, and to differences in education systems. Comparison was made between
Chinese philosophy and the European tradition of hypothetico-deductive logic. The
context of market opportunities and effects of training and experience of working
with Western organisations were also indicated. These contextual factors are shown
in Figure 12.1
The cultural dimension of Universalism - Particularism was also clear as a
contextual factor. Particularism appeared in Chinese concern for opportunities and
solutions in a particular context, in contrast to Universalism of Western concern for
general principles that may determine what processes are likely to work. This is
supported by the cultural survey (Table 6.1.) which found Czech and British
responses to be more Universalist than those of Chinese respondents. The cultural
dimension of Universalism - Particularism is included in Figure 12.1.
The tendency to see control in terms of using interpersonal relationships rather than
in terms of process, which was found to be more prevalent among mainland Chinese
than non-Chinese managers, indicates Person rather than Task orientation, and
Diffuse rather than Specific culture. Control in terms of people may indicate
Collectivism, which tends to privilege interpersonal relationships. However, this
connection is complicated by the tendency also among Czech managers to see people
as important, because this importance was based on personal integrity and
understanding rather than Collectivist relationships. The importance of people to
many mainland Chinese and Czech perceptions may indicate Locus of Control in
83 This does not imply that all non-British managers saw a control environment and attitudes
to control as unimportant to providing a control assurance (interviews # 789,804).
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Other people. The pattern of control perceptions is consistent with the significantly
more Diffuse Chinese than Czech or British cultures found in the cultural survey
(Table 6.1) and with Czech culture falling between the two. However it is
inconsistent with more Locus of Control in Other people found among British than
mainland Chinese survey respondents, and the significantly greater Locus of Control
in Other people found among British than Czech survey responses (Table 6.1).
Consistency with Individualism - Collectivism is unclear because Trompenaars
(Table 5.3) found Czech culture to be the most Individualist. Therefore only Specific
- Diffuse is included among contextual factors in Figure 12.1. Indeed a significant
correlation was found (Table 13.8)between control focus on people and relationships
and Diffuse culture (negative correlation with Specific - Diffuse), and a significant
correlation was found between control focus on process and Specific culture.
12.5 Relating findings on systems logic to the literature
This section starts to relate findings on systems logic to existing literature. Later
sections refer more specifically to cultural theory and empirical research.
Redding and Martyn-Johns (1979, page 107) point out that:
"The structuring of organizations and imposition of control systems onto the
structure, imply a view of cause and effect relationships and some form of
abstraction. "
They compare Maruyama's (1974) 'unidirectional causal paradigm', typical of
Western thinking, to the 'mutual causal paradigm' typical of Oriental thinking. The
former embraces the traditional linear cause and effect model, a deterministic view of
the world, Universalism or homogenistic thinking, categorical perception, and belief
in one truth. In this, knowledge is accumulated from tested abstract theories of
relationships between observations. Maruyama traces the deductive and
classificatory or categorical thinking of the unidirectional causal paradigm to Plato
and Aristotle among other ancient Greek philosophers. The latter Oriental mode of
thinking" includes acceptance of circular reasoning, organic development through
84 Maruyama (1974)he adds a third the 'random process paradigm'. He stresses that his
paradigms are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. He links the mutual causal
paradigm to Japanese and, with some differences, to Chinese thinking, as well as to some
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multiple linkages and networks with multiple relationships, contextual perception,
and multiple truths.
Maruyama (1974) relates his paradigms to perceived ability to predict future events
from the present. He explains how under the unidirectional causal paradigm future
events are seen to follow predictably as the result of prior conditions. Under the
mutual causal paradigm cause is not seen as unidirectional: networks with deviation
counteracting causal loops may give small effects to large causes, whereas deviation
amplifying causal loops may result in large effects from seemingly small causes.85
Redding and Martyn-Johns (1979) maintain that Chinese people tend to avoid
concepts. In this, knowledge is based upon reality as it is perceived within its
context, rather upon abstract theories. Consequently, Chinese thinking is intensely
pragmatic, and Chinese students avoid concept orientated disciplines. While they
point to the pragmatism and absence of metaphysics in Confucian philosophy,
Honderich (1995) describes Chinese philosophy as predominantly practical. He
describes Chinese philosophy as motivated primarily by a concern with how people
should live their lives and, in some schools of thought, concern to maintain social
and political order. Redding and Martyn-Johns claim that, as a consequence of this
mutual causal paradigm, Chinese businesses in South East Asia operate without an
organised planning system.
Maruyama's (1974) and Redding and Martyn-Johns' (1979) contrast of
unidirectional to mutual causal paradigms appears to give cognitive and
philosophical background to the Universalist - Particularist cultural dimension
identified here as a contextual factor, as well as to different attitudes to planning.
Further empirical evidence of this contrast between Chinese and Western thinking is
native American thinking, such as that of the Navajo. He links the unidirectional causal
paradigm to white middle class US thinking.
8S Under Maruyama's random process paradigm, outcomes are seen as probable rather than
certain. Since his paradigms are not exclusive, he postulates a probabilistic mutual causal
paradigm as a combination of the random process and mutual causal paradigms. Under this,
random chance events are seen to interject into causal loops creating more uncertainty and
making prediction even more difficult.
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given by Beamer (1998). Also, Porter (1996) provides examples of managers in
Chinese State Owned Enterprises failing to evaluate alternatives and to consider the
process for how an outcome is to be attained, when deciding on what course of
action to pursue. These examples would offend the unidirectional paradigm.
Hall (1977) contrasts mono chronic time, which is a typical perception of time in
USA, to polychronic time, typical in Latin America, the Middle East and
Mediterranean countries. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) equate Hall's
polychronic time to Synchronous orientation to time. Hall maintains that a
consequence of monochronic time is that tasks are seen as done one at a time, and
require some implicit or explicit scheduling; it therefore appears to be synonymous
with Sequential orientation to time. According to this orientation, tasks and time are
compartinentalised, which reduces attention to context.
"The particular blindness of the monochronic organization is to the humanness
of its members. The weakness of the polychronic type lies in their extreme
dependence on the head man to handle contingencies and stay on top of things.
(Monochronic) type bureaucracies, as they grow larger, turn inward" (HaU,
1977, page 24).
Hofstede (1991) remarks that Western thinking is analytical, while Eastern thinking
is concerned more with synthesis than is usual in Western cultures. Differences
between Chinese and European thinking can be illustrated, rather than proved, by
comparing the Chinese classic Sun Zi's Art of War (Sun Tzu, 1992)86 to Caesar's
Gallic Wars (Caesar, 1960)87. Chinese synthesis can be compared to European
analysis in the opening sentence of each work:
"The art of war is of vital importance to the state: the way of life or death; the
road to safety or ruin. II (Sun Tzu, 1992,page 1)
86 Sun Zi was a Chinese general of around 500 BC. His treatise on warfare is used as a guide
to business strategy and management (Khoo, 1992), and together with Confucian thinking
has had considerable influence on Chinese executives (Chen, 1995). The spelling 'Sun Zi'
conforms to the pinyin method, as used in mainland China and adopted in this study. He is
spelt 'Sun Tzu' in the traditional Wade Giles method.
87 This narrates Caesar's military campaign in Gaul and Britain from 58 to 50 BC.
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"The country of Gaul consists of three separateparts, one of which is inhabited
by the Belgae, one by the Aquitani, and one by the people who we call 'Gauls'
but who are known in their own language as 'Celts' " (Caesar, 1960,page 11).
Contrasting Chinese concerns for solutions and overall purpose, as opposed to
European attention to more immediate goals and processes for achieving them, can
also be illustrated in these works. Caesar narrates his battle against the German
Ariovistus, who had invaded Gaul:
"The next day I left what I considered to be adequate garrisons in both camps
and stationed all the auxiliaries in front of the smaller camp in sight of the
enemy. I hoped that their appearance would make some impression on the
enemy.... I placed each of my five senior officers in command of a legion and
entrusted the remaining legion to my quaestor, so that each man might know
that he was displaying his courage under the eyes of a high-ranking officer. ...
the battle again swung our way and the whole enemy army turned and ran.
They fled without stopping until they came to the Rhine, about fifteen miles
away. A very few, who thought their strength equal to the task, tried to swim
across, or managed tofind boats and so escaped. Among these was Ariovistus,
whofound a small craft moored to the bank and got away safely in it. All the
rest were overtaken and killed by our cavalry. " (Caesar, 1960,pages 38 - 39).
"It is also better to capture the enemy's army than to destroy it ... Fighting to
win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the supreme skill.
However to break the enemy's resistance withoutfighting is the supreme skill. "
(Sun Tzu, 1992, page 9).
Sun Zi does maintain that planning well ahead is important. However, this planning
seems to be ensuring that one only fights when in danger yet in a position to win, and
that the welfare of what is conquered is then restored (Sun Tzu, 1992, Chapter 12).
His emphasis is on positioning with respect to weather and ground, and on when and
with what resources to fight, rather than on sequential processes of strategy and
tactics. Beamer (1998) reports how mainland Chinese organisations avoid slavish
adherence to planning, which is in any case less detailed than done by German and
US companies.
This literature therefore gives support to findings here that Chinese systems thinking
with regard to management control tends towards pragmatic concern with
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opportunities and solutions rather than processes for achieving them, and with
concern for context and people than with sequential steps. British and Czech
concern with whether processes work and with detailed planning can be seen as
consistent with European traditions of deductive and sequential thought.
Whitley (1999) contrasts personal trust, in which trust is based upon personal
knowledge and interpersonal relationships, to systemic trust, in which trust is based
upon institutions and systems. The former he sees as typifying 'patriarchal' control
systems found in Chinese family businesses, whereas the latter is more significant in
other types of control systems prevalent in Western societies. This gives some
support to the finding here that Chinese managers tend to place more control
assurance on people and interpersonal relationships than on processes and on general
principles.
12.6 Relating findings on systems logic to cultural theory
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) maintain that in cultures where time is
seen as Sequential, planning tends to be thought of in terms of forecasts, and the
present and future tend to be seen as causally linked so that the future is capable of
being predicted. Chinese responses in the cultural survey, to Trompenaars' question
for this dimension, tended to be less Sequential than British or Czech responses, but
the difference is not significant (Table 6.1). However, Hampden-Turner and
Trompenaars (ibid.) report some misgivings with the circles question in
Trompenaars' instrument used for measuring Sequential - Synchronous time
orientations, particularly for rapidly developing countries, such as mainland China
and the Czech Republic. They therefore use another test to identify the extent that
time horizons for past, present and future overlap. They found mainland Chinese
culture to be the third most Synchronous after Hong Kong and Korea, and UK
culture to be 17th most Synchronous, or 8th most Sequential, among cultures of 24
countries (ibd., page 209).
It might be thought that the long-term and short-term orientations of Confucian
Dynamism might be associated with attitudes to planning. Hofstede and Bond
(1988; Hofstede, 1991) argue that the long term orientation of this cultural dimension
is more consistent than the short term orientation to entrepreneurship. However, they
do not appear to link their cultural dimension to planning or management control.
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12.7 Relating the findings on systems logic to empirical research
12. 7.1 Long term planning
Several cross-national empirical studies have inquired into preferences for short or
long term planning horizons and control. Daley et al. (1985) found that Japanese,
compared to US, controllers and managers think that long range plans for 3 or more
years are more valuable than short range plans. However, Ueno (Ueno and Sekaran,
1992; Ueno and Wu, 1993) found no significant difference between US and Japanese
companies in the importance of long range planning over 3 or more years.
Harrison et al. (1994) found greater emphasis by Singaporean and Hong Kong
managers, than by Australian and US managers, on long term planning, and greater
emphasis by Australian and US managers on short term planning. However, they do
not report what time scales they used in their instrument to differentiate long from
short term. Their finding supported their hypothesis which was based on cultural
dimensions of Individualism and Confucian Dynamism. This is not inconsistent with
the findings here of mainland Chinese emphasis on broad long term opportunities,
bearing in mind of course the caution against expecting there necessarily to be a
single constellation of Chinese values (Bond, 1996). However, the findings here add
an important rider, at least for mainland Chinese managers, that there may be low
emphasis on detailed planning of the processes to achieve these long term
opportunities.
12. 7.2 Overall conceDea,fcontrol
Several empirical studies have identified differences between nations in prevalent
overall concepts of control. Horovitz (1980) found a German concept of Kontrolle,
which was different from British ideas of control. Kontrolle is concerned with past
performance, product profitability and contribution, and with production efficiency.
It gives attention to accounting and cost data that follows fiscal accounting rules.
Horovitz described a development of thinking from Kontrolle to 'controlling', which
German managers see as a separate function, and has more emphasis on
responsibilities, planning, budgeting, and interpretation of variances in order to assist
operations take corrective action. Even with this development, he found that German
top managers tend to show greater agreement, than their British counterparts, with
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control as ensuring performance is as near as practical to plans. He found French top
managers showed the least agreement with this view of control. He also found that
both German and French top managers tend to see control as policing operations,
with which their British counterparts have low agreement. In contrast, he found that
British top managers have higher agreement than German or French top managers,
with control as motivation, assisting bosses evaluate subordinates' performance for
rewards and promotion.
Kreder and Zeller (1988) make a rather different comparison between German and
US concepts of control, which may to some extent reflect changes in German
thinking that were described as continuing in Horovitz' (1980) study. Kreder and
Zeller found a German concept of control that they described in a 'behavioral
model'. This emphasises decentralised, participative, direct interpersonal and socio-
emotional types of control. They contrast this with a US 'systems model' of control,
in which divisions or departments are seen as self controlling subsystems within an
integrated system characterised by centralised task-orientated control, and by indirect
control through regulations, plans and programmes.
Findings here of a characteristic Chinese concept of control contrasted to British and
Czech concepts of control, does not fit the comparisons made by either Horovitz
(1980) or Kreder and Zeller (1988). Both Chinese and Czech control concepts were
found here to have a greater 'policing' feel, for example ensuring that staff are
reliable, than British concepts that tend to be more consistent with empowerment.
Yet Chinese control appears to be the least interested in feedback information on past
events. While British and Czech control concepts are generally more consistent with
a systems or process approach, and Chinese concepts with a personal and attitudes
approach, the socio-emotional aspects of control are clearly important to managers
from all 3 countries. This analysis of control concepts, which builds upon what
emerges from the case study data rather than upon prior theory, appears to have
explored new avenues of inquiry.
12.8 Conclusions on systems logic
Findings from this key category of systems logic show that mainland Chinese
managers tend to gain relatively little control assurance from detailed or long term
plans. They tend to be more concerned about opportunities and pragmatic solutions
323
Chapter 12:Systems logic
than the processes for achieving them. Greater mainland Chinese reliance on people
and their attitudes than on control processes was also identified. In contrast, British
and Czech managers seemed to focus their control assurance on control processes,
that is on the means to ensure achievement of objectives. They seemed to seek more
control assurance that these processes work, than assurance from flexible positioning
and opportunities for new objectives.
These different perspectives were related to cultural dimensions of Sequential or
Synchronous time orientations, Specific - Diffuse and Universalist - Particularist.
Philosophic traditions, education systems and market conditions were also identified
as contextual factors. Some support was found in existing literature for these
findings and contextual factors. Empirical cross-national research into management
control indicates different cultural attitudes to long term planning and different
overall conceptions of management control, such as indicated by these findings for
systems logic. These findings extend the aspects of planning and overall control
concepts examined by these prior studies. There is however little overlap between
findings of this and the prior studies, and hence no scope for corroboration, apart
from the possibility that there may be cultural differences in perceptions.
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CHAPTER 13.
CORROBORATING FINDINGS WITH QUANTITATIVE TESTS
The selective coding findings described so far in this dissertation were generated by
qualitative analysis of patterns that emerged from data gathered in the field. This
chapter seeks to corroborate these findings with statistical or other quantitative tests.
The first section of this chapter is concerned with whether each axial respondent or
interviewee's perception of management control was unique. The researcher's feel for
the data gained during qualitative analysis was that no two people interviewed had the
same view of management control. This is demonstrated here quantitatively for axial
respondents and other interviewees who gave their views on a sufficiently wide range of
categories for their views to be compared.
The study has focused on the patterns that appeared to relate to the countries that
managers came from. The second section describes non-parametric statistical tests to
check whether alternative explanations to managers' country of upbringing could
explain these patterns. The third section then uses non-parametric statistics to test if
these patterns relate to particular cultural dimensions that were identified in the data of
the study or identified from cultural theory. Such relationships with cultural dimensions
may indicate explanations for patterns in perceptions of management control.
13.1 Unique perceptions ofmanagement control
13.1.1 The technique
A simple technique was developed to demonstrate whether the perceptions of
management control were unique'", This uses the ordinal score for an axial respondent
or other interviewee's view on each category. Each score was measured on a Likert
intensity scale, whether it were for an axial coding category (see 6.5 Patterns in
perceptions of management control) or for a selective coding category (see 4.3.8
Selective coding - Depth of support and alternative explanations, also footnote 46 in
7.4.1 Trust and relationships). Scores for categories may be concatenated to give a
88 This simple technique was inspired by conversation with Margaret Milner, at the University
of Glasgow.
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string, or concatenated number, for each interviewee. This string of scores may be
sorted in, say, ascending numeric order. Two interviewees with identical scores on all
categories would appear as two identical strings or numbers that are adjacent in the
sorted sequence. If no two adjacent strings are identical, then each interviewee's score
across all categories analysed is unique. This therefore demonstrates whether or not
perceptions of management control given by any two interviewees were scored as
identical; that is, not unique in terms of what categories they referred to and how
important they thought each category to be for providing control assurance. This
demonstration of uniqueness is irrespective of the order in which scores for the
categories are placed in the string.
Care, in selecting the order in which scores for categories are placed in the string, may
however illustrate to what extent perceptions fall into demographic clusters of
interviewees. For example, if scores that are powerful in separating perceptions
between national cultures are placed at the left hand end of the string, sorting
interviewees by their string of axial coding scores, as if this were a concatenated
number, would tend to list interviewees by national culture. Itmay also demonstrate the
extent that there is some overlap between perceptions of interviewees from different
cultures (Au, 1999).
Of course this technique uses the effect of each category on its own to cluster
interviewees. It does not recognise the potential interaction between two or more
categories. It may be tempting to use statistical cluster or factor analysis to identify
interactions of categories in separating the views of interviewees from different
countries. This has not been done for two reasons. Firstly there were concerns of
method. Although factor analysis of ordinal data is possible (Rummel, 1970; Cattell,
1978), it is difficult because of scaling and non-linearity problems, and because
assumptions of normal distributions would probably have to be relaxed. Furthermore,
missing data in the selective coding would severely restrict which categories could be
included in the factor analysis. Secondly, analysis of clusters may go beyond what is
essential to an exploratory study. Analysis of clusters of categories of control
perceptions, or clusters of cultural and other contextual factors, might be addressed in
future research, although this might face other methodological concerns (15.1.1
Methodology and method - Interaction between factors). There was also concern that
clusters of categories or factors appearing from statistical analysis might not necessarily
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represent associations that are meaningful to either the managers who were the subject
of this research or practitioners among the research audience. That is to say, it might
not meet the criteria of purpose and perspectives (3.5 1. Purpose and perspectives).
]3, /,2 Unique percevtions jn the axjal coding
The technique described above was applied to the axial coding categories for the 30
axial respondents. The string of category scores for each axial respondent is shown in a
row in Table 13.1. Each column shows scores for each axial coding category.
Columns are sequenced in Table 13.1 according to how powerful they appear to be in
distinguishing perceptions between national cultures. For this, significance of
differences from a Mann-Whitney test were used, in which the probability ('p' value)
was tested for the null hypothesis that perceptions for a category came from a single
homogenous population. The Mann-Whitney test was run 3 times, once each to
compare British to Czech, British to Chinese, and Czech to Chinese axial respondents.
This was done to identify the lowest 'p' value for each category between any 2 national
cultures, where a low 'p' value indicates confidence that perceptions are distinguished
between these two cultures. This minimum 'p' value is shown in the bottom row of
Table 13.1.
Each row in Table 13.1, with a string of scores for an axial respondent, can be seen to
be unique. If each row is viewed as a number, rows can be seen to be sorted in
ascending value. The most left hand digit where each row differs from its predecessor
is identified by a bold digit. Further variety in these unique views is therefore shown by
differences between digits to the right of those in bold print.
Because of the sequence in which categories have been placed in Table 13.1, axial
respondents begin to cluster by national culture. The top of the Table is populated
mostly by Chinese axial respondents, the middle by Czech and the bottom by British.
However, it also shows considerable overlap, with a Czech axial respondent appearing
fifth from the top of the Table among Chinese axial respondents, and another Czech
appearing sixth from the bottom among British axial respondents.
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Chinese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 2
Chinese 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 3 2 0 0 2 0 2
Chinese 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 3 0 0 2
Chinese 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 3 2 2 0 2
Czech 0 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 3 2 2 2 2 2 0 2
Chinese 0 0 2 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2
Chinese 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 3 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 0 2
Czech 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 0 2 3 0 2 3 3 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 2
Czech 0 1 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 3 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2
British 0 2 4 2 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2
Chinese I 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Czech 1 0 I 2 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2
Chinese 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 2 3 2 0 0 2 3 2 2 0 2 2 2
Chinese 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 3 2 2 0 3 2 2 2
British 2 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 3 0 2 0
Czech 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 2 3 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2
Czech 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2
Czech 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
Czech 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 3 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2
Czech 2 0 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 3 2 2 2 0 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 0 2
British 2 0 2 2 0 2 3 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2
British 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 3 0 3 3 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
British 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 3 2 2 2 0 2 0 2
British 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 2 3 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2
Czech 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 3 0 0 3 0 3 2 3 2 2 0 0 2 2
British 2 2 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 3 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 0 2
British 2 2 4 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 2 4 2 0 2 1 2 0 3
British 2 3 2 2 0 4 2 1 2 3 2 2 2 0 0 4 3 2 2 0 0 2 3
British 3 0 3 2 0 2 3 0 2 2 3 2 2 0 0 4 3 2 1 2 3 2 2
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Table 13.1: Axial coding scores sorted to demonstrate uniqueness of axial
respondent's perceptions89
89 For this analysis, coding was as follows: 0 - no mention of a category, 1 - some reference to a
category by the axial respondent in their description of a control element, 2 - mention of a
control as important to providing control assurance and which corresponds to a category, 3 -
described as very or most important to control assurance, 4 - described as essential or a
prerequisite to control assurance.
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Table 13.1 however only illustrates the existence of uniqueness, not the extent of
differences between perceptions in the axial coding. One might ask: how unique would
a perception be if there were only a small difference from another manager's
perception? The number of categories for which scores between two axial respondents
differ may be taken as a crude indicator of the extent of differences between their
perceptions. Each axial respondent's perception may then be compared to those of
other axial respondents to find with whom there is the least difference. The number of
categories that differ from the most similar perception then gives some indication of
how unique is this axial respondent's perception. For example, according to this
indicator, the axial respondent on the 1st row of Table 13.1 is most similar to the axial
respondent on the 14th preceding row, because there are only 6 categories for which
their scores differ. The comparison is illustrated in Table 13.2, in which categories with
different scores between the 1st and 14th axial respondents are shown in bold:
fJ>~ ... fJ> fJ>e c ~ ~~ "g ~ ...
tkj § ::s fJ> c
~
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Chinese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 2
Chinese 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 3 2 2 0 3 2 2 2
Table 13.2: Example of a match of a perception with its most similar perception
This search for the most similar perception has been done for all 30 axial respondents.
The minimum number of categories by which each axial respondent's perception
differed from its most similar perception was noted as an indicator of how unique that
axial respondent was in their perception. The frequency of these minimum differences
is illustrated in Figure 13.1.
It shows that the extent of differences between each axial respondent's perception and
his or her most similar perception is no smaller than differences on 4 categories and has
a median of 7. It confirms that the extent of differences between axial respondents in
their perceptions scored in the axial coding is in no instance trivial.
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Figure 13.1: Frequency of minimum number of differences between perceptions
]3. 1.3 Unique vercevtions jn the selective coding
Analysis of unique perceptions has been done so far in terms of the axial coding.
Whether interviewees' perceptions are unique in the selective coding categories is
however more relevant to the substantive theory. Analysis of uniqueness in the
selective coding is more difficult because no one gave views that were included in all
selective coding categories. Whereas axial coding was based on general discussion with
each axial respondent of what provides control assurance for credit control, selective
coding inquired into differences of views for specific key categories. Therefore, while
omission of an axial category may be interpreted as the axial respondent seeing it as
insufficiently important to credit control assurance to warrant mention, omission of a
selective coding category very likely represents omission by the researcher in not asking
the interviewee about it. Uniqueness analysis has therefore been restricted to the
selective coding categories for which most views were given, and to the axial
respondents and other interviewees who gave views on these categories. Only 27 out of
the 59 interviewees'" included in the selective coding could be included in this analysis.
90 30 axialrespondents plus 29 other interviewees.
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Czech -1.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.4
Chinese -1.0 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0
Chinese -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Chinese -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
Chinese -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.0 0.4
Chinese -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
Czech -1.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.5
British -1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Czech -1.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3
Czech -1.0 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6
Czech -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Czech -1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.2
Chinese -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.4
Czech -0.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7
Czech -0.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.0
Chinese 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Czech 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.0 0.0
British 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.2
British 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.0
British 1.0 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.3
British 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.0
British 1.0 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
British 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4 0.0
British 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 1.0
British 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.7
British 1.0 0.7 0.0 0.5 0.8 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.2 0.0
British 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003 0.0011 0.0023 0.0027 0.0035 0.0114 0.0117'p'value
Table 13.3: Selective coding scores sorted to demonstrate uniqueness of
perceptions"
91 These scores are as included in analysis of weights of opinion for the selective coding.
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Scores for the perceptions of these interviewees against these selective coding
categories are shown in Table 13.3. It uses the same technique as used for
demonstrating uniqueness of axial coding categories, illustrated in Table 13.1.
The most left hand digit where each row differs from its predecessor is identified by a
bold digit; these show only differences of at least 0.392 so as not to indicate greater
accuracy than the scoring method may support. These bold digits show that perceptions
of interviewees could be distinguished in most cases within the first 4 categories from
the left in Table 13.3. It shows that the views of the 5th from bottom interviewee in the
Table could not be distinguished from those of the 6th from bottom interviewee for these
categories by an appreciable difference in score. As it happens, scores for the views of
these 2 interviewees are appreciably different for 4 selective coding categories that are
not shown in the Table93• This illustrates that identifying the extent of differences
between interviewees' perceptions is less meaningful for the selective than axial coding
categories, because so many selective coding categories had to be omitted from the
analysis.
Because columns for categories have been sequenced in Table 13.3 by the power with
which categories distinguish views between managers from different countries, it
illustrates clustering and overlap of views between managers from the 3 countries. The
top of the Table is populated mostly by Chinese interviewees, the middle by Czech and
the bottom by British. There are also exceptions to this pattern such as the Czech
interviewee at the head of the Table, and the lonely British interviewee 8 from the top of
the table.
13.2 Testing alternative explanations to country of upbringing
The selective coding findings were identified as relating to country factors, such as
national culture or differences in institutions between the countries. However,
92 The 0.3 was rounded up from 0.25 for columns with a range of 0 to +1. Because the first
column has a wider range of -1 to + 1, differences of at least 0.5 were sought in this column.
93 'Appreciable difference' was indicated by difference in scores of at least 0.25 for scales 0 to
1, or at least 0.5 for scales -1 to +1. Because both of these interviewees were axial respondents,
it was also seen that they differed in their perceptions of credit control.
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alternative explanations were also checked as 'negative case analysis' In order to
challenge the emerging theory (see 4.3.8 Selective coding - Depth of support and
alternative explanations).
13.2.1 Qualitative negative case analysjs
Negative case analysis started by looking for instances where emergent hypotheses were
not supported. In some cases, negative case analysis led to modification of emerging
hypotheses in order to reflect different contextual factors. This increased the conceptual
density and explanatory power of the grounded theory (Henwood and Pigeon, 1992).
An example was reluctance to accept responsibility, which emerged first of all as a
mainland Chinese trait (8.2 Responsibility). This was explained as arising from, firstly,
fear of losing face and the strong burden of responsibility felt by mainland Chinese
people, secondly less separation by them of work and home life so that concerns at work
are more likely to be taken home, and thirdly Chinese comfort zones. However,
instances of Czech reluctance to accept responsibility were then identified. Inquiry into
these revealed different explanations of attitudes held over from the previous
Communist regime before 1989; and responsibility appeared to mean something
different to Czech people than it did to mainland Chinese people. Finally, on returning
to the UK, inquiry led to examples of British reluctance to accept responsibility. These
were explained as arising from uncertainty. It can thus be seen how negative case
analysis, into the initial hypothesis of reluctance to accept responsibility being a
Chinese trait, extended the theory both in terms of who might be reluctant and of
reasons for their reluctance.
Weights of opinion were analysed for interviewees working for CoX and CoY as well
as between managers from different countries. This analysis checked the alternative
hypothesis that perhaps apparent differences between managers from different countries
actually arose from corporate factors. Absence of major differences between weights of
opinion between the 2 MNCs helped to show that differences between corporate
cultures, or between their management control systems, were not explanations for
patterns of perceptions.
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13.2.2 Non-varametric statistical tests
Simple comparison of the magnitude of differences in weights of opinion was taken
further in statistical tests on the Likert scale intensity scores of interviewees' opinions,
from which weights of opinion had been calculated. This allowed statistical
significance of differences in patterns of perceptions to be calculated. Results of these
tests are summarised in Table 13.4.
These statistical tests were done for selective coding findings of differences between
interviewees from different countries, where intensity scores were gathered from a
sufficient range of interviewees. It was done to check significance of patterns between
the 3 locations, 6 sites, 3 functions, 4 levels of seniority and both genders, as well as
between countries of upbringing and MNCs. The choice of the Kruskal-Wallis and
Mann-Whitney non-parametric tests was explained in Chapter 4 (4.3.8 Selective coding
- Corroborating selective coding hypotheses with statistical tests).
Differences by 'national' cultural grouping, i.e. country of upbringing.'
Table 13.4 shows that the difference in perceptions between interviewees from different
countries ('National' cultural grouping) is significant (p<O.1) for all of these categories
used in the findings, apart from 'Self interest, mutual interest or mutual reliance'.
Although not significant (p=0.178), this category was included in the findings because
qualitative analysis showed it to be consistent with perceptions of reliance on contracts
or relationships and with explanations for a Czech tendency towards low trust (7.4.1
Trust and relationships). It was also consistent with a tendency for Czech loyalty to
oneself (9.4 Loyalty - Czech views). This test therefore corroborates the qualitative
findings of differences in control perceptions, apart from this one category, between
managers from different countries. That is to say, there is a less than a 10% likelihood
that the patterns, identified as being between managers from different countries, arose
by chance or from some factors others than the country they come from. In many cases,
this likelihood is less than 1%, and in 12 cases less than 0.1% (p = 0.000 in Table 13.4).
Because no claim is made that the interviewees are representative of any wider
population, this statistical significance says nothing about real world populations (4.3. 7
Axial coding - Statistical test of axial coding patterns).
334
Chapter 13: Corroborating findings with quantitative tests
Qat!:lgQri!:l:!Qf !<Q!ltrQII2!:lr!<!:ll2tiQ!lS N CI.!I!Y[al grQYl2i!lgs
~ ~ LQ!<ii!!i2DS ~ EI.!!l!<ti2DS S~!li2ri!:t ~
BI.!:!il!!:lSSmlatiQ!ls w~b ~lIt~rl!all2al1i~s (Qbal2!~[ Z)
Contract or relationship 34 0.009 0.040 0.047
Relationship:
- Self interest. mutual interest or mutual 29
reliance
- Instrumental or based on feeling 16 0.001 0.Q15 0.036 0.061
QbligatioD:! (Qbal2t~[ Il)
Responsibility: guilt or shame 13 0.016 0.045 0.071
Accountability or responsibility 40 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.067
Il!t~[l!al mla!i2!lS (Cbal2!~[ 9)
Contribution or reliability 28 0.000 0.079 0.082
Coach and develop staff 24 0.015 0.037
Instruct staff 24 0.064
Protect and look after staff 24 0.062 0.038 0.060 0.040 0.087
Coach - instruct - look after staff 24 0.018 0.031 0.065
Instruct - coach - look after staff 24 0.070 0.072
Coach - look after - instruct staff 24 0.048
Loyal to self 24 0.057 0.004 0.034
Loyal to boss 24 0.018 0.005 0.051
Structure: teams 43 0.000 0.000 0.001
Structure: roles 43 0.025
Structure: hierarchy 43 0.000 0.029 0.043
Hierarchy: paternal 19 0.000 0.062 0.016 0.043
Hierarchy: ability and or charisma 19 0.000 0.001 0.017
Hierarchy: organisational authority 19 0.013 0.056
l!lfimnatiQ!l (Qbal2t!:l[ 1Q)
Truth: Absolute or relative 15 0.001 0.006 0.070
Information: transparency or secrecy 38 0.000 0.001 0.002
Li!w. n!1~s~ 12[Q~dl.!ms (Qbi!I2I~[ 11)
Rule of law 28 0.000 0.000 0.004
Morality: individual or communal 30 0.000 0.001 0.017
Legal process for resolving disputes 17 0.000 0.000 0.013
Procedures & internal regulations: 44 0.000 0.070 0.046 0.017
importance
Basis for acceptability of procedures:
- Feeling 40 0.002 0.003 0.047
- Reason & understanding 40 0.027 0.028
- actually like procedures 40 0.003 0.010 0.074
S:tlil~mlilQ9i!<(Cbi!l2t~[ 12)
Control focus on: - Opportunities 48 0.001 0.106
• People & relationships 48 0.019 0.012 0.085
• Process 48 0.000 0.022 0.057
Table 13.4: Significance of differences in control perceptions"
94 Numbers within this table represent the statistical probability that the opinions come from a
single homogenous population, not from different cultural groups. These are shown only where
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Differences by MNC:
Table 13.4 shows that there were few categories where there was a significant
likelihood of some effect from differences between the two MNCs. Categories where
significant differences are shown (,Protect and look after staff, 'Hierarchy: paternal'
and 'Procedures & internal regulations: importance') were examined above (9.3.3
Chinese views; 9.8.1 Chinese views; 11.4.2 Internal procedures). It was shown that
when contolling for MNC for these categories that, while there were corporate effects,
corporate effects did not create apparent difference by country of upbringing.
Differences by location, i.e. UK, Prague and Beijing:
It was explained how expatriates were included among interviewees in order to check
whether apparent patterns between managers from different countries actually arose
from factors of the location rather than national culture (4.3.8 Selective coding - Depth
of support and alternative explanations). Such location effects might have been
markets, local institutions or other local social factors that affect how business in done
and how management control may be maintained.
Grouping expatriate managers' views on how they gain control assurance with views of
local managers gives a location analysis of control perceptions. This is shown in the 5th
column of Table 13.4, headed 'Locations'. This column therefore differs from that for
differences by country of upbringing (headed 'National'), because in the latter views of
expatriate managers' on how they gain control assurance are grouped with their
compatriots.
Views of expatriate managers may tend to differ from those of their compatriots
working in their home country for a number of reasons, besides the factors of their
working location. There may be a random effect from selecting a small number of
expatriates for this study. The MNC's human resource systems may have selected for
expatriate postings managers who were untypical, either for their experience, approach
they are significant at p<O.1. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used for all cultural groupings, apart
from 'MNCs' and 'Gender' where the Mann-Whitney test was used because here the data fell
into only 2 groups. The strongest pattern for each property is indicated by showing the
probability in bold.
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to management control, or for being outspoken. These selection effects, whether for the
study or the expatriate posting, might produce patterns of expatriate views that fall
either closer or further away from local views relative to those of their compatriots at
home. Location factors may also be expected to shift expatriate views. Expatriates may
shift their views towards those typical for the location, as they appreciate the local
points of view and adopt them as appropriate in the local setting. They may go further
in adopting local cultural values; that is to say, they may 'go native'. Alternatively,
expatriates may shift their views further away from the local views while living and
working abroad. They may stereotype differences between their own and the local
culture, perhaps through a 'mote-beam' mechanism of falsely believing they are free of
characteristics they identify with another culture (Stenning, 1979). Hofstede (1991,
page 211) notes "a tendency among expatriates to idealize what one remembers from
home".
These factors may interact. Accordingly, differences between patterns of control
perceptions by country of upbringing and by location may represent a complex interplay
of factors. Table 13.5 compares the significance of these patterns to the numbers of
expatriate managers whose views are included in these patterns. It also shows whether
expatriate views tended to shift towards or away from the local views relative to the
average weight of opinion for their compatriots in their home country.
Table 13.5 shows that apparent differences between local and national patterns of
opinion arise from opinions of a very small number of expatriates. For some categories,
where there is a significant difference by location, this falls to as low as 2 expatriates
(e.g. for 'Basis for acceptability of procedures'), or even 1 expatriate ('Legal process for
resolving disputes'). It can be seen that 2 categories where patterns by location are
more significant that those by country of upbringing ('Loyalty to self and 'Loyalty to
boss'), arose from the views of only 3 expatriates. Two of these expatriates gave views
that were strongly aligned with those of their local colleagues rather than of their
compatriots. This may reflect local factors, such as the local job market for expatriates,
the expatriates 'going native' in adopting attitudes and values prevalent in the location,
or a random effect of these individuals holding untypical views. Perhaps not too much
should be read into these differences, which arose from views of 2 expatriates and was
not reflected by the third.
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QategQri!.l:l Qf !<Q!ltrQIr:1!.lrr<!.lr:1tiQ!l:l N ~ Cultural grQUl2i!lg:l E~r:1atriat!;!~iews sbift!ld
~ Ni!tiQni!I LQ!<atiQlls IQwards IQ!<al Away. frQID IQ!<al
El!.!sin!.l:l:lrelatiQn:l w~h e~terllal r:1iuties (Cbal2ter Zl
Contract or relationship 34 4 0.009 0.040 A
Relationship:
- Self interest. mutual interest or mutual 29 4 T
reliance
- Instrumental or based on feeling 16 3 0.001 0.015
QbligatiQlls (Cbal2tl:l[ 6)
Responsibility: guilt or shame 13 1 0.016
Accountability or responsibility 40 6 0.000 0.001
Illt!.l[!Jal relatiQIlS (Qbagter 91
Contribution or reliability 28 6 0.000 0.079 A
Coach and develop staff 24 3 0.015 0.037 T
Instruct staff 24 3 0.064
Protect and look after staff 24 3 0.062 0.060
Coach - instruct - look after staff 24 3 0.018 0.031 T
Instruct - coach - look after staff 24 3 0.070
Coach - look after - instruct staff 24 3 0.048 T
Loyal to self 24 3 0.057 0.004 T
Loyal to boss 24 3 0.018 0.005 T
Structure: teams 43 7 0.000 0.000 A
Structure: roles 43 7 0.025 A
Structure: hierarchy 43 7 0.000 0.029 A
Hierarchy: paternal 19 3 0.000 0.016 A
Hierarchy: ability and or charisma 19 3 0.000 0.001
Hierarchy: organisational authority 19 3 0.013 T
InfQrmatiQIl (Cbagter 101
Truth: Absolute or relative 15 3 0.001 0.006
Information: transparency or secrecy 38 3 0.000 0.001 A
Li!w. [!,lIes ~ I2[Q!<!ldures (Clliill2ter 11)
Rule of law 28 2 0.000 0.000 A
Morality: individual or communal 30 8 0.000 0.001
Legal process for resolving disputes 17 1 0.000 0.000
Procedures & intemal regulations: 44 5 0.000 0.046 T
importance
Basis for acceptability of procedures:
- Feeling 40 2 0.002 0.003 A
- Reason & understanding 40 2 0.027 0.028 A
- actually like procedures 40 2 0.003 0.010 T
Sll:iteID:i lQ9i!<(Cbi!pt!U lZl
Control focus on: - Opportunities 48 9 0.001 0.106 A
- People & relationships 48 9 0.019 0.012 T
- Process 48 9 0.000 0.022 A
Table 13.5: Comparison of differences by location and by national greupings"
95 N is the total number of interviewees for the category. 'Expatriates' is the number of
expatriates, included within the total interviewees N, whose views on how they gain control
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The slightly more significant pattern by location than by country of upbringing for
'Control Focus on People and Relationships' reflected expatriate views, that on balance,
showed tendancies towards rather than away from local views in Beijing, Prague and
the UK. This gives some small evidence that the apparent pattern by national culture
may largely result from location effects in all 3 locations. However, as will be seen
from Table 13.8, the explanation of national culture is supported by a correlation
between this category and Diffuse culture.
Across all of the categories, scores for expatriate views tended to shift about as far
towards as away from local views. However, this should be treated with extreme
caution because it is the result of adding ordinal data for weights of opinion across all
selective coding categories. The number of expatriate views on categories that shifted
away from the local weight of opinion, relative to their compatriots, at 61 exceeded the
number at 38 that shifted towards weight of opinion. This provides some small
evidence that differences identified as arising from country of upbringing tended not to
arise from location effects.
In conclusion, statistical analysis by location has not succeeded in adding much
corroboration to the findings. This is because insufficient data has been gathered to
unravel the complexities involved. It has however illustrated what some of these
complexities may be. Nevertheless, qualitative analysis of views offered by expatriates
helped identify some of the contextual factors. They also contributed insight into local
attitudes to management control and control assurance.
Differences by sites:
The 6 sites of the 2 MNCs in the 3 locations were included in the analysis in case
factors relating to the sites appeared to create more significant patterns of opinions than
country of upbringing, location or employing MNC. These site factors might have
arisen, for example, from local organisational culture, the particular type of business
assurance are included in the analysis for the category. Columns for national and location
cultural groupings show significance of differences per Table 13.4 for ease of comparison.
Columns with 'T' or 'A' show whether the views ofthese expatriates tended to shift towards or
away from average views of local interviewees in the location.
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carried out at a site, markets, or local regulation affecting one MNC differently from the
other in a location.
Table 13.4 shows that significant patterns by site were apparent for many categories.
Generally these patterns were less significant than those by country of upbringing
shown in the column headed 'National'. Where this is so, one might expect site patterns
to appear merely from the significant differences by country of upbringing and any
differences between the 2 MNCs. For 2 categories ('Protect and look after staff, and
'Loyal to self) patterns by site were more significant than patterns by country of
upbringing. The first of these appear to arise from more significant corporate factors,
which were discussed above (9.3 Coaching, instructing or looking after subordinates -
Chinese views). The pattern for 'Loyal to self included views of2 expatriates working
with one of the MNCs, that were aligned more strongly with their colleagues in the site
than their compatriots. This appears to reflect a location effect, as there was a more
significant difference in views between the 3 locations than between the 6 sites.
Differences by functions:
Significant patterns by function arose for 2 categories. 'Protect and look after staff and
'Coach - look after - instruct staff appeared to arise from views being given only by
interviewees from CoX, not CoY. Since two of the functions, namely Sales and
Finance, are represented by CoX and the third, Service, by CoY, patterns for these two
categories appear to arise from the company factors that have been discussed (9.3
Coaching, instructing or looking after subordinates).
'Hierarchy: organisational authority' arose because Finance staff gave much stronger
views for hierarchy based upon organisational authority than did Sales or Service staff.
This appears to reflect responsibility that CoX Finance staff have for maintaining formal
financial authority systems.
None of the patterns by function were more significant than the related patterns by
country of upbringing.
Differences by level of seniority and gender:
Table 13.4 shows that 4 categories had significant patterns by level of seniority. None
of these were as significant as the related patterns by country of upbringing.
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Emergence of a significant pattern by gender came as considerable surprise to the
researcher. Perhaps this was because several managers gave the view that there are no
differences between the sexes in views on management control. The significant pattern
by gender arose in views on whether responsibility involves guilt or shame. Only 13
interviewees gave views on this, of whom 9 were men and 4 women. It is possible that
the pattern arose from the small number of women who were selected, or from
individuals among these women being outspoken in their views. Because this
significant pattern was not identified until after the close of the fieldwork, it was not
possible to return to seek opinions from more interviewees or to inquire deeper into why
views differed by gender. This pattern is not supported by any other patterns or
explanations, and, because it arose from such a small sample, it would be unsafe to read
very much into this pattern.
13.3 Testing association with cultural dimensions
Explanations for different patterns of views on gaining control assurance were sought in
cultural and other contextual factors. These were based upon qualitative analysis of
explanations offered by interviewees and also then by comparison to cultural theory.
Where these explanations indicated cultural dimensions, they were checked to
measurements of the dimensions either in the cultural survey done as part of this study
or made in previous research. Results of these tests were explained in Chapters 7 to 12.
13.3.1 The alternative exv1anation
These explanations are still in very general terms, referring to characteristic traits of
populations. Views of individuals were found here often to depart from what is typical
for their culture. Therefore a question remained. Where a pattern of control
perceptions, such as relying on contracts or relationships, coincides with a cultural
characteristic for their national cultures such as the Universalism - Particularism
cultural dimension, which happens to be a plausible explanation for that pattern of
perceptions, does the pattern of perceptions result from or manifest that cultural
characteristic? Alternatively, are the pattern and cultural characteristic related no more
than in describing what is typical for people from the countries; that is to say are they
related only through the extraneous variable of country of upbringing? This question
posed by the alternative explanation is illustrated in Figure 13.2 for the selective coding
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category of reliance on contract or relationship and the cultural dimension of
Universalism - Particularism. This Figure poses the question whether it was the
managers that favoured contracts who tended to be Universalist, or whether Czech
managers who relied on contracts did not necessarily coincide with Czech managers
































This alternative explanation warranted examining whether individual interviewees
holding a particular perception coincided with survey respondents having a cultural
characteristic, irrespective of the country they come from. This was done by testing
correlations between scores for opinions, by which many of the categories for control
perceptions were measured, to the results of the cultural survey. This was possible
because a score for each survey respondent was calculated for each cultural dimension







AMONG 33 CHINESE, BRITISH &: CZECH
INTERVIEWEES'
96 The 34 interviewees analysed for the selective coding category of reliance on contract or
relationships included one expatriate from Hong Kong working for one of the 2 MNCs. This
number therefore differs from the number of mainland Chinese, Czech and British interviewees.
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13.3,2 The correlation tests
It was explained (4,3,8 Selective coding - Corroborating selective coding hypotheses
with statistical tests) why the Spearman rank correlation test was used for opinions on
control categories of 49 selective coding interviewees who were also survey
respondents. However, not all of them gave views for every selective coding category,
because not all of them could be asked about all findings that emerged during the
fieldwork. The number of interviewees included in the test for each selective coding
category is therefore indicated in the column headed 'N' in Tables 13.6-8.
Directional hypotheses for correlation between categories and cultural dimensions were
based upon data identified in the field, such as comments by interviewees, or upon
cultural theory as described above in chapters 7 to 12 on selective coding findings.
They are indicated by a '+' or '-ve' for positive or negative correlation respectively in
Tables 13.6-8. Itwill be remembered (2.5.4 Problems raised by positivist epistemology)
that existing cultural theory appears to be insufficiently precise to guide cross-national
research into management control. Care was therefore taken not to generate hypotheses
between patterns of control perceptions and cultural dimensions except where indicated
by data gathered in field or specifically posited by cultural theorists.
13.3,3 Results a/the tests
Categories are included in Tables 13.6-8 only where they are used in the selective
coding findings, opinions measured on intensity scales were gathered from a sufficient
range of interviewees to run the test, and there were directional hypotheses. The
cultural dimensions of Locus of Control by Chance, and orientations to Future, Present
and Past, are omitted because no hypotheses were identified for them. High Power
Distance is represented by Hierarchy, and Low Power Distance by Egalitarian, in Tables
13.6-8. The cultural dimension of Individualism - Collectivism is omitted from the
table because its measurement in the cultural survey was found to provide insufficient
construct validity. It is discussed below (13.3.5 Correlations with Individualism -
Collectivism).
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Cultural dimensions
Categories of control N Universal Specific Locus: Locus: Achieved Sequential Hierarchy Personperceptions
Particular Diffuse Internal Other people Ascribed Synch. Egalitarian Task
6l.!~in~~~ ~la!iQn~ Wi!!l ilx!!1rOi!1pii!!1ie~(Cbapter Z)
Contract or relationship
Expected correlation + +
Correlation Coefficient 0.081 0.261
Significance (1-tailed) 33 0.328 0.071 •
Relationship:
- Instrumental or based Onfeeling
Expected correlation r--- + - ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.372 -0.496
Significance (1-tailed) 16 0.078 • 0.025 •
QbligatiQo~ (Cbapter S)
Responsibility: guilt or shame
Expected correlation - + +
Correlation Coefficient 0.272 0.155





Correlation Coefficient 0.243 0.373
Significance (1-tailed) 35 0.080 • 0.014 •
lot!1[[]al ~latiQO~ (Cbapter 9)
Contribution or reliability
Expected correlation + -ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.347 0.007
Significance (1-tailed) 27 0.038 • 0.486
Coach and develop staff
Expected correlation + -ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.481 0.027








Significance (1-tailed) 21 0.308
Table 13.6: Correlations between cultural dimensions and control categories (1) 97
97 ... _ significant at level p < 0.1; ......- significant at level p < 0.01.
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Cultural dimensions
Categories of control N
Universal Specific Locus: Locus: Achieved Sequential Hierarchy Personperceptions




Significance (1-tailed) 38 0.00 -
Structure: hierarchy
Expected correlation + -ve +
Correlation Coefficient 0.191 -0.160 -0.028
Significance (1-tailed) 38 0.125 0.169 0.434
Hierarchy: paternal
Expected correlation -ve +
Correlation Coefficient 0.020 0.006
Significance (1-tailed) 17 0.469 0.491




Correlation Coefficient 0.336 -0.115
Significance (1-tailed) 17 0.093 • 0.330
Hierarchy: organisational authority
Expected correlation - +
Correlation CoeffiCient 0.552
Significance (1-tailed) 17 0.011 •
IllfQ[[!]l!tiQ!] (Qbl!l2t~[ 1Ql
Truth: Absolute or relative
Expected correlation + + + -ve
Correlation Coefficient -0.239 0.242 0.661 0.081
Significance (1-tailed) 7 0.303 0.301 0.053 • 0.432
Information: transparency or secrecy
Expected correlation + + + -ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.095 0.289 0.653 -0.185
Significance (1-tailed) 17 0.358 0.130 0.002 - 0.239




Significance (1-tailed) 11 0.256
Legal process for resolving disputes
Expected correlation +
Correlation CoeffiCient -0.420
Significance (1-tailed) 6 0.203
Table 13.7: Correlations between cultural dimensions and control categories (2)97
345
Chapter 13: Corroboratingfindings with quantitative tests
Cultural dimensions
Categories of control N
Universal Specific Locus: Locus: Achieved Sequential Hierarchy Personperceptions
Particular Diffuse Internal Other people Ascribed Synch. Egalitarian Task
Procedures & internal regulations
Expected correlation + +
Correlation Coefficient 0.065 0.205
Significance (1-tailed) 33 0.360 0.126
Basis for acceptability of procedures:
- Reason & understanding
Expected correlation + -ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.316 -0.330
Significance (1-tailed) 33 0.037 • 0.030 •
- actually like procedures
Expected correlation + +
Correlation Coefficient 0.447 0.258
Significance (1-tailed) 33 0.005 - 0.073 •
S:i~l~m~ IQgis;(Qbi!l2t~[ 1Z)




Correlation Coefficient -0.065 0.338
Significance (1-tailed) 35 0.354 0.029 •
- People & relationships
Expected correlation -ve + +
Correlation Coefficient -0.312 -0.144 -0.046
Significance (1-tailed) 35 0.034 • 0.205 0.396
- Process
Expected correlation + + + - ve
Correlation Coefficient 0.195 0.274 -0.303 0.022
Significance (1-tailed) 35 0.131 0.055 • 0.046 • 0.451
Table 13.8: Correlations between cultural dimensions and control categories (3) 97
Unexpected correlations were also looked for between 13 cultural dimensions and 41
selective coding categories. A 2 tailed level of significance of p < 0.0004 was chosen as
being equivalent to a 1 tailed level of significance of p < 0.1 for expected correlations
(0.1 x 21 (13 x 41) = 0.00037). None were significant at this level; indeed none were
more significant than p < 0.0025.
13. 3. 4 Exp/anatoO' Dower and construct validity ojthe cultural dimensions
Curiosity, if not some concern, was raised about measuring cultural dimensions in this
cultural survey and seeking to use these as measurements of national culture in order to
explain the qualitative findings. First of all, the survey instrument used here was a
shortened version of the well tried instrument developed by Trompenaars (1993;
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Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997). Specific concerns had been raised about
how well it had measured some cultural dimensions such as Individualism -
Collectivism and Locus of Control (6.2.2 Analysis of survey results). Secondly, doubts
have been raised about basing cross-national research into management control on
survey measures of ideational national culture (Lau et al., 1997; Chow et al., 1999b;
Harrison and McKinnon, 1999). Thirdly, survey measures were recognised here as very
narrow instruments to measure the richness of cultures and as inevitably ignoring what
is emic to cultures (2.5.1 Problems raised by nomothetic methodology). Fourthly,
examination of Tables 13.6-8 indicated that little support for expected association
between findings and cultural dimensions appeared for some of these dimensions.
These concerns raised the question of the construct validity of measured cultural
dimensions for the cultural traits for which they stand as labels. A cultural trait or
characteristic is a construct, for which there probably can be no direct measure. Various
measures of it may have greater or less construct validity. A distinction is therefore
made between an underlying cultural trait described by a cultural dimension, and
measurement of this trait in a cultural dimension. Such measures may include cultural
surveys done here or in other research (Hofstede, 1984; Trompenaars, 1993; Schwartz
and Sagiv, 1995). Evidence for underlying cultural traits may also include analysis of
data gathered ethnographically such as done here from opinions of interviewees and
from observation. It may also include literature. Concern about construct validity is
illustrated in Figure 13.3, which expands on Figure 13.2.
Some construct validity is assumed for measurement of each cultural dimension in the
cultural survey. A dimension, such as Universalism - Particularism is assumed to
measure the cultural trait for which the cultural dimension is a label, in this case
preference for universal principles or particular relationships. Based upon this validity,
correlations are tested between the measured cultural dimension and observed control
perceptions that are expected to be associated with them. A weak correlation was found
between Universalism - Particularism and seeing contracts more than relationships as
important for providing control assurance (Table 13.6). The low significance of this
correlation (p = 0.328) indicates that there is only a two thirds likelihood that there is
the hypothesised association between the observed perception and the measured cultural
dimension. Absence of a stronger or more significant correlation may arise either from
coincidence of the measured cultural dimension and
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Figure 13.3: Construct validity for a cultural dimension
control perception among mainland Chinese and Czech managers, or from the cultural
dimension being a poor measure of the cultural trait. In the former case, preference for
contract or relationships may arise predominantly from non-cultural factors, such as
differences in legal institutions or market conditions. In the latter case, preference for
contracts over relationships may arise predominantly from the cultural trait of
preference for universal principles over particular relationships, but the cultural
dimension may have poor construct validity as a measure of the cultural trait.
Comparison of how many hypothesised correlations are supported may give an
indication of the explanatory power of each cultural dimensions, and hence of its
construct validity. Explanatory power is used here to mean how often an explanation is
provided for the findings of patterns in control perceptions.
The number of correlations, the strength at which they were found, and their
significance are summarised in Table 13.9. It shows that out of 48 hypothesised
correlations that were tested, 34 (6 + 10 + 18) were found to be in the expected
direction. However, 6 of these were very weak correlations with a correlation
coefficient less than 0.1, a further 10were stronger but not significant, and only 18were
significant (p < 0.1). It can be seen from Tables 13.6-8 that the 18 significant
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correlations had correlation coefficients falling between ± 0.24 and ± 0.66. Therefore it
appeared that none of the cultural dimensions fully explained the ranking'" of
respondents by their weight of opinion for a category of control perception. However,
14 (6 + 6 + 2) correlations were found in the opposite to expected direction. 6 of these
were weak with a correlation coefficient of less than 0.1, 6 were stronger but not
significant, while 2 were significant (p < 0.1).
Cultural dimensions
Total
Universal Specific Locus: Locus: Achieved Sequential Hierarchy Person
Particular Diffuse Internal Other people Ascribed Synch. Egalitarian Task
Correlation in predicted direction
< 0.1 correlation coeff. 4 1 1 6
> 0.1 correlation coeff. 1 5 1 2 1 10
< 0.1 Significance 1 8 1 1 6 1 18
Correlation in opposite to predicted direction
< 0.1 correlation coeff. 1 4 1 6
> 0.1 correlation coeff. 3 1 1 1 6
< 0.1 significance 2 2
Net supported correlations (Number in predicted direction less in opposite direction)
< 0.1 correlation coeff. 4 0 0 0 -1 0 -3 0 0
> 0.1 correlation coeff. -2 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 4
< 0.1 significance 1 8 1 1 6 -2 1 0 16
Total expected 9 14 1 3 9 2 8 2 48
correlations
Net significant (>0.1) I 0.11 0.57 1.0 0.33 0.67 -1.0 0.13 0 0.33
Total correlations
Table 13.9: Number of correlations by cultural dimension
A crude comparison can be made between the number of correlations in the expected
and in opposite to expected directions. If each correlation in the opposite to expected
direction is assumed to negate the explanatory power of one correlation in the expected
direction, the number of net supported correlations can be compared between cultural
dimensions. Comparison of the number of net significant correlations (Net supported
98 The Spearman rank correlation test compares ranking of subjects by each variable, not
variation in values for variables.
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correlations: < 0.1 significance, third from bottom row of table 13.9) may indicate how
much explanation of the findings each cultural dimension provides".
It can be seen that the Specific - Diffuse cultural dimension supports 8 net significant
correlations. The Achieved - Ascribed dimension has 6 net significant correlations.
Universal- Particular, Internal Locus of Control, Locus of Control in Other People, and
Hierarchical - Egalitarian each support just 1 net significant correlation. Person - Task
supports 0 net significant correlations, and Sequential - Synchronous time has a
negative net significant correlation. These latter 2 dimensions have no explanatory
power. This gives further weight to the misgivings (12.4 Relating findings on systems
logic to cultural theory) about Q. 34 in the cultural survey as a measurement for
Sequential- Synchronous time.
The number of net supported correlations may reflect what validity there is in
interpreting these indices as measurements for the cultural dimensions. This validity
may be indicated by a ratio of the number of net significant correlations to the number
of expected correlations; this is shown in the final row of Table 13.9. An arbitrary
threshold it taken here, of 50% of expected correlations being supported in the test by
net significant (p < 0.1) correlations. It is used as a rough indicator of a reasonable
degree of construct validity.
It will be important to understand what the limitations are of this rough indicator of
construct validity, because interpretation of these correlation tests rests on assumptions
about construct validity. This is a rough indicator firstly because it is inferential: there
cannot be a direct measure of construct validity for constructs which, by definition,
cannot be directly measured. Secondly, there is some circularity to the logic used here,
which is illustrated in Figure 13.3. Some construct validity is assumed in calculating
indices from the cultural survey. Based on this validity, correlations are tested between
the measured cultural dimensions and control perceptions that are expected to be
associated with them. The proportion of expected correlations that are found and are
significant is used as an indicator of the construct validity, which was assumed in the
99 This sort of validity indicator could also have used data on net supported correlations that
were not significant. This however would depend upon what arbitrary weighting is given to
significant and to non-significant correlations.
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first place. However, this approach may provide useful information where the circle is
shown to be broken. If the measurement of a cultural dimension is seen generally not to
support expected association between control perceptions and a cultural trait, it may be
a poor indicator of that trait. In this case as illustrated in Figure 13.3, correlations found
between the cultural dimension and a control perception may arise from the dimension
and the perception both being associated with the country of upbringing. Interpretation
of the correlation as an association with the cultural trait would not then be valid.
Only 3 out of the 7 survey measurements of cultural dimensions achieve this threshold
of satisfying the rough indicator of construct validity. They are Specific - Diffuse,
Internal Locus of Control, and Achieved - Ascribed. This rough indicator says nothing
to question their construct validity and very little to support it. It says rather more about
the 5 measured cultural dimensions that fail to achieve this threshold; they are
Universalism - Particularism, Locus of Control in Other People, Sequential -
Synchronous, Hierarchical - Egalitarian and Person - Task. A significant difference
was found in the cultural survey for 3 of these cultural dimensions between the survey
respondents from at least 2 of the 3 countries (Table 6.1); these were Universalism -
Particularism, Locus of Control in Other People, and Hierarchical - Egalitarian.
Therefore measurement of these 3 cultural dimensions did succeed in identifying
cultural differences. Furthermore significant differences were found between opinions
of interviewees from different countries for selective coding categories (Table 13.4)
with which correlations were expected (Tables 13.6-8). This suggests that perhaps there
is less than equivalence between these measured cultural dimensions and the cultural
traits that might be associated with the patterns of control perceptions. Therefore
correlations, that are supported in this Spearman rank test with these 5 cultural
dimensions, may arise from both the cultural dimensions and control perceptions being
associated with country of upbringing, but not necessarily with the cultural traits that the
cultural dimensions are intended to identify.
13.3.5 Correlations with Indiyjdualism - Collectivism
The cultural dimension of Individualism - Collectivism has been omitted so far from the
analysis of correlations because of concern raised during the axial coding about its
construct validity as measured in this cultural survey. It will be remembered (6.2.2
Analysis of the survey results) that the survey results for this cultural dimension were
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Expected Individualism - Collectivism
Categories of control perceptions N direction of
Index C.20 C.21 C.22correlation
BUSiO!:sS [elaliQns wilt! !:lIl!:roalllar:!i!:S (QtJallle[ Zl
Contract or relationship +
ICorrelation Coefficient -0.080 0.049 -0.177 0.012
ISig. (Hailed) 33 0.330 0.394 0.166 0.473
Qbli9aliQns (Qtlailler ~l
Responsibility: guilt or shame +
ICorrelation Coefficient -0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000
ISig. (l-tailed) 13 0.062 •
Accountability or responsibility +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.282 0.238 0.147 0.264
ISig. (Hailed) 35 0.050 • 0.088 • 0.204 0.065 •
Inlemal [!:laliQOS (Qhal!l!:[ III
Contribution or reliability +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.493 0.514 0.205 0.408
ISig. (l-tailed) 27 0.004 •• 0.004 .. 0.157 0.019 ••
Coach and develop staff +
[Correlatlon Coefficient 0.318 0.527 0.115 0.057
ISig. (Hailed) 19 0.092 • 0.012 • 0.325 0.411
Loyal to self +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.058 -0.123 -0.013 0.331
ISig. (l-tailed) 19 0.402 0.308 0.479 0.083 •
Structure: roles +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.212 -0.016 0.109 0.316
ISig. (l-tailed) 38 0.101 0.463 0.257 0.026 •
Hierarchy: patemal -ve
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.049 0.099 0.174 -0.359
ISig. (l-tailed) 17 0.425 O. 0.253 0.079 •
lofQrmaliQO (QtJalller 1Ql
Truth: Absolute or relative +
[Corretation Coefficient -0.519 -0.091 -0.725 0.000
ISig. (l-tailed) 7 0.116 0.423 0.033 •
Information: transparency or secrecy +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.249 0.181 -0.101 0.458
ISig. (l-tailed) 17 0.167 0.236 0.346 0.026·
Law [!,flea & I![QCedu£es (CtJal!le[ 111
Rule of law +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.206 -0.043 0.141 0.233
ISig (l-tailed) 11 0.272 0.450 0.340 0.245
Morality: individual or communal +
ICorrelation Coefficient
I -0.232 -0.145 0.242 0.104
ISig. (l-tailed)
I 15 0.203 0.310 0.203 0.361
Legal process for resolving disputes +
ICorrelation Coefficient -0.426 -0.250 -0.671 0.316
ISig. (Hailed) 6 0.200 0.316 0.072 • 0.271
Basis for procedures: Reason +
ICorrelation Coefficient 0.191 0.015 0.148 0.108
I Sig. (Hailed) 33 0.144 0.468 0.205 0.274
S~!iil!lms IQgi!; {Cbal!le[ 12)
Control focus: People and relationships '-ve
I Correlation Coefficient -0.058 -0.105 0.033 -0.105
I Sig. (Hailed) 35 0.370 0.274 0.425 0.274
Table 13.10: Correlations between Individualism and control categories1oo
100 • - significant at level p < 0.1; •• - significant at level p < 0.01.
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contrary to both qualitative data in the study and other research. It will be further
shown that it performs poorly against the rough indicator of construct validity discussed
above.
Doubts about Individualism - Collectivism were unfortunate because more correlations
were hypothesised with it, at 15, than for any other cultural dimension (13 for Specific -
Diffuse). The correlation test was therefore run not only for the calculated index for the
dimension, but also for each of the 3 survey questions used to calculate the index. The
results are compared in Table 13.10. This shows very little consistency between these 4
measures in where they support significant correlation with categories of control
perceptions. Their explanatory power for these categories may be compared as if they
were alternative measures of Individualism - Collectivism. This is done in Table 13.11.
Individualism - Collectivism
Index a.20 a.21 a.22
Correlation in predicted direction
< 0.1 correlation coefficient 2 2 0 2
> 0.1 correlation coefficient 4 2 7 5
< 0.1 Significance 3 3 0 6
Correlation in opposite to predicted direction
< 0.1 correlation coefficient 2 4 2 0
> 0.1 correlation coefficient 3 3 3 0
< 0.1 significance 1 0 2 0
Net supported correlations (Number In predicted direction less in opposite direction)
< 0.1 correlation coefficient 0 -2 -2 2
> 0.1 correlation coefficient 1 -1 4 5
< 0.1 significance 2 3 -2 6
15 14 14 13
Total correlations tested
Net significant (>0/1) / Total correlations 0.13 0.20 -0.13 0.40
Table 13.11: Number of correlations for Individualism
This table shows that the index calculated for the dimension and the 3 questions from
which it was calculated fail the rough indicator of construct validity (all < 0.5 in the
final row of Table 13.11). All but Question 22 fall far short of it. Question 22 on its
own appears to be a poor measure of Individualism - Collectivism. Besides not quite
meeting this rough indicator of construct validity, it showed Czech respondents to he
more Collective than the Chinese, with British respondents the most Individualist; this
is inconsistent with Czech Individualism found from the qualitative analysis and in
literature. Perhaps better success would have been achieved if all 5 questions on
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Individualism - Collectivism had been used from Trompenaars' instrument, or if
Hofstede's instrument (1984) had been used; one of the instruments or methods
described by Triandis (1995) might also have yielded better results.
]3.3. 6 Implications ojthe correlations tests
It is probably unwise to draw any conclusions from correlation tests with the cultural
dimensions that failed the rough test for construct validity. Correlation tests are
therefore taken as neither supporting nor throwing doubt on the associations between
these cultural dimensions and patterns of control perceptions identified in the specific
coding findings (Chapters 7 - 12). In contrast, correlation tests for the 3 cultural
dimensions that pass the rough indicator of construct validity have been noted in
Chapters 7 to 12.
The analysis done here is limited. No consideration has been given to the possibility of
joint effects between cultural dimensions. Cultural dimensions may also have a joint
effect with other contextual factors such as social, economic or institutional factors.
]3 3 7 Measurement q,fculture
It may be wise to distinguish the measurement of cultural dimensions from the
description of what these dimensions represent. Both Hofstede's (1984, 1991) and
Trompenaars (1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) measures are based
upon a limited number of questions in a survey instrument. They cannot explore the full
breadth of the descriptions given to dimensions they purport to measure. It is therefore
possible that patterns found here in perceptions of management control could reflect the
cultural traits for which cultural dimensions are labels, notwithstanding absence of
association with the measured cultural dimensions.
Problems identified here with construct validity of cultural dimensions illustrate some
of the difficulties of measuring culture. Although these arose with the use of a
shortened survey instrument, any measurement of a cultural trait with a limited number
of closed questions can capture only a shallow reflection of the depth of shared beliefs,
attitudes and values comprising a national culture. There is in addition the problems of
achieving functional equivalence, so that each question is interpreted as referring to the
same thing in each culture (Adler, 1983), so it invokes the same cultural dimensions.
Furthermore there is likely to be a considerable emic part of shared beliefs, attitudes and
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values within a national culture that cannot be accessed and compared using cross-
cultural instruments.
These problems may be illustrated by the pattern found of Chinese views on paternal
hierarchy. It was compared to Czech and British views on hierarchy. A very small
insignificant correlation was found between paternal hierarchy and the cultural
dimensions of Hierarchical - Egalitarian (Table 13.7). Yet similarities were noted
between Chinese views of hierarchy and Confucian teaching of hierarchy in society.
The Confucian view of social and organisational hierarchies has been embedded in
Chinese culture for perhaps 2,500 years'?'. It is etic only between cultures that have a
Confucian tradition. A survey designed to measure national cultures in a limited
number of closed questions can no more than scratch the surface of the deep values,
beliefs and meanings of each culture. The more ideographic research methods used
here of interviews, open ended questions and observation, can perhaps uncover slightly
more of a still imperfect description of the richness of cultures. Therefore, if the views
on this type of paternalistic or Confucian hierarchy are accepted as being predominantly
cultural (Lachman et aI., 1994), the lack of cultural explanation given by surveys for
these findings probably reflects limitations of the survey methods, more than limitations
of the more ideographic methods used for qualitative analysis.
Other researchers have raised doubts whether survey instruments to measure culture are
always sufficiently sensitive to give meaningful insight (Lau et aI., 1997; Chow et aI.,
1999b; Harrison and McKinnon, 1999). The restricted range of information given by a
few dimensions for etic measurement of culture, may provide insufficient information to
explain, let alone to predict, management control in different cultures. Therefore
although parsimony of cultural models with their cultural dimensions facilitates
thinking, it hides complexity that is inherent in culture.
13,3.8 Relating thjs analysjs to prior research
It appears that correlation or interaction of cultural dimensions at the individual
manager level to management control variables has seldom been done in prior empirical
cross-national research into management control. Three exceptions have been identified
101 Confucius is thought to have lived from 551 to 479 BC (de Barry, 1960)
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among the empirical studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Chow et al. (1991) found no
significant interaction between measured Individualism and management control in
their independent effect upon work performance. Frucot and Shearon (1991) found an
interaction between Locus of Control and budgetary participation affecting managers'
satisfaction. Brewer (1995) found no interaction between Locus of Control from more
Powerful Others and resistance to implementation of ABC management systems, but
did find an interaction between concern for saving face and such resistance.
Hofstede (1984) may have deterred researchers from analysing national culture at the
individual level. He warns of the ecological fallacy of confusing within society
correlations with between society correlations. His indices for cultural dimensions are
measures of populations not of individuals, and he distinguishes culture of groups from
personality of individuals (Hofstede, 1991). He therefore condemns analysis of culture
at the level of individuals as being based on "an inadequate research paradigm" (1984,
page 25), although other cultural researchers have recognised it as legitimate and useful
(Triandis, 1995; Bond, 1996). However as shown here, confining measurements of
cultural dimensions to groups leads to potential confusion between effects of a cultural
dimension and effects of belonging to the cultural group. Unless analysis is done for
sufficiently many cultures, it potentially fails to isolate the effects of a cultural
dimension from the overall effect of country of upbringing.
It is possible that prior cross-cultural studies of management control have fallen into the
pitfall, identified here, of assuming that findings of management control for a country
are associated with plausible cultural explanations, where both the management control
phenomenon and cultural characteristic are identified with the country. This pitfall
might help explain some of the discrepancies in findings between studies identified in
Chapter 2. For example it might help explain discrepancies concerning an association
between Individualism - Collectivism and use of responsibility centres (Chow et al.,
1991; Harrison et al., 1994), or Individualism and Power Distance being associated with
the effects of budget emphasis (Harrison, 1992; Lau et al., 1997). While it cannot be
demonstrated that this is a cause for discrepancies in findings of prior studies, it must
remain a possibility where associations between management control phenomena and
cultural attributes are assumed rather than checked such as with correlations for
individual SUbjects.
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13.4 Conclusions on corroborating findings with statistical tests
Uniqueness of perceptions was demonstrated for both the axial and selective coding.
Corroboration of country of upbringing as distinguishing patterns of control perceptions
was generally successful. This test corroborated findings for all but 1 selective coding
category. It showed that differences in opinions, apparently between managers from
different countries, generally did not arise from differences between the 2 MNCs.
The statistical corroboration for location factors was generally not successful. This was
because views were gathered from insufficient expatriates. Secondly, it was seen that
views of expatriate managers may tend to differ from those of either their local
colleagues or their compatriots for a complex variety of reasons. Yet it appeared from
the limited data available that there was not a general tendency for expatriate views to
shift from the norm for their compatriots towards local views. This provides some
small support for the conclusion from qualitative analysis that differences between
countries related to factors of managers' countries of upbringing, such as national
culture, more than to location factors such as local regulation, markets or institutions.
Corroborative statistical tests of association, between selective coding categories for
control perceptions and cultural dimensions, uncovered a problem of construct validity.
This raised concern whether indices, calculated for some of the cultural dimensions
from the cultural survey, provide valid measurement of the cultural characteristics for
which the dimensions are taken as labels. This pointed to difficulties of capturing the
richness of national cultures in survey instruments. Lack of construct validity for
cultural dimensions as measurements of cultural traits may have confounded prior
cross-national studies into management control.
Nevertheless 15 significant correlations were found between the 3 cultural dimensions
for which no construct validity doubts were raised (Specific - Diffues, Internal Locus
and Achieved - Ascribed in Table 13.9). These correlations helped corroborate
association between patterns of differences found between managers from different
countries in their control perceptions and cultural dimensions. This supports
conclusions of the qualitative analysis that these differences in perceptions of
management control reflect factors of national culture as well as of other contextual
factors.
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This chapter draws on the findings of the selective coding, and in one respect also
from axial coding. It shapes these into a coherent theory. The first section of this
chapter outlines the nature of the theory. Four strands of theory are then set out, each
in a separate section. These are unique perceptions of management control, patterns
in these unique views, the context of perceptions of management control, and the
main distinguishing features between national patterns in control perceptions. This
theory is then related to existing knowledge. Firstly it is related to the state of cross-
national research into management control, secondly to management control systems
theory, and thirdly to theories of accountability. The chapter finishes with a
concluding summary.
14.1 Nature of the theory
This theory is substantive, in the sense that it is of the substantive area in which this
study has been conducted (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Other studies have been
referred to for the purpose of seeking corroboration for this substantive theory, rather
than to extend it into a formal theory. It has been generated from inquiry principally
among British, Czech and Chinese managers of two Western MNCs. These people
were located in the UK, Prague and Beijing, where these MNCs both have
operations. It remains to be demonstrated to what extent this theory is applicable to
other Western MNCs operating in other industries and service sectors, to members of
indigenous companies, to other locations within these countries102, and to other
countries of similar culture and institutions. It is a theory about how managers gain
control assurance. It was developed from inquiry that started asking about trade
credit control. Inquiry was broadened in selective coding to embrace management
control in general. However, it remains to be seen to what extent this substantive
theory, developed in this way, is applicable in areas of management control that have
not been specifically covered, or have been specifically excluded (4.3.9 No
102 Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming) find considerable regional variety in control attitudes
within both mainland China and the UK.
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comparison between the 2 MNCs). It is therefore a substantive rather than formal
theory, in the sense that it is not claimed to apply across a range of generic situations.
As explained in Chapter 3, this theory is developed from the stance of middle range
ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. The methodology
adopted is insufficient to support generation of predictive theory. This substantive
theory is intended only as an explanation and aid to understanding, not as an aid for
prediction. Of course, by extending existing knowledge, it also indicates questions
that may stimulate further research.
As has become apparent to the researcher during this study, an explanatory rather
than a predictive theory is more likely to provide practical benefit to practitioners of
management control across national cultures. This is because outcomes within this
substantive area are inherently unpredictable in terms of how a particular individual,
or small group of people, will perceive management control. Providing managers
with a theory that purports to aid prediction of what they will find, or of optimal
solutions to problems they may encounter, is likely to close down mind sets. This
would tend to lead to lower perception of unfamiliar and unexpected cultural patterns
and subtleties. It would be likely to encourage stereotyped perception and solutions.
Instead, a theory that purports merely to explain is more likely to open mind sets to
new and unfamiliar ways of seeing management control.
14.2 Uniqueperceptions
The first part of this substantive theory is that perception of management control held
by each individual is unique. This is an important finding. It suggests that there
cannot be a standard view of management control. There is likely to be considerable
complexity of different views within any cultural grouping; there is scope for many
levels of patterns within sub-groups, such as for regional variation within national
cultures. Alasuutari's claim (1995, page 14) that "in qualitative analysis a single
exception is enough to break the rule, to show that one has to rethink the whole
thing" is untenable in this situation. Rather than rules, nothing more than tendencies
in perceptions of management control have been found. These cultural tendencies
with exceptions and overlaps were illustrated in Tables 13.1 and 13.3, where Chinese
perceptions tended to cluster at the top and British perceptions at the bottom of the
tables.
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This uniqueness of views makes the subject of this theory inherently unpredictable at
the level of individuals or small groups of people.
14.3 Distinct patterns by national culture in control perceptions
Secondly, despite these unique views of management control, patterns in perceptions
appear by various groupings of managers. Patterns by national groupings are
distinctly different patterns by company and by function, by level of seniority in
organisational hierarchies, and by gender (Tables 6.2 and 13.4). Basic assumptions,
values and perceptions from the culture of managers' country of upbringing seem to
be reflected in different perceptions of, and attitudes to, a number of categories. Yet
managers and staff from all countries appear to fit into organisational cultures, and to
take on roles and practices expected of them; perhaps this is an implicit condition of
career success in CoX and CoY. The focus of this theory is the differences by
national culture, rather than similarities between views of managers from different
countries, or patterns of differences between other cultural groupings such as
companies or functions.
14.4 Context ofperceptions ofmanagement control
The third part of this theory concerns the context within which perceptions are held
of management control. Patterns in perceptions have been developed from
differences appearing in the axial coding (Chapter 6), through selective coding that
culminated in 6 key categories (Chapters 7 to 12). Relationships have been sought
between these patterns in control perceptions and the context in which control
assurance is provided.
Cultural aspects of this context have been sought in terms of dimensions of national
culture, such as Universalism - Particularism, which allow unbundling and
measurement of national culture. This has not always been successful, and evidence
has accumulated that there is much more to the effect of national culture on
perceptions of management control than can be measured in cultural surveys. A
richer cultural background has been indicated by qualitative analysis, and by relating
control perceptions to historical, literary and philosophical traditions of people of the
3 countries. Yet measurement of cultural dimensions has at times been useful for
indicating what aspects of culture affect what aspects of control perceptions. This
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has provided between methods triangulation (Jick, 1979; Eisenhardt, 1989), and
support for the qualitative induction of the substantive theory.
Context has also been identified in terms of wider economic, market, regulatory and
social factors that appear to affect perceptions of management control.
A simplified model of the context for gaining control assurance is summarised in
Figure 14.1. Within this model, 'distinguishing perceptions' represent the
characteristic perceptions of gaining control assurance that were identified in
Chapters 7 to 12. The shaded central oval, or 'egg,I03 ,of Figure 14.1 is developed
further in the next section. The purpose of this section is to explain that part of the
substantive theory represented by the un-shaded part of Figure 14.1 and its
relationship with the shaded 'shared values and preferences'.
Shared preferences, such as for openness and personal relationships, follow directly
from shared values, which themselves are an integral part of culture (as defined in
Appendix A). Shared values of culture have been analysed here through cultural
dimensions, which give a crude representation and measurement of national culture.
The dimensions of national culture that have been identified in the data of the study,
such as Universalist - Particularist, are shown in un-shaded ovals in Figure 14.1.
They are connected to shared preferences and values by solid lines in order to
indicate that the former are constituent aspects of the latter. Dimensions of national
culture extend beyond what has been measured here in the cultural surveyor in
research by Hofstede (1984; 1991) or by Trompenaars (1993; Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1997), to include concern for face. Also the cultural dimensions
represent broader concepts than what has been measured directly. For example,
Chinese group orientation as described above (5.1 Chinese culture - 2. Group
orientation) is included within Collectivism, and comfort zones within Uncertainty
avoidance.
The affect of historical, philosophical and other social traditions on shared values and
preferences are also represented in Figure 14.1. with arrows indicating direction of
103 The metaphor of an egg is used purely for ease of description of constituents of the
substantive theory, rather than to imply or to convey any meaning about the nature of the
theory (Morgan, 1980).
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influence. These historical factors that were identified in the study data include
Czech resentment of foreign domination. Philosophical traditions, identified in the
study data as factors affecting perceptions of gaining control assurance, include
Confucian and Taoist philosophy, European hypotheco-deductive logic, and Czech
philosophies of truth. Social traditions identified as affecting perceptions of gaining
control assurance include Chinese guan xi and ren qing,








Figure 14.1: Context of gaining control assurance
Other contextual factors, such as education and markets, were also identified in the
study data, and these are shown in square boxes. They are connected by arrows to
shared values and influences in order indicate the influence these were found to have
on perceptions of gaining control assurance.
It appears that cultural dimensions interrelate. Indeed comparison of Hofstede's
(1984), Trompenaars' (1993) and Schwartz' (Schwartz and Sagiv, 1995) schemes for
dimensions suggests that demarcation between dimensions appearing in different
schemes is to a large extent arbitrary. For example, although both Hofstede (1991)
and Trompenaars (1993) each have a similar dimension of Individualism -
Collectivism, Trompenaars distinguishes it from his dimension of Specific - Diffuse
that embraces the nature of relationships, which Hofstede attributes to Individualism
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- Collectivism. Also it was shown here (J 1.7 Relating findings on laws, rules and
procedures to cultural theory) that while Trompenaars (1993) explains attitudes to
law with his Universalism - Particularism dimension, Hofstede (1991) does so with
his Uncertainty Avoidance and Individualism - Collectivism dimensions.
It is submitted that there are interrelations between cultural factors and other
contextual factors, as well as between the cultural factors. For example, historical
and philosophical traditions have been handed down by one generation to the next,
and by education systems, to shape cultural values, which in turn shape education
systems and create further historical and philosophical traditions. On a shorter time
scale, market factors affect corporate experience and managers' personal
experiences, which become reflected in corporate cultures, which in turn influence
corporate actions that constitute market activity. Even a circular loop of causation,
such as implied here, may be an over simplification. For example, corporate action
may emerge within market conditions spontaneously, as well as purposefully
designed with the benefit of past experience. Thus each factor may influence and
feed off all other factors in a complex socio-cultural-economic ecology. The
possibility of this sort of complex interaction was explained for attitudes to
information (l0.8.2 Czech context). Historical, philosophical and social traditions,
other contextual factors and national culture are therefore shown in Figure 14.1 as all
influencing each other.
From middle range ontology and assumption of human nature, a wholly objective
and deterministic view of gaining control assurance seems implausible. Control
assurance is probably not the outcome of definitive factors, but at least to some
material extent a social construction (Berger and Luckman, 1967; Ahrens, 1996).
Views on whether a particular business is under control may be socially constructed
within a management team, within an audit team, between such teams, and within the
community of capital markets. This is not to deny that consensus and patterns of
views may be identified objectively. From this middle range stance, deterministic
models, showing linear relationships between factors and contingencies affecting
management control (e.g. Child, 1981, Figure 1), or for that matter accounting
systems (Gray, 1988, Figure 2), appear over simplistic. Hofstede (1984, Figure 1.4,
page 22) suggests considerable interaction between ecological factors, cultural value
systems and institutions. The possibility is therefore recognised that how managers
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perceive gaining control assurance may affect their shared values and preferences,
which may affect the organisational, market and social context in which they work.
For example the perceived effectiveness or importance of a control method or type of
management control, is likely to affect corporate cultures and how companies
operate in the market. Forces of both competition and mimetic institutional
isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991) are likely to
spread practice between firms (Firth, 1996), spurred on by normative institutional
forces of professional best practice and perhaps reflected in coercive forces of
regulation. These institutional forces are likely to alter cognition of what is
constituted as reality in society (Scott, 1995). The risk based approach to internal
(McNamee and Selim, 1998) and external auditing is an example of good practice,
spread by professional standards of required best practice (APB, 1985) and now
appearing in market regulation in the UK (Turnbull, 1999; FSA, 2000). A dotted
arrow in Figure 14.1 therefore shows a potential influence by perceptions of gaining
control assurance, and by shared values and preferences, on wider contextual factors.
14.5 Principle distinguishing features of the perceptions
Features of the key categories, that emerged during selective coding from managers'
control elements, have been re-grouped in order to tease out recurring themes in
essential differences between how managers from the three countries tend to see
gaining control assurance. This picture of the substantive theory, shown in Figure
14.2, was developed through presentation of the research findings to senior managers
of the two MNCs and from presentation to academic conferences (4.4 Initial
reporting).
This is a simplified model of complex phenomena. No apology is made for the
complexity it is attempting to portray, because culture and cultural analysis are
inherently complex (Bate, 1994).
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BRITISH
CHINESE CZECH
Figure 14.2: Shared values & preferences, and distinguishing perceptions of
gaining control assurance
In this figure, the outer 'shell' of the egg represents shared values and preferences,
such as for openness, which were related to the context of gaining control assurance
in the previous section. The 'white of egg' represents the major distinguishing
themes in the key categories, and was labelled 'distinguishing perceptions' in Figure
14.1. The 'yolk' of the egg is the core category of gaining control assurance.
Although gaining control assurance was common to managers from all three
countries, how they gained that assurance tended to be different, which is signified
by the three way division of the white and shell of the egg. The whole egg is
dependent upon the context of cultural and other contextual factors depicted in
Figure 14.1. This comparative picture omits the considerable similarities between
the three national cultures in gaining control assurance, indicated in Table 6.2.
14.5. 1 Chinese perceptions
Among Chinese managers in this study two shared preferences or values stood out as
explaining much of what distinguished their perceptions of management control from
those of British and Czech managers. The first was personal relationships. This was
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reflected in reliance on relationships more than on contracts and legal processes,
personal responsibility owed to fellow members of an in-group, paternal hierarchy
based upon personal loyalty by subordinates given in return for expectations of being
looked after, looking to people more than rules, and keeping information private.
Secondly, there was preference for opportunity and context. This was reflected in
maintaining flexibility rather than commitment to a process. It was also reflected in
looking to people more than rules, in keeping information private and showing less
concern for feedback information, and in expecting business between people to
develop with their relationship rather than expecting it to be defined and constrained
by a contract.
Six features of the distinguishing key categories for the Chinese managers'
perception of gaining control assurance in this study are shown in Figure 14.2. Each
is symbolic for a key category, which distinguishes how Chinese managers tended to
gain control assurance.
The feature of 'relationships more than contracts' signifies the greater reliance that
tended to be given by Chinese managers to personal relationships than to contracts
with external parties, and of Chinese views of the key category developed in Chapter
7. It includes the nature of these relationships, which for example usually involved
elements of Chinese guan xi or even ren qing. How transactions and relations with
external parties were regulated impacted on assurance that organisational objectives,
standards, goals or purposes would be achieved. While being clearly pertinent to
trade credit control, regulation of external relations was also crucial to wider aspects
of selling goods and providing services, as well as to procurement, value chain
management, and management of joint ventures.
'Responsibility to in-group' symbolises the Chinese perceptions found here for the
key category of obligations developed in Chapter 8. It included the tendency for
Chinese people in this study to see responsibility as a heavy duty or burden owed to
their colleagues and to their bosses. This was personal in that its weight depended
upon the relationship with the person to whom it was owed, which was very much
greater where that person were an important figure in one's in-group. The moral
overtones to this sort of responsibility appeared to be a feature of Chinese
interpersonal relationships. The strength of this duty of responsibility, and the
Willingness or reluctance with which it was accepted, appeared to be an important
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distinguishing feature of how control assurance was gained by the Chinese managers
that people would conform to and fulfil what was expected of them.
'Paternal hierarchy' symbolises the personal and hierarchical nature of relations
within organisations, that tended to be seen and expected by Chinese staff and
managers (Chapter 9). This included reliability of subordinates and the personal
,
nature of their loyalty to the particular boss, assuming that sufficient personal
relationship has developed between them. It also represents a hierarchical nature of
teams. This, together with the previous 'responsibility to in-group' and the next
feature 'people more than rules', appeared to be distinguishing features of how the
Chinese managers tended to gain control assurance that the internal organisational
structure and relations between organisational members would help achieve
organisational objectives, standards, goals or purposes.
'People more than rules' signifies the tendency seen for the Chinese managers in this
study to place greater reliance on people and on personal relationships with them,
than on impersonal rules (Chapter 11). This refers both to internal organisational
rules, procedures and relationships with fellow organisational members, and to
legislation, external regulation and relationships with external parties. An apparent
paradox was seen between this feature and Chinese regulators and managers tending
to issue a large volume of rules. This appeared to be reconciled by, inter alia, using
ambiguity and flexible interpretation to allow people to mediate between rules and
their practical effect. The implication seems to be that rules per se tended not to
provide much control assurance to the Chinese managers in this study. It appears
that it was people and relationships between them, rather more than rules, that tended
to give them control assurance.
'Private information' symbolises the tendency that appeared among Chinese
managers and organisations towards secrecy, and to see information as valuable
where it can be used to maintain relationships, rather than when widely held and
open to scrutiny and challenge (Chapter 10). Information appeared in all 30 axial
respondents' perception of control (Table 6.2), but these features of prevalent
Chinese attitudes to information appear to indicate that information tended to take a
different part in providing assurance for the Chinese as opposed to Czech or British
managers. It seems that one way in which information tended to provide assurance
to the Chinese managers was by indicating reliability of interpersonal relationships,
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and, drawing on the findings of Chapter 12, by describing context and indicating
potential opportunities. This may suggest that rather less assurance tended to be
gained by the mainland Chinese than Czech or British managers from feedback
confirmation that systems are operating as expected.
'Room for manoeuvre more than process' symbolises greater attention that tends to
be given by the Chinese managers to opportunities, context and people rather than to
process (Chapter 12). Consequently, flexibility and good positioning for
opportunities tended to be more important to Chinese than to British or Czech
managers for providing control assurance; whereas British and Czech managers
tended to place greater control assurance on processes than did Chinese managers.
This, as well as 'people more than rules', is illustrated by the remark of a Chinese
manager (interview # 997) that
"Control is awareness not a system; it is only effective when it is in people IS
mind".
14.5.2 Czech perceptjons
Among the Czech managers, three shared values or preferences appeared as themes
to underlie the distinguishing features of how they gain control assurance. The first
was valuing people as individuals. This was reflected in Czech managers tending to
see people as inherently self interested and loyal to themselves, responsibility as the
duty of an individual, and for a desire for freedom unconstrained by procedures that
were not understood by the individual. Secondly there was the shared value put on
principles. This was reflected in the duty of responsibility based upon what should
be done, rather than what someone might be forced to do or be obliged by others to
do. Itwas reflected in the importance of contracts, despite difficulties with enforcing
them, in truth, in the desire by individuals to know why procedures should be
followed, and in their desire to understand design principles for control systems.
Thirdly, linking these two themes, there was the shared preference for understanding,
for individuals to understand the principles that should guide their action or that
regulate the system. This was reflected in the importance of individuals
understanding their responsibilities, in truth to oneself, and in understanding the
design of the control system.
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In Figure 14.2, 'Contract' represents Czech perceptions of the key category of how
business relations with external parties are regulated (Chapter 7). There was a
tendency for the Czech managers to rely more on contracts than on relationships. In
contrast to Chinese managers, they appeared generally to gain greater control
assurance from clear statement of principles by which transactions are to be
regulated than on developing relationships and interpersonal feelings with business
counter-parties.
'Individual responsibility' signifies Czech attitudes to the key category of obligations
developed in Chapter 8. It is an understanding by individuals of what their duty is,
as well as the tendency for Czech people in this study to look primarily after their
own interests and comforts. Therefore, in contrast to Chinese responsibility owed to
others within interpersonal relationships, Czech responsibility appeared to be more a
matter of individual integrity owed to oneself and society at large. Ensuring that
staff understand their responsibilities was a key theme of how control assurance was
gained among Czech managers.
'Self interest and loyalty' symbolises Czech views found here on the key category of
internal relations, which was developed in Chapter 9. It includes the primary
allegiance to oneself among the Czech interviewees, together with the contingent
allegiance and respect that Czech staff tended to give both to bosses as leaders and to
teams. Czech managers' views of the internal organisational structure, with respect
to gaining control assurance, appeared as a system comprising individual people who
need to be instructed so that they understand their duties and the principles on which
the system works. Drawing also on the findings of Chapter 11, it was seen that these
views were reflected by Czech subordinates, who tended to want to understand these
reasons and principles before they would commit themselves to organisational
purposes, objectives, standards and procedures.
'Truth' symbolises Czech views on the key category of information, which was
developed in Chapter 10. It includes high importance that tended to be given to
personal integrity, and to the widespread frustration felt for dishonesty and the low
morality displayed in the Czech Republic. This paucity of honesty in the Czech
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Republic'P' appeared to frustrate some of the Czech managers in their assurance that
their business was under control. Other Czech managers felt that it frustrated
development of businesses in the Czech Republic towards more fulfilling standards,
goals and objectives.
'Freedom: principle more than procedure' symbolises Czech views on the law,
regulation and procedures, which was developed in Chapter 11. It includes the
apparent paradox between the tendency for Czech employees to desire legal
certainty, and at the same time want freedom to follow internal procedures only
when they understand why these should be followed. This appeared to be a tension
between individual self interest and high regard for universal principles. Resolution
in the previous Communist regime might have been through force and fear (Seal et
aI., 1995). Today, resolution appears to be through appeal to understanding of
principles and to individual integrity. The implications within this study for gaining
control assurance by Czech managers appeared to be that assurance of achieving
organisational objectives, standards and goals depends upon clear exposition and
understanding of those principles.
'Understand system design' symbolises Czech perceptions found here for the key
category of systems logic, developed in Chapter 12. It includes a focus on whether
the control system works, and also more concern than by the Chinese managers for
detailed and sequential planning. Understanding the design and logic of the system
can be seen as a recurring theme extending to internal organisational relations and
compliance with procedures. The questions whether the control system was well
designed, whether it was internally consistent, operated as designed and worked
efficiently, appeared generally to be central to control assurance for Czech managers
in this study.
14.5,3 British vercevtionsL _
Three shared values and preferences appear to underlie and run as common
interrelated themes through the British perceptions in this study. First there is
preference for openness. It is reflected in transparent information and in
104 This does not imply that there was lack of honesty or low morality within CoX or CoY in
Prague. For them the problem was lack of honesty outside their companies.
370
Chapter 14: The substantive theory
accountability. The second shared preference is for roles. It is a preference for
recognising and making allowance for the various roles that people play within
organisations and in business relations with external parties. This links with
openness, because recognition of roles requires openness as to what role people are
playing. It was seen how roles are implied in procedures, in reliance on contracts as
well as on relationships, in transparency of information, and in accountability.
Finally there is shared preference among British managers for checks and balances.
These were seen as valuable because the world is uncertain and unpredictable. They
were valued because of the variety and shifting complexity of roles that people play.
Checks and balances are reflected in the interplay between principles and
pragmatism that appear in procedures and corporate knowledge: for example,
procedures and established ways of working need to strike a balance between
pragmatism and standardisation. Checks and balances are also reflected in reliance
on both relationships and contracts, in empowerment with accountability, and in the
broad range of elements or 'control framework' that appeared to comprise the typical
British perception of gaining control assurance.
'Relationships and contracts' represent the pattern of how the British managers
tended to gain control assurance for business relations with external parties, which
was developed in Chapter 7. It includes the possibility for aligning interests into
relationships of mutual interest. It also includes a balance between relationships and
taking people to court. It therefore lies between mainland Chinese reliance mainly
on relationships and Czech reliance on contracts.
'Accountability' symbolises British perceptions in this study of obligations that were
examined in Chapter 8. It includes a tendency to combine responsibility with either,
or both of, the roles of owing responsibility and to whom responsibility is owed, and
explanation for fulfilment of the responsibility. Understanding by British
interviewees of responsibility was distinguished from meanings for Chinese and
Czech people as being concerned not so much with duties to members of a relatively
fixed in-group or to oneself, but as defined by variable roles. This feature of the
British perceptions of management control reflects shared preferences for openness
and for checks and balances as well as recognition of roles. Accountability appeared
to be a key distinguishing feature of how the British managers gained control
assurance concerning other people.
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'Empowerment' symbolises British perceptions of control aspects of internal
organisational relations, which were developed in Chapter 9. It embraces the
tendency among the British managers firstly to want their staff to contribute more
than merely being reliable. It includes secondly, the British tendency to see coaching
staff members as important, so that they are enabled to contribute more to
organisational objectives, to work more effectively in flat teams, and to take on more
challenging roles. It contrasts with the tendencies found towards more hierarchical
views of internal organisational relations by the mainland Chinese managers, and
contingent hierarchical views by the Czech managers. Empowerment and
accountability appear to be complementary aspects of how the British managers tend
to gain control assurance concerning people within their organisation.
'Transparent information' represents patterns of British perceptions of information
for management control, which were examined in Chapter 10. It reflects shared
preference for openness. Focus on transparency of information, whether public,
between organisations or within organisations, appeared as a distinguishing trend of
the British views on what sort of information contributes to providing control
assurance. It contrasts with the Czech trend for greater concern with accuracy and
honesty than with transparency, and with the mainland Chinese preference for
information to be narrowly held.
'Procedures and corporate knowledge' symbolise patterns of British attitudes to the
rule of law, regulation, internal policies and procedures (Chapter 11). The British
interviewees tended to see procedures as useful, which distinguished them from the
mainland Chinese and Czech interviewees. The British managers tended also to
value corporate knowledge, of which policies, procedures and established ways of
working are a part. British managers therefore appeared to gain control assurance
from expectations that rules would be followed, and from establishing expected ways
of working appropriate to the particular roles and circumstances.
'Control Framework' symbolises prevalent British systems logic that was examined
in Chapter 12. This was identified as reliance on a variety of checks and balances for
ensuring that control processes work. This, like the tendency for Czech systems
logic but unlike that for mainland Chinese managers, appeared to focus on control
processes more than on their context or on objectives for which control assurance
was sought. It showed control assurance gained from a pragmatic mix of universal
372
Chapter J4: The substantive theory
principles, such as might be embodied in a process design, and adaptation to
particular roles and circumstances.
This concludes the substantive theory, which IS next compared to existing
knowledge.
14.6 The substantive theory and cross-national research into
management control
This section compares the study and its substantive theory to the types of prior
comparative research conducted into management control, and to reviews of this
prior research. Comparison to existing theories are held over to the following 2
sections on management control systems theory and accountability theory.
14.6.1 Context
Concurrently with the writing up of this research, Bhimani (1999) and Harrison and
McKinnon (1999) published papers regretting the influence of Hofstede's (1984,
1991) successful measurement of cultural dimensions. As reviewed in Chapter 2,
subsequent empirical research has relied too much on his cultural dimensions to the
exclusion of wider contextual factors. This study has anticipated their call for a
wider look at the context of management control. Identification of culture only in
quantitative cultural dimensions was recognised here as an over simplistic, and
potentially misleading, recognition of complex cultural factors that can affect control
perceptions. An attempt to capture this wider context is made in Figure 14.1, which
illustrates some of the broad range of contextual factors identified in this study. It
can be compared to prior research.
Granick (1972 and 1978) identifies cultural value systems, managerial backgrounds
such as education, and business practice in staff selection as affecting managerial
remuneration and reward systems. Child and Kieser (1979; see also Child, 1981)
recognise in their empirical research multiple factors of cultural forces and
contingencies of industrialisation such as economies of scale, organisational
structures and business practices. Horovitz (1980) identifies national cultures
together with professionalism of managers, characteristics of the market segment, the
impact of technology and organisational structure as affecting management control.
Unfortunately, most cross-national research into management control, since the
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success of Hofstede (1984, originally published 1980) m measunng cultural
dimensions, has focused on his dimensions (Harrison and McKinnon, 1999). The
research reported here attempts to return attention to wider contextual factors.
14.6.2 Nature ofmanagement control
Bhimani (1999) criticises cross-national research for taking an overly deterministic
view of forces that affect management control. This too has been anticipated in this
study with a middle range stance towards assumptions about human nature, which
were explained in Chapter 3. Figure 14.1 illustrates the conclusion to this middle
range stance, with a potential complex of mutually interacting factors of national
culture, historical, philosophical and social traditions, market, social and
organisational institutions, and perceptions of gaining control assurance.
The inductive holistic approach taken in this study has set out to be sensitive to
concepts of rnanagernent control that are emic to the cultures studied. Although an
obvious limitation is the impossibility for a single researcher to be sensitive to all
within these cultures. The approach taken has atternpted to be open to rnanagement
control as socially constructed in each of the 3 national cultures (Berger and
Luckman, 1967; Ahrens, 1996), rather than merely to what conforms to a prior
techno-rational theory of management control.
11.6. 3 Management control in different countries
Unlike rnost empirical studies that start with a srnall number of specific management
control variables, or a restricted range of such variables, this research has set out to
take a holistic approach to management control. A wide variety of variables were
identified in the open and initial part of axial coding, which was then cut down to
frequently recurring control elements. Figure 14.2 is a holistic view of key
distinguishing features of control perceptions for managers from the 3 countries.
Inquiry into management control as a whole is important because different control
elements may complement or substitute for each other (Fisher, 1995; Chow et al.,
1994). It may also open new areas to research. External relationships and contracts,
accountability and types of responsibility, the nature of organisational relations, and
attitudes to control processes may be examples of such new areas for comparative
rnanagement control research that have been explored in this study.
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It should be stressed that while the study is intended to be holistic, it does not purport
to be comprehensive of key features that distinguish management control perceptions
of even the managers studied. There may be further management control elements
on which perceptions differ; for example Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming) identify
significantly different attitudes to risk and uncertainty between mainland Chinese
and British managers. This limitation of the research not being comprehensive is
explained further in the next chapter.
Among prior empirical studies, only Horovitz (1980) and Kreder and Zeller (1988),
appear to have taken a holistic approach. Some studies, such as Bimberg and
Snodgrass (1988) and Chow et al. (1999), have purported to inquire into a complete
coverage of management control functions, such as organising, planning, evaluation
and rewarding.
Some of the early cross-national research into management control addressed the
question of whether management behaviour and best practice is universal around the
World or if these are culturally dependent (Child and Kieser, 1979; Horovitz, 1980).
Conclusions were that there is some truth in both hypotheses. This study recognises
the possibility that some control methods and types of control may be accepted as
good practice in all 3 cultures studied here. Indeed information was identified (Table
6.1) as a control element for all of the 30 axial respondents from all three countries.
However, this study, like most empirical research after these early studies, has
inquired into cultural differences in management control.
14.7 The substentiv« theory and management control systems
theory
The research question was framed in terms of management control but not of
management control systems. This avoided taking into the grounded theory study
prior theory and notions of what a system might be. The term 'systems' was
introduced in Chapter 12 in order to identify a key category. Many of the
interviewees used the word 'system' when describing their perception of
management control. It is therefore pertinent to compare these perceptions and the
substantive theory to theory of management control systems.
Two types of comparison are made. Firstly managers' use in the field of the word
'system' is compared to how it is used in theory of management control systems.
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This may throw some light on how far the use of the term 'system' in management
control theory is reflected in use of the word by practitioners. Secondly, comparison
may show to what extent perceptions of management control identified in this study
correspond to general systems theorytOS of management control, irrespective of
whether the interviewees who described their perceptions used the word 'system'.
This may show to what extent systems thinking in management control theory
reflects the way that practitioners see management control.
Unfortunately time and the researcher's limited language abilities prevented any
comparative research between general systems theory in the English, Czech and
Chinese speaking worlds. Nor indeed, was comparative research done between
theories of management control systems in the English, Czech and Chinese speaking
worlds. Such comparative research would have allowed examination of the extent
that British, Czech and Chinese managers' perceptions have been influenced, if at all,
by prevalent theories of management control systems and by general systems theory
in the different countries.
These comparisons of the use of the word 'system' and systems thinking between
interviewees and theory do not form part of the grounded theory study. 'System'
was not explored with interviewees; it was not pursued as an avenue of inquiry in
selective sampling. These comparisons between the data and findings of this study
and theory have been brought to the study after completion of the findings. Any
attempt to form new findings at this stage would run the risk of shaping data to fit
theory, which is contrary to the grounded theory approach to research.
J 4. 7. I Comparjson to management control systems theory
Theory:
Macintosh (1994) includes 'control systems' in the title of his text, but he appears to
explain neither why 'control' is associated with 'system', nor what he means by a
system. Perhaps these are self evident to at least most Canadian readers of this text
lOS General systems theory is used here to refer to what is termed 'general systems theory'
(Boulding, 1956; Bertalanffy, 1968; Otley, 1983), 'systems thinking' (Checkland, 1993) or
'systems theory' (Nicholson, 1995; de Leeuw and Volberda, 1996).
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by a Canadian author. Simons (1995) in USA describes his 'levers of control' in
terms of 4 types of system (belief, boundary, diagnostic control and interactive
control systems), but without explaining why these are systems. Maciariello and
Kirby, also in the USA, define 'management control system', in their text on the
subject (1994, pag~ 1), as follows:
"A MCS is a set of interrelated communication structures that facilitates the
processing of information for the purpose of assisting managers in
coordinating the parts and attaining the purpose of an organization on a
continuous basis".
However, they appear not to state explicitly why management control requires a
system. They do however define a system as an association of parts that are related
to each other. Anthony and Govindarajan (1998), also in the USA, entitle their text
'Management Control Systems'. They explain that control processes used by
management employ elements of a system, namely sensor, assessor, effector and
communications network. They claim,
"Any organisation - however well-aligned its structure is to the chosen
strategy - cannot effectively implement its strategy without a consistent
management control system" (op. cit., page 578).
Lowe (1971, page 5) defines a management control system,
"as a system of organizational information seeking and gathering,
accountability, and feedback designed 10 ensure that the enterprise adapts to
changes in its substantive environment and that the work behaviour of its
employees is measured by reference to a set of operational sub-goals (which
conform to overall objectives) so that the discrepancy between the two can be
reconciled and correctedfor".
He argues, on grounds of gaps between objectives of organisations and of
individuals, of uncertainty and the need to economise, why such a system for
management control is needed by a business organisation. Hussey (1999) defines an
'internal control system' 106 as a system of controls. It is therefore not surprising that
Otley (1989) describes how general systems theory has been used as a framework for
106 It will be remembered(1.2Managementcontrol and control assurance)that 'internal
control' is assumedhereto be synonymouswith 'managementcontrol'.
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management control system theory, while Otley, Broadbent and Berry (1995) note
that systems thinking has had an important influence on management control systems
theory.
In order to understand the theory of management control systems, an understanding
is needed of general systems theory. Management control systems (MCS)107 theory
will therefore be explored briefly here in terms of those parts of general systems
theory that has been used by management control theorists.
Is a system essential to management control?
However, before considering general systems theory, it is worthwhile to pause and
consider whether management control must in theory be linked to a system. It was
seen above that some authors, such as Macintosh (1994), Maciariello and Kirby
(1994), and Simons (1995) appear to assume that management control must involve a
system. Several professional pronouncements (COSO, 1994; CICA, 1994; HA - UK
1998) define internal control not as a system but as a process designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives. On the other hand,
the Turnbull Guidance (1999) refers to 'internal control systems'. The UK Auditing
Principles Board (APB), in their standard SAS 300 (1995) on Accounting and
internal control systems, define an internal control system as including the control
environment and policies and procedures adopted to assist in achieving various stated
objectives. They also define 'control procedures' as policies and procedures
"established to achieve the entity's specific objectives" (APB, 1995, paragraph 10).
It appears from reading SAS 300 that the APB envisage internal control as provided
only by an internal control system, not by control procedures in isolation from the
control environment nor by a control environment without control procedures.
Among academic theorists Berry, Broadbent and Otley (1995, page 4) define
management control as,
"the process guiding organisations into viable patterns of activity in a
changing environment"
107 MCS is adopted as an acronym for 'management control system' by several theorists
(Otley, 1983 and 1989; Maciariello and Kirby, 1994; Otley, Broadbent and Berry, 1995).
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For them control is of an organisation that they view as a system. However, in
discussing management control, they use the perspective of general systems theory,
so perhaps they see the management control process as a system. This view, of a
control process for an organisation seen as a system, is similar to that of Emmanuel
et al. (1990, pages 7 - 8) for whom,
"control is concerned with the processes by which a system adapts itself to
its environment. That is, in a self-regulating system, such as a business
enterprise, both the specification of objectives and the means of their
achievement are internally generated andform part of the control process".
They then go on to discuss management control in terms of a systems model.
Therefore, while many theorists in the English speaking world view management
control in terms of systems, others see it as a process. However, for the latter, the
management control process may represent a sub-system of the organisation, which
is itself a system. The argument returns to what a 'system' is in the context of
management control, while concluding at this stage that, for many authors,
management or internal control is inextricably linked to the concept of a system.
Axial respondents' use of the word 'system ':
The diagrams for the 30 axial respondents' views illustrate each of their perspectives
of credit control. In contrast, other interviewees generally gave views on a specific
aspect of a key category, or on the context for the study. In a few cases, other
interviews did provide a reasonably comprehensive description of their view of
management control, but these were not confirmed with them. Comparison is
therefore restricted to the 30 axial respondents.
All but 6 of the 30 axial respondents used the word 'system'. However, a further 5,
of the 24 who saw 'system' as having some relevance to management control, were
referring only to computer systems. A further 3 appeared to use 'system' for only
part of management control, usually the formal and largely mechanistic part of
management control. Therefore, only 16 out of the 30, just over half, referred to all
of management control as a system. This suggests that practitioners do not
universally refer to management control within an organisation as a 'system'.
However, this still leaves the question whether their perceptions of management
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control corresponds to general systems theory, that is whether they adopted a systems
approach to management control.
14.7.2 MCS as sYStematic or methodical
Theory:
No attempt is made to provide a definitive description of general systems theory, but
merely an outline of where MCS theory has drawn from general systems theory. It is
done under this and subsequent headings, each identifying a feature of general
systems theory.
Management control theorists sometimes use 'management control system' in the
common everyday sense of a methodical way of doing something according to an
organised method or scheme'". For example, according to Anthony and
Govindarajan (1998, page 5),
HA system is a prescribed way of carrying out an activity or set of activities;
usually the activities are repeated ... a system is characterised by a more or
less rhythmic, recurring, coordinated series of steps that are intended to
accomplish a specified purpose. "
Anthony and Govindarajan (ibid.) describe management control processes as being
'systematic' when they conform to this definition of a system. Cybernetic models of
management control systems, which are discussed below, are generally depicted as a
methodical arrangement of control processes.
This process view of an MCS may correspond to the 'transformation process' In
general systems theory, that is "the means by which defined inputs are transformed
into defined outputs" (Checkland, 1993, page 224).
Perceptions of systematic management control:
All of the diagrams of the 30 axial respondents' perceptions of credit control
included sequences of steps forming a process. Most diagrams included elements
108 Pearsall (1998, page 1883) includes in the definition of 'system' "an organized scheme or
method". She includes in the definition of 'systematic' "done or acting according to a fixed
plan or system; methodical".
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that were subject to design, such as establishing procedures or using computer
systems. In all cases it appeared that respondents were referring to control elements
that they thought should be clearly established and methodically used, even if they
did not form part of a formal control system. One axial respondent referred to the
systematic nature of control as contributing to control assurance. In this case it
appeared that systematic was used to mean following a clear methodical process.
Another 3 axial respondents, as mentioned above, specifically referred what was
formal and largely mechanistic in management control as a 'system'.
On the other hand, there were findings that a process is not always seen as
contributing to management control. A Chinese tendency was found, and examined
in Chapter 12, of looking more to opportunities, context and people than to processes
for control assurance. This is represented by the box 'Room for manoeuvre more
than process' in Figure 14.2. Also a Czech tendency was found in Chapter 11 for
preferring the freedom to act on principle rather than to follow procedures. This is
represented by the box 'Freedom: principle more than procedure' in Figure 14.2.
Therefore it is concluded that the views in this study show some, but not universal,
consistency with theorists who see management control as being systematic.
14. 7.3 MeS as designed towards an end goal or purpose
Theory:
Parker (1992, p. 276) defines a 'system' as "a group of related elements organized
for a purpose." The definition of management control by Maciariello and Kirby
(1994) and the definition of a system in the context of management control by
Anthony and Govindarajan (1998), both referred to above, view management control
as directed towards the purposes of an organisation. The UK external auditing
standard SAS 300 (APB, 1995) defines an internal control system in terms of various
objectives.
Lowe (1971) includes both objectives and 'designed' in his definition of a
management control system. Maciariello and Kirby (1994) refer to the need to
design an MCS so that it is able to achieve its purpose. Some form of design may
also be implied by Otley (1989) who describes the study of management control
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systems as including how diverse activities are co-ordinated so that they contribute to
a desired result.
On the other hand, Otley et al. (1995) trace a historical development of management
control theory from rational perspectives, which saw organisations and their
management control as purposefully designed. to systems models of natural
emergent control. Examples given of the latter view include Hopwood's (1974)
behavioural view of organisational control. Dent's (1991) study of emergent
accounting within the changing organisation of a European railway. and the political
nature of management control examined in Chua et al. (1989). Otley et al. do not
consider whether these emergent views are of management control systems. but they
take a general systems theory approach to their analysis.
Perceptions a/management control designed towards an end, goal or purpose:
The study set out with a definition of management control (see Appendix A) that
referred to "objectives (standard. goal. objective or purpose)". This definition was
discussed with all of the axial respondents. Control objectives were implicit in the
question, asked by the researcher in the first meeting with each axial respondent.
This was what he or she thought needs to be controlled and why. Therefore it would
be unwise to interpret the views of axial respondents as seeing management control
directed towards ends, goals or purposes. Although it can be noted that none of them
expressed any unease with discussing management control in these terms.
Much of the perceptions of management control studied here are of informal control.
rather than of elements formally designed and implemented for control purposes.
This study therefore falls largely, but probably not exclusively, into Otley et al.'s
(1995) category of studying natural emergent control.
14.7.4 Cybernetic model ofMCS
Theory:
Norbert Wiener (1948. page 19) coined the word 'cybernetics' for "the entire field of
control and communication theory. whether in the machine or in the animal" and
launched it as a subject for study. He saw cybernetics in terms of feedback control
382
Chapter 14: The substantive theory
and homeostasis (Wiener, 1954). Cybernetics has been included as part of general
systems theory, which has a wider ambit than cybernetics (Bertalanffy, 1968).
A cybernetic model of management control combines process, purpose (including
aim, goal or standard) and information in one or more control loops. It therefore
includes the previous two elements of control theory discussed here, namely a
methodical process and a control objective or purpose. The control loop of
cybernetic models of management control generally uses information for feedback
control, such as described by Rathe (1957); in most models it also uses feed forward
information'". Such a model has been widely adopted by management control
theorists (Otley and Berry 1980; Otley, 1983; Willmer, 1983; Emmanuel et al. 1990,
Maciariello and Kirby, 1994). Flamholtz (1983; 1996a and b; Flamholtz et al., 1985)
puts a cybernetic model at the core of his model of organisational control. Some
authors (Lowe, 1971; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998) appear to adopt it, but
without calling it a cybernetic model. Other authors on management control refer to
it, even if they do not explicitly adopt it (Macintosh, 1994; Berry et al., 1995).
However the cybernetic model of management control is not without criticism
(Hofstede, 1978).
The cybernetic model has been further developed for management control by Otley
and Berry (1980) to show possibilities for 2nd order control and for leaming.
Emmanuel et al. (1990) distinguish programmed from non-programmed decisions for
feed forward control, based upon how much precision can be achieved with
predictive models. Whether management control decisions are programmed or
remain non-programmed depends upon the extent of uncertainty (Merchant, 1998),
which can be either in the transformation process or in objectives that are unclear or
ambiguous. An implication of whether management control is programmed or non-
programmed is in where discretionary judgement must reside; that is, which
managers within an organisation must make control decisions. Design of
programmed control is by senior managers, who may dictate what and how activities
are to be done. Execution of these programmed directions can then be delegated to
more junior ranks (Anthony, 1965),who may be subject to Bureaucratic control. For
109 SeeAppendixA forcomparisonof 'Feedbackcontrol'and 'Feed forwardcontrol'.
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non-programmed decisions, discretion must be left to those managers, perhaps close
to business operations, who are have best insight and predictive models as to what
processes or immediate objectives will contribute towards wider organisational aims
(Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Macintoshl994; Hamilton and Kashlak, 1999).
Cybernetic perceptions of management control:
All of the 30 axial respondents' diagrams of credit control were cybernetic in the
sense of seeing communication of information being used for the purpose of control.
21 of these diagrams included control loops, such as a review of controls leading to
possible intervention and adjustment of those controls. An example is included in
Appendix C. No view is taken whether these control loops represent feedback or
feed forward control.
It is interesting that interviewees in this study did not raise the distinctions made by
theorists between feedback or feed forward control and between programmed or non-
programmed control decisions. At first sight, trade credit management involves a
number of standard control decisions, such as the following. To whom should goods
or services be sold? On what credit terms? How should customers pay? What
should be done if customers do not pay when expected? What information should be
collected and monitored? Who should decide if an overdue debt is to be treated as a
bad debt, and what are the implications of this decisions? Other recurring decisions,
such as what product or service to sell, how much of it to sell, and at what price, are
also important to trade credit control. Trade credit decisions were also seen as
relevant to non-programmed strategic decisions such as managing an acceptable
balance between risk and reward, and what markets and businesses the company
should be inllo.
Interviewees referred to a wide range of management control decisions that CoX and
CoY had standardised, whether in formal procedures or other routines for how they
conduct their business activities. Examples of standardised decisions that were
discussed included how new staff should be recruited and on what criteria,
organisational decisions of who should do what activities or take what decisions, and
110 This wide range of implications are reflected in the literature on trade credit control, for
example Alien (1997) and Pike et al. (1998).
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decisions standardised in procedures, IT systems or established routines. The
products sold by CoX, services provided by CoY, and the processes by which these
were delivered by both MNCs to customers, were to a greater or lesser extent
standardised. International management of both MNCs gave considerable attention
for their worldwide operations to common processes (interview # 18), or common
standards (interview # 957), applicable for example to trade credit control, processes
for delivery, and what sort of value should be provided to customers.
Perhaps the question of what control decisions are programmed or non-programmed
was not seen by interviewees as relevant. This question was however neither raised
by interviewees nor put specifically to them, because the theoretical sampling
pursued control issues that emerged as being important to the axial respondents and
other interviewees, not what might be seen as important in theory. This omission
may have arisen from interviewees' lack of contact with theory of programmed or
non-programmed decisions. Alternatively, this question may have been explicitly or
implicitly understood, but there may have been other more important issues that
occupied managers' concern about how to gain control assurance.
Several reasons appear for why the distinction between programmed and non-
programmed decisions might not have been of great concern to interviewees. Firstly,
programmed decisions may have generally been seen as not warranting management
discussion, because routine processes might only enter the agenda of management
control concern where change was identified as worthwhile. Managers might have
been too busy to fix what was working.
Secondly, some routine decisions apparently subject to standardised criteria, i.e.
programmed decisions, would have received attention from fairly senior managers.
Examples included selection of recruits, approval of capital investments, and
acceptance of high risk customers. In these cases management attention might have
been focused on aspects of these decisions that could not be programmed, or only
very approximately programmed. For example, the control element 'clear choices'
in Appendix C refers to management decisions concerning trade credit exposure and
risk 111, so that risks and rewards can be managed within the context of the business
III Risk is used as defined in Appendix A.
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strategy. It might be imagined that balancing risk and reward within a business
strategy might not be readily programmed. In this case apparently programmed
decisions might warrant senior management attention, because of the wider and
longer term implications of these decisions.
Thlrldy, not all non-programmed decisions were matters for control concern. Much
judgement was left to relatively junior staff. So long as staff members were trusted,
they decided many non-routine matters such as when to visit a problem customer and
what arguments to use in persuading the customer to pay on time. The quality of
service provided, particularly by CoY, depended to a very considerable extent on the
skill, expertise and judgement of individual employees. Reliance on judgement was
reflected in concerns about assigning an appropriate person to a task or job (interview
# 1064), and in concerns about reliability and integrity of staff (interviews # 20, 254).
Therefore non-programmed decisions were so commonplace and left to junior staff
that they did not necessarily enter managers' agenda of control concern except for
the issue of whether staff had the knowledge, skill and integrity to make these non-
programmed decisions.
Fourthly, the extent of uncertainty and resulting non-programmed nature of control
decisions appeared not to be a sufficient reason for locating control decisions and
instigating control initiatives. Instead of delegating decisions and control autonomy
to the most senior managers who have an adequate predictive model, CoX and CoY
appeared to operate on the basis of giving autonomy to all except where some
guidance, instruction, procedure or system was warranted. Examples of major
location decisions were the various regional and global initiatives being introduced
within CoX (5.5.1 CoX). As far as the researcher could see, these had objectives of
improving efficiency and of responsiveness to regional and global customers, rather
than necessarily aligning decisions with the best placed predictive models. Whether
because uncertainty was seen as endemic, or because of cost pressures, or because of
preferred management styles, formal control methods appeared to be avoided except
where they could be warranted. This seemed to be the preference among British
managers who tended to favour empowerment, among Czech managers who tended
to rely more on individual integrity than on procedures, and also among Chinese
managers who tended to prefer reliance on interpersonal relationships than on formal
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control processes and rules. Pressure of cost control, staff availability and
competition were common to all of them.
Therefore, not only was the distinction between programmed or non-programmed
control decisions was not raised by practitioners in their discussion of management
control, but reasons can be identified for why the distinction might not have been of
concern to them. They might perhaps have found control theory that dealt with
parameters of cost, benefit, risk, culture and the social dynamics of change
management pertinent to the challenges they faced. This however is conjecture
because the researcher avoided putting any alternative management control theories
to the interviewees in this grounded theory study.
14. 7.5 Holistic systems approach - jnteuelatjonshios oJparts
Theory:
Common meanings of 'system' include "a complex whole; a set of connected things
or parts" (Allen, 1990,page 1238). The adjective 'systemic' may describe relating to
a whole system (Pearsall, 1998). General systems theorists also see systems in terms
of a whole comprising interrelated parts. For example, Bertalanffy (1968, page 38)
defines systems as "sets of elements standing in interrelation". According to
Checkland (1993, page 3),
"The central concept 'system' embodies the idea of a set of elements
connected together which form a whole, this showing properties which are
properties of the whole, rather than of its component parts. "
Nicholson (1995, pages 551-2) describes 'systems theory' as follows:
"This denotes broad meta-theory for describing the structure and behavior of
complex wholes called systems .... One key feature has to do with the notion
of system itself and how it forms an organized whole ... behaving in a way
that is greater than merely the sum of the behaviors of its parts"
This feature of general systems theory is taken up among MCS theorists by Otley.
For example (1980, page 423)
"The simultaneous use of a wide range of control mechanisms serving
multiple purposes makes it difficult, if not impossible, to isolate the effect of
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any specific means of control. ... One way forward to greater conceptual
clarification lies in the utilisation of a control systems framework. ".
He sees the potential of soft systems thinking for 'organisational level of analysis'
and for the study of management control of "situations involving greater amounts of
complexity and uncertainty than we have techniques adequately to cope with"
(Otley, 1983,pages 85 - 86).
Holistic perceptions of management control:
Axial respondents had no difficulty in envisaging credit control as a coherent
interrelationship of control elements. An example is given in Appendix C.
Accordingly, it is concluded that all axial respondents saw management control as
some complex interrelation of elements. Several of them, however, admitted they
had never before the study thought it through so comprehensively, as they had
expressed in their interviews or was illustrated in the diagram of their perception.
3 of the axial respondents referred to management control in terms of an overall
control framework. which itself contributed to control assurance. 16 axial
respondents, including 2 of those who spoke of a control framework, referred to
overall management control as a 'system'. Two further contrasting findings in
Chapter 12 also suggest a holistic view of management control. A tendency was
found of Czech managers being concerned whether they knew or understood whether
the control system was working; it is represented in Figure 14.2 by the box labelled
'Understand system design'. This appears to imply some overview of the whole
management control system. There was also the Chinese pattern of seeing
management control in terms of opportunities and context, which is also represented
in Figure 14.2. Unless these opportunities were for the individual manager, they
referred to the overall business situation for the manager's organisation, rather than
to a control element or sub-set of the organisation's overall management control
system. There therefore appears to have been within this study a widespread,
although not universal, view of management control in holistic terms.
Managers' holistic perceptions of management control are reflected also in the
balance of topics that emerged during the study. Three aspects of these broad views
are worth commenting on. Firstly, it was noted in Chapter 10 that managers were
more concerned with informal than formal information for providing control
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assurance. Examples of informal management control emerged in selective coding
for other key categories. These included reliance on external relationships as
opposed to formal contracts (Chapter 7), various types of responsibilities expected of
colleagues and of subordinates, different expectations and perspectives on control
issues by people in different roles (Chapter 8), expectations of team members, bosses
and subordinates (Chapter 9), the Chinese tendency to rely more on people than on
rules (Chapter 11), and assurance provided by opportunities and context, or by
people as well as by formal control processes (Chapter 12). Management control
clearly was seen as wider than the formal designed processes and control methods
put in place for the purpose of control.
Secondly, management control was not seen as comprising merely planning,
monitoring, evaluation and reward sub-systems as suggested in some literature
(Flamholtz, 1983 and 1996; Birnberg and Snodgrass, 1988). Greater attention to the
people aspects, as opposed to process aspects, of management control has emerged
than is typical for much management control theory. Managers' concerns about
people and attitudes of staff to control are reflected in findings concerning attitudes
to internal relations (Chapter 9). They are also reflected in Appendix C, in the
explanatory notes for the 'Teamwork', 'Independent objective counterbalance', and
'Understanding' control elements. This study may also, as mentioned above, have
opened new areas of management control to comparative research, such as external
relationships and contracts, accountability and types of responsibility, the nature of
organisational relations, and attitudes to control processes.
Thirdly, management control was seen as more than production and use of
accounting information. Appendix C shows a broad array of control elements
beyond production and use of accounting and credit control information, such as
procedures, authorities and responsibilities, supervision and staff appraisal,
segregation of duties, teamwork, and the overall control environment. Management
control was the concern of all managers. The implication for researchers, educators
and students is that any focus just on accounting in the study of management control
is a narrow restricted view. It would leave out much, if not the greater part, of what
practising managers in CoX and CoY saw as important to management control. A
multi-disciplinary approach to MCS would be consistent with Bertalanffy's (1968)
description of the rise of general systems theory in order to bring a multi-disciplinary
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approach to complex problems of science, social sciences, engineering and
administration. Unfortunately, as noted by Fisher (1995, page 27) "relatively little
research has been done on nonfinancial control systems."
14.7.6 Oven MCS interacting with its envjronment
Theory:
The theory of open systems is concerned with systems that interact with their
environment (Bertalaffny, 1968). Maciariello and Kirby (1994) consider a MCS to
be open in the sense that it adapts to its environment. Otley (1989, p. 33) also
applies open systems to MCS theory:
"The MCS approach views an organisation as a controlled system, open to
and interacting with a wider environment. "
This allows a MCS to adapt to the changing environment for the organisation, and
allows the scope of the MCS to include ensuring viability and survival of the
organisation. Adaptation to a changing environment is included in Lowe's (1971)
definition of a MCS. Ensuring viability within a changing environment is central to
the definition of management control by Berry et al. (1995). Otley (1989) describes
this MCS approach, of an organisation interacting with and adapting to its
environment, as a 'systemic view'. de Leeuw and Volberda (1996) develop
interaction of a MCS with its environment to explore flexibility and evolution
through adaptability. Simons (1995) identifies belief systems and boundary systems
as 'levers of control' through which a firm competes and positions itself within its
environment.
Perceptions a/management control consistent with open systems:
The 30 axial respondents were generally very aware of the business context for credit
control. Diagrams for the perceptions of27 out of the 30 included contextual factors
outside their organisation. Perhaps not too much should be concluded from a tenth
of axial respondents not giving sufficient emphasis to contextual factors for them to
be included in their diagrams of credit control. This is because the question of
whether they described management control as open or closed to the business
environment was not pursued in the fieldwork.
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The finding, already noted, of a Chinese tendency for concern about opportunities
and context, also suggests a view of management control consistent with an open
systems approach to management control theory. In addition, two managers
(interviews # 159, 879) talked of the importance for control assurance of sending the
right message to the market about how their organisation was prepared to do
business.
The selective coding included a key category, namely business relations with
external parties, which focused on control of how the organisation interacts with its
business environment. This was unsurprising given the choice of credit as the area of
control from which inquiries started. It may therefore reflect a bias of the study
design. However, this bias was not only of the researcher, but also of the senior
managers in CoX and CoY who suggested this area of control. No surprise was
encountered among interviewees that credit control was chosen as the area of control
from which to start inquiries. Nor was there any surprise that a study of management
control should inquire into matters outside the organisation, such as economic
conditions, external sources of information, and local regulation. It is therefore
concluded, despite the potential bias of the research design, that interviewees saw
management control in terms of open interaction with the environment in which their
organisations operated.
These perceptions by managers of management control concerned with the
organisation within its environment illustrates that 'internal control' may be a
misnomer, if it indicates a scope limited to control of what is internal to an
organisation.
14.7.7 MCS as soft systems
Theory:
Checkland (1993) contrasts soft systems thinking for problems involving people to
hard systems thinking typically used for engineering. Whereas the latter is
concerned with problems, systems and objectives that are well defined, the former
are not. Otley (1983) recognises that soft systems thinking is more likely to be
applicable to MCS involving people, where objectives are often vague or ambiguous,
decision processes may be ill-defined, and where only qualitative measures of
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performance may be available. The problems of indeterminate or multiple goals and
incongruity between objectives of an organisation and of its individual members
have been of concern to MCS theorists (Lowe, 1971; Berry et al., 1995).
Simons (1995) takes a different approach to the problem of multiple indeterminate
objectives. He maps out how an organisation can use its MCS to shape its strategy,
within constraints of limited management time and how much information
management can handle.
Soft systems thinking for MCS may be related to the historical development of
'natural models' of emergent management control, which was identified by Otley et
al. (1995). Machin (1983) makes a similar contrast between seeing management
control systems as 'systemic' or developing organically, as opposed to systematically
designed for a well defined purpose. The soft systems approach to MCS recognises
possibilities for negotiation and political dialectic over what objectives management
control is to provide some assurance of achieving (Chua et al., 1989; Dent, 1991).
Control objectives are no longer given and a MCS need not be deterministic. The
soft systems approach provides a guard against possibilities for totalitarian control
systems envisaged by Bertalanffy (1968, page 52):
"We have a/air idea what a scientifically controlled world would look like.
In the best case, it would be /ike Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, in the
worst, like Orwell's 1984."
Perceptions of management control as natural or soft systems:
All of the 30 axial respondents identified several objectives, which were identified in
their diagrams of credit control. This number ranged from 3 to 17 objectives,
although axial respondents who identified more than 9 objectives were distinguishing
objectives between different types of business. 18 out of the 30 axial respondents'
diagrams of credit control had some review or implied adjustment of the objectives
towards which assurance was provided. A common example of implied adjustment
was balancing objectives such as risk and reward. No one indicated that this
adjustment would follow logically from a rational algorithm. These 18 axial
respondents saw the control objectives as not fixed, but open to adjustment and
challenge.
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Another manager, who was not an axial respondent, saw problem recognition and
changing the management mindset to recognise changing problems as very important
to control assurance (interview # 879). According to this manager, control objectives
were subject to control elements of problem recognition, changing mindsets and
strategy. This formed an explicit control loop bringing adjustment of control
objectives within the jurisdiction of management control. Such a loop breaks any
dichotomy between those who control and those who are controlled, at least for those
senior enough to feed into adjustment of the control objectives.
The Chinese tendency was noted of concern for opportunities and context. This also
implies adjustment of objectives or of the strategy being pursued. The concern by
managers of all 3 countries for people aspects of management control (I4. 7.5
Holistic systems approach - Holistic perceptions of management control) is a further
aspect of open systems view of management control found in this study.
There were therefore a wide range of views expressed, that appear to be consistent
with management control as a natural system, or consistent with soft systems
thinking, where the objectives are open to debate and adjustment, rather than
deterministic.
14. 7 8 Conclusions for manqgement control systems theory
Although only just over half of the axial respondents referred to all of management
control for an organisation as a 'system', there was broad consistency between the
perceptions found here of management control and general systems theory. No
pattern between managers from different countries was identified in the degree of
this consistency to any aspect of general systems theory. This gives no reasons to
doubt that there may be much potential application of a systems approach to
management control within the Czech Republic and mainland China, as well as
within the UK.
However, the analysis that can be done here is limited and tentative, because
elements of general systems theory were not put to interviewees in the field.
Therefore, it should not be inferred from this study that there might be no effects of
national culture or of other cross-national contextual factors on the applicability of
general systems theory to management control.
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14.8 The substentive theory and accountability theory
'Accountability' appears in Figure 14.2 representing the British perceptions of
obligations that were examined in Chapter 8. They were seen as a key distinguishing
feature of how British managers gain control assurance. It is pertinent to compare
these findings on accountability to the theory of accountability in order to ask
whether this theory is applicable within Czech and mainland Chinese cultures. As
with MCS and general systems theory, comparison is made only to accountability
theory of the English speaking world. If accountability theory from the English
speaking world is not applicable in Czech and mainland Chinese cultures, theorists,
students and practitioners should question whether it is universally applicable.
Alternatively it may be parochial (Adler, 1983) and not necessarily valid outside the
cultures where it was developed.
14.8.1 Accountabilit,y theory
The concept of accountability is gaining attention in the public sector and public
regulation of utilities in the UK and Australia (Stewart, 1984; Day and Klein, 1987;
Otley, 1990; Levaggi, 1995; Sinclair, 1995; Armstrong and Tomes, 1996; Laughlin,
1996; Conrad, 1997). It is implicated in the rise of the 'audit society' (power, 1997)
in the UK, and as a principle underlying corporate governance relations between
companies listed in the UK and their stakeholders (Cadbury, 1992; Committee on
Corporate Governance, 1998). Hayes (1996) notes a growing demand for
accountability within the Irish voluntary sector as charities become more open, they
separate funding from management, and they take a higher profile in society.
Much of accountability theory is concerned with accountability between
organisations, between organisations and their stakeholders and within the public
sector. A comparison is sought between findings of this study and theory of
accountability within organisations, or intra-organisational accountability. This
wider body of theory is drawn on therefore only to assist understanding intra-
organisational accountability.
Roberts and Scapens (1985, page 447) give a definition of accountability that is
applicable within organisations, which is adopted here:
"Accountability in its broadest sense simply refers to the giving and
demanding of reasons for conduct ",
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They link accountability embodied in accounting systems to rights of people to hold
others to account, to responsibilities of those others, and to power relationships.
Jones and Dugdale (1995) examine regimes of accountability within organisations.
These include accounting for activities and outcomes, people making an account or
narrative and explanation of their activities usually to their superiors, holding
accountable someone who is responsible for both providing the account and for the
activities and outcome that are the subject of account, and finally of construction of
the 'accountable person'. The latter is someone so enmeshed that they are self
accountable as a mirror of the regime of accountability.
Munro (1996, page 16) begins to open up the concept by asking:
IIWho is accounting to whom, over what?"
Accountability, as a chameleon (Day and Klein, 1987), appears to differ with the
circumstances (Sinclair, 1995). Attempts to find generalities for this chameleon may
be helped by continuing Munro's (1996) questioning as shown in Figure 14.3.
FORWHAT? TOWHOM?
OBLIGATION, RELATJONSHIP
AUTHORITY PRINCIPAL. AGENT MODEL
RESPONSIBILITY MULTIPLE ROLES HIERARCHY:-. / AUTHORITYFOUCAULDIAN DISCIPLINE
ACCOUNT ABILITY:
GIVING & DEMANDING HWHY?
CO·OPERATION:
REASONS FOR CONDUCT SOCIALISING
\ EMPOWERMENT/ FLAT ORGANISATIONS & TEAMSHOW? ETHICS:
PROVIDE AN ACCOUNT
IDENTITY: LEGITIMATION
CALLED TO ACCOUNT REINFORCE VALUES
AUTONOMOUS SANCTION DEVIANCY
IN SOCIETY
Figure 14.3: Questions underlying accountabilitylll
112 In this diagram, arrows indicate progression from what is general to what is more specific.
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This shows four questions underlying accountability, namely how accountability is
enacted, for what and to whom accountability is owed, and why it is important. Each
of these is addressed in the following sub-sections.
14.8,2 How? Proyiding an account
Theory:
Much commentary on accountability is in terms of management accounting or
reporting by companies to the public (Ijiri, 1983; Roberts and Scapens, 1985; Gray et
al., 1987; Otley, 1990; Roberts, 1991; Jones and Dugdale, 1995; Kirk and Mouritsen,
1996). It is reflected in financial stewardship (Day and Klein, 1987) and the phrase
'fiscal accountability' or the proper use of money (Hayes, 1996).
But this ability to provide an account perhaps more fundamentally reflects "making
the invisible visible" (Munro, 1996page 5) and offering openness and an artefact for
scrutiny (Sinclair, 1995), irrespective of whether the information is in terms of
monetary units. Day and Klein (1987, page 22) see growth in this emphasis on
transparency:
"The other theme that emerges from the debate of the past ten years is the
emphasis on accountability seen as openness. Effective scrutiny implies
effective access to information. "
Findings,'
In contrast to British managers, Czech and Chinese managers in this study tended not
to see the 'giving and demanding reasons for conduct' (Roberts and Scapens, 1995)
with respect to responsibilities as important to management control. There was little
if any concern for providing "an account ... or reckoning of the actions for which
one is held responsible" (Gray, Owen and Maunders, 1987). As explained, this does
not imply that accounting information was not important to them.
British managers' concern for transparency, that is for clarity of understanding
through openness and visibility, appeared at times to go beyond what is required for
monitoring conduct. Transparency appeared to enhance the value of information.
Transparency and wide availability of information seemed to be overshadowed by
Czech managers' concern for accuracy and truth. In contrast to apparent British
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willingness to be open with information, Chinese attitudes appeared to devalue
information according to how widely it was held. Furthermore, Chinese concerns
were with truth relative to the particular interpersonal relationships rather more than
Czech concern with absolute truth. Therefore "making the invisible visible" (Munro,
1996, page 5) and offering openness for scrutiny (Sinclair, 1995) seemed to be
relatively unimportant to Czech views and alien to Chinese views.
Little concern among Czech and mainland Chinese managers about providing an
account raises the question of what other control components take the place of
accountability in providing control assurance. This will be returned to when all four
questions depicted in Figure 14.3 have been addressed.
11.8.3 Accountable for what?.
Visibility raises the second question in Figure 14.3 of what is to be made visible.
Roberts and Scapens (1985, p. 447) refer to "reasons for conduct".
According to Sinclair (1995, page 220):
"In its simplest sense, accountability entails a relationship in which people
are required to explain and take responsibility for their actions".
This is reflected in her accountability aspects of an obligation, part of a job contract,
and the relationship of accepting authority.
Gray et al. (1987, page 2) focus on responsibility:
"Accountability means the onus, requirement, or responsibility to provide an
account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of the
actions for which one is held responsible .... If responsibilities do not exist,
then there is little logical reason to concern oneself with accountabilities. "
Or again, as Day and Klein (1987, page 5) write:
"one cannot be accountable to anyone, unless one also has responsibility for
something. "
Sinclair (1995) identified variety in what chief executives of public agencies
described themselves as accountable for. There was political accountability for the
exercise of authority on behalf of elected representatives, wider accountability to the
public, managerial accountability within their managerial hierarchy, professional
accountability, and personal accountability as fidelity to personal conscience.
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Variety is also analysed by Stewart (1984). His ladder of accountability ranges from
accountability for probity and legality, through process and performance
accountability, to accountability for programmes and policy.
A common theme appears to be accountability for action for which one is deemed to
be responsible for. That, however, still leaves the question of who is responsible to
whom.
J 4.8. 4 Who js accountable to whom?
Theory:
This third question, illustrated in Figure 14.3, is put by Day and Klein:
"To talk of accountability is to define who can call for an accounting, and
who owes a duty of explanation" (1987, page 5).
Gray et al. (1987) and Laughlin (1996) both attempt to answer it with models of a
principal and an agent between whom there is an explicit or implied contract.
Although these models differ, common elements are the relationship between the
parties, and demands or expectations for both action and supply of some account or
information on that action.
Accountability can therefore be seen as a property of a relationship (Ijiri, 1983). Any
role however may typically have relationships with multiple 'principals' (Sinclair,
1995; Laughlin, 1996), and most managerial positions involve multiple roles.
Accountability to multiple people or interest groups complicates not only the
relational nature of accountability, but also what one is accountable for. Groups may
differ in their interests for which they expect an 'account'. Therefore a manager or
organisation may be accountable to one interest group for a set of issues, and at the
same time be accountable to another interest group for another set of issues (Hayes,
1996). Multiple accountability to different interest groups, and for different
responsibilities, often requires difficult compromises (Sinclair, 1995). It is a feature
of the multiple roles that we play within society. Social construction of roles in
society will be considered later under accountability for identity.
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Findings of accountability for what and to whom:
Multiple and potentially different responsibilities dependent upon roles, as described
by Sinclair (1995), Roberts (1996) and Hayes (1996), seemed to be generally
consistent with views of British managers in this study. Several talked of 'silo'
mentalities or 'functional cultures' that were determined by the particular role taken
at a particular time and place.
In contrast, Czech managers appeared not to see responsibility in terms of relations
with other people. Czech responsibility appeared to be predominantly personal
integrity, a matter of conscience and understanding duty to oneself and to society.
Chinese concern for interpersonal relationships was at the opposite extreme to
apparent Czech apathy. Chinese responsibility was described in terms of duties to
specific people, such as bosses, subordinates, colleagues or others with whom there
was a personal relationship. Where these depend upon membership of in-groups and
long term guan xi or ren qing type relationships, they may be less specific to jobs and
functions than expected by British managers. The principal agent model adopted by
(Gray et al., 1987) may be more difficult to apply in Chinese than British society,
because interpersonal relationships were found to be more important to Chinese
managers than were contracts for regulating external relations.
These contrasting British, Czech and mainland Chinese tendencies in views on
obligations for what and to whom are illustrated in Figure 14.4. This figure, which
refers to the four questions depicted in Figure 14.3, also shows the contrasting
tendencies for British preference for transparency compared to those for Czech
preference for accuracy and for mainland Chinese preference for information kept
within relationships. Itwill be referred to again when comparing findings to reasons
why accountability may be important.
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Figure 14.4: Relating fladlngs to accountability theory
14.8.5 Why? Hierarchical and socialising accountability
Theory:
Hierarchical (Roberts, 1991 and 1996) or managerial accountability (Sinclair, 1995),
as shown in Figure 14.3, exists between a superior and his or her subordinate. Gray
et al. (1987) describe this sort of relationship in their principal and agent model of
accountability. It appears in the accountability aspects of authority and job contracts
(Sinclair, 1995), and also in Ahrens' (1996a and b) descriptions of both hierarchy
maintained with management accounting in British brewers and functional hierarchy
in German brewers.
Roberts (1991 and 1996) criticises hierarchical forms of accountability for over
emphasising the individual over co-operative action. He contrasts hierarchical or
individualising forms of accountability to socialising forms of informal
accountability. The latter refer to lateral relationships that are not enforced by power
relationships of a hierarchy; they acknowledge interdependence between people.
This has some similarities with Hayes' (1996) comparison of accountability in
gesellschaft associations, where relationships are contractually derived, and
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accountability in private and spontaneous gemeinschaft associations'Y, Similarly,
Laughlin (1996) contrasts low trust contractual accountability, based upon tightly
defined demands for action and information, with communal accountability based
upon greater trust and having less definition of expectations. There may also be
some parallel between socialising, gemeinschaft and communal accountability, on
the one hand, and on the other hand Katzenbach and Smith's (l993a and b) team or
mutual accountability based upon commitment and trust. Advantages of socialising
accountability include greater potential for unleashing co-operation and
empowerment and for being more compatible with learning (Munro, 1996; Roberts,
1991 and 1996). Academic concern about shortcomings of hierarchical
accountability and possibilities for empowerment appear to be paralleled in practice
by flatter organisations that move away from hierarchical control, as described for
Levi Strauss (Howard, 1990) and United Airlines (Flint, 1995) in USA, and the
Rover Group (Arthur, 1994) in the UK.
Findings:
Roberts' (1991 and 1996) concern for the over emphasis by hierarchical
accountability on individuals and for diminution of socialising accountability, is
interesting within the context of this study. Here it was the British managers who
tended to have the lowest concern for hierarchy and greatest concern for roles and
relations with peers. In contrast, the Chinese managers and subordinates tended to
place greatest reliance on hierarchical responsibilities. In Chinese society it appears
that interpersonal and inter-organisational relations are mediated rather more by
vertical lines of authority and allegiance (Boisot and Child, 1988 and 1996; Ch'ng,
1997) and by in-group relationships of guan xi (Ch'ng, 1997; Child 1994; Yang;
1994) than by free forming roles. That is to say, tasks tend to follow relationship
113 The similarities have limits. For example, gemeinschaft relations, such as between parent
and child, may involve hierarchy (Parsons, 1949). Hayes (1996) makes a 3 way comparison
between accountability in gesellschaft, gemeinschaft and bureaucracy types relationships.
The bureaucracy type of relationship "when task accomplishment is supreme" (ibid., page
97) was not apparent in this study.
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rather than, as is the tendency in British society, relationships arise from roles and
tasks.
Under a Confucian view of society, ordered hierarchically within family and state,
concerns about potential ethical conflict between socialising and hierarchical forms
of accountability would be rather different than put by Roberts (1991 and 1996).
Traditionally, so long as the Emperor retained 'the mandate of heaven', ethics
supported 'benevolent government' (Mencius, 1970) rather more than rights of the
individual. In this case appeals over the heads of 'principals' to higher ideals
(Laughlin, 1996)might lead back to the hierarchy of Chinese society.
A tension was seen here between Czech tendencies for contingent respect for bosses
or leaders and loyalty of individuals to themselves. This has a parallel with the
concern of Ahrens (1996b) and Roberts (1991 and 1996) about the constraints of
hierarchical accountability. Therefore it was among Czech rather than British
interviewees that concerns about hierarchical relations were evident.
Hayes' (1996) analogy of gemeinschaft and gese/lschaft relationships to explain
accountability is both informative and curious. It is informative because it provides
metaphors for the poles of a spectrum running from Chinese interpersonal
relationship based obligations, through British role based obligations, to Czech
individual based obligations. As noted, Chinese views were generally in terms of
interpersonal relationships with resulting duties to specific people identified in the
relationship. These were sanctioned by institutional norms, which may be closer to
gemeinschaft association as described by Parsons (1949). In contrast, gesellschaft
type contractual relations between calculative self interested individuals seemed to
be the fabric of Czech views of internal organisational and external business
relations. Moderation was by institutionalised norms of how people should behave
as individuals. British obligations of role based accountability may be seen as a
combination of gemeinschaft relationships between people related through reciprocal
roles and gesellschaft agreements between self interested free agents who negotiate
their roles.
Hayes' (1996) analogy however looks curious because it does not fit any association
with hierarchy nor with spontaneity. Any link seen between Roberts' (1991 and
1996) concern for lack of co-operation in hierarchical accountability and gesellschaft
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type impersonal relationships breaks down in this study, where Chinese obligations
were found to be mostly hierarchical and interpersonal. Hayes sees gemeinschaft
relationships as spontaneous in comparison to gesellschaft relationships as
contractual. Nothing was seen in this study to suggest that Chinese obligations
tended to be more spontaneous than British or Czech obligations.
14.8.6 Whv?Accountability as social construction
Theory of accountability as social construction of identity:
"Garfinkel highlights the pervasive nature of accountability practices
through which human beings render the world, including themselves,
'observable-and-reportable ' in those ways that are commonsensical to other
members who share this way of accomplishing a commonsense world ...
(without) these everday accountability practices, the intersubjective world
would collapse into the void of solipsism" (Willmott, 1996, page 27)
"To be held accountable holds a mirror up to an action and its consequences
in a way that createsfocus within the stream of lived experience; thefocus of
being an individual. Self is reflected and confirmed by being called to
account to others. " (Roberts, 1996, page 42)
Accountability is thus not just a personal attribute (Sinclair, 1995), but part of the
social construction of who people are within society (Munro, 1996). However, it
follows that accountability depends upon how the individual self is socially
constructed as being autonomous, as capable of self-determined activity and
responsible for his or her own conduct (Willmott, 1996). So, while there is not much
accountability where there is no responsibility (Day and Klein, 1987; Gray et aI.,
1987), responsibility is itself a social construction.
Theory of accountability and social construction of ethics:
Interdependency between accountability and ethics begins to emerge when
accountability is seen in terms of social construction. Accountability both plays a
part in the social construction of values, and depends upon the values that are
socially constructed. As identity becomes socially constructed, so also do the values
of the particular society: common interests are legitimated by public social support
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and become ideologies when upheld in society by experts of theory and religion
(Berger and Luckman, 1967). Society gives itself an account of the values to which
it conforms. At the same time, accountability may be part of the enforcement
processes for social values. Giving visibility to an account that is inconsistent with
values of a group may lead to social sanction or ultimately loss of membership from
the group (Munro, 1996). This is reflected in Sinclair's (1995) personal
accountability and in Ahrens' (1996b) reference to internalised Foucauldian
discipline implicit in hierarchical accountability.
Roberts (1991 and 1996) is concerned about the moral implications of hierarchical
accountability, which excludes ethical considerations and encourages inequalities.
He maintains that the apparent objectivity of hierarchical accountability, such as the
neutrality claimed for accounting, denies the moral assumptions on which
accountability within society rests.
Accountability as social construction also points to dependency of accountability on
its historical and cultural context (Willmott, 1996). As put by Sinclair:
"How we define accountability is dependent on the ideologies, motifs and
language of our times" (1995,page 22J).
Different societies construct their reality and identities in their own ways, each
ensuring internal consistency, tending towards a monopoly of truth, while
distinguishing, and in some cases ostracising, foreign untruths (Berger and
Luckmann, 1967). How the process of accountability, as part of this
institutionalisation of reality, is acted out therefore depends upon the cultural
uniqueness of the society that it plays a part in constructing. This is illustrated in
Day and Klein's (1987) historical explanation for how modem public accountability
in the UK grew from initial simple political accountability at the time of Aristotle in
Athens, through feudal concepts, theories of contractual government by Locke and of
representative democracy by J.S. Mill. It was developed in practice by reforms of
Gladstone, and had to develop in order to match the growing complexity of modem
government involving local and central governments, the Welfare State, QUANGOs,
and emerging professionalism.
It is therefore worth noting from which societies this literature on accountability
theory has appeared, although this review of literature on accountability does not
pretend to be representative, let alone comprehensive. Much of it is from the UK,
404
Chapter 14: The substantive theory
which is not surprising because this is where this researcher is based. Other
countries of the English speaking world are represented by USA (Ijiri, 1983;
Katzenbach and Smith, 1993a and b), Canada (Kirk and Mouritsen, 1996), Australia
(Sinclair,1995), and Ireland (Hayes, 1996). Germany is represented by Ahrens'
(1996a and b) comparison of German and British breweries. Denmark is represented
by Kirk and Mouritsen (Kirk and Mouritsen, 1996; Munro and Mouritsen, 1996).
Findings on accountability as social construction of identity and of ethics
This study did not inquire specifically into social construction of identity or of ethics.
However, evidence emerged suggesting rather different cultural views of identity.
British perceptions tended to be of individuals as employees and as team members
playing out a number of roles. Explanations and accounts of how someone acted in a
job signalled to fellow members of the organisation what role was being played.
Fellow organisational members may have supported or disapproved of these signals.
Roles, identified by jobs and functions, were seen in terms of expected tasks to be
performed by a position holder, his or her perspectives on the tasks, and also the
interests that he or she brought to achieving shared objectives and control assurance.
For Czech managers, identity seemed to be of individuals, who chose whether to give
their allegiance to leaders, to join teams, to commit their energies to an organisation,
and to give or withhold their respect for others. Responsibility as an individual in the
world tended to take the place of role based accountability to others.
For Chinese interviewees, identity seemed to be defined by membership within in-
groups, which might be an extended family and personal guan xi or ren qing
relationships. The process of social construction of identity may perhaps therefore
be within a different scope of society than is usual for the English speaking world.
This may have implications for how theory of accountability as a social construction
could be applied (Munro, 1996; Willmott 1996).
Comparison of the study to social construction of ethics is more tentative, because
the findings pointed less clearly to ethics than to identity. However, the tensions
apparent in the different forms of identity give some indication of underlying social
values. Various British tensions concerning accountability appeared with
empowerment, whether sought in order to engage employees' capabilities or to foster
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their development. Firstly, there was a tension between empowerment and the need
for checks and balances on how subordinates used that empowerment. Secondly,
there was a tension between fostering subordinates' development and inviting their
failure by giving them scope to extend beyond their abilities. Thirdly, there was a
tension between empowering managers so they could fulfil their capabilities and the
dangers of allowing them to have conflicts of interest. Perhaps these British tensions
represent shared values both of fulfilment for individual people and of how they
behave in their roles within society. The latter could be manifest in concern that
there be no conflicts of interest, and also in concern that there should be transparency
so that society can see that there is no conflict or abuse of interest.
Czech tensions concerning obligations of responsibility appeared to centre on
integrity of individuals. On the one hand individuals should be respected for their
opinions, and for their identity as individuals. On the other hand, respect for
authority was contingent upon the ability, knowledge and experience of individuals
in position of authority. It was also contingent on understanding, by individuals
subject to authority, of the logic for why directions should be followed. Besides
managers' concern about the integrity of their subordinates and people they did
business with, numerous examples emerged during the study of concern about
corruption by individuals in society at large. The greater importance of integrity of
individuals than of roles, in Czech society, is reflected in the greater Czech concern.
seen in this study for absolute truth than for transparency.
Mainland Chinese tensions concerning obligations of responsibility appeared to
centre on attitudes of people to their relationships. Concern about interpersonal
attitudes seemed to be implicit in discussions of relationships between bosses and
subordinates, whether subordinates would respect and support their boss and whether
bosses would reciprocate that trust by looking after their subordinates. Interpersonal
attitudes also underpinned guan xi and ren qing relationships and examples of
relative truth. These interpersonal attitudes are represented by the Chinese meaning
for sincerity of how one behaves in relationships (Ch'ng, 1997), which is based upon
the Confucian virtue of xin and is related to loyalty (Dawson, 1993).
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14.8.7 Imvlications (or accountability theory
It may well be that giving an account of oneself is an important mechanism in the
social construction of identity within mainland Chinese and Czech society. Yet the
theory of accountability from the English speaking world and Northern Europe, as
. identified in these questions of 'How?', 'For What?', 'To whom?' and 'Why?', does
not fit what was found in this study for Czech and mainland Chinese managers. This
comparison to findings in this study suggests that this theory, developed in the
English speaking world, Germany and Denmark, is not applicable in cultures of the
Czech Republic and mainland China. It appears to be parochial.
Accountability has been contrasted to different concepts of responsibility.
Transparency has been contrasted to other attitudes concerning information. If
accountability is not important to Chinese and Czech views of control assurance, on
what alternative concepts do these managers base their control assurance? For
Chinese managers the strength and reliability of interpersonal relationships was
generally important; their control assurance seemed to rest more on reliability of
people and relationships than on management control as a system. Czech managers
tended to see management control as a well designed system; within this, many
seemed to put some assurance on integrity of individuals and people understanding
their responsibilities. British managers, like Czech managers, tended to see control
assurance in terms of a management control system or framework, within which
accountability plays an important part. However, in contrast to general Czech views,
they tended to place less reliance on the overall system design and integrity of
individuals than on checks and balances between a variable array of control
components and perspectives from different roles.
14.9 Conclusions for the substsntive theory
A skeletal theory for the substantive area has been put forward for differences in
perceptions of gaining control assurance by British, Czech and mainland Chinese
managers working for 2 MNCs. Although each person was found to have a unique
perception, significant patterns emerged between managers from different countries.
These patterns have been related to a broad variety of contextual factors.
These include national culture, both in terms of measured cultural dimensions and
qualitative cultural characteristics. Possibilities have been identified for complex
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interrelations between the contextual factors and also between them and perceptions
of gaining control assurance. This is a move away from the deterministic
assumptions of most prior comparative research into management control to a middle
range stance between determinism and voluntarism.
The holistic grounded theory approach has allowed, it is thought, some insight into
emic features of perceptions of management control, such as Chinese paternal
hierarchy. It has also opened to study new management control elements apparently
not studied before in comparative research such as, external relationships and
contracts, accountability, the nature of internal relationships and attitudes to control
processes.
The holistic approach of this study, while not claiming to show a comprehensive
picture of managers' perceptions of management control, illustrates how accounting
forms only part of how managers gain control assurance.
A drawback of taking a grounded theory approach is that comparison to existing
theory is made only when the substantive grounded theory is complete. It was not
possible to return to the field in order to put to the interviewees points that emerged
from comparing findings to prior theory. Nevertheless some conclusions can be
reached from such comparisons to prior theory. Management control was spoken of
as a 'system' by only 16 out of the 30 axial respondents. The term 'management
control system' is not in universal usage. Nevertheless, many of the features of
general systems theory, that are found in theory of management control systems,
were reflected in how interviewees talked about their perceptions of management
control. An example of this was soft or natural systems thinking, as more than half
of the 30 axial respondents saw control objectives not as fixed and deterministic but
as open to adjustment or negotiation.
Unlike, management control systems theory, accountability theory was not found to
be consistent with the findings of the study for Czech and mainland Chinese
perceptions. This suggests that accountability theory, as developed largely in the




LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
This chapter concludes the dissertation. It discusses the limitations of the research,
summarises the contributions made to theory and practice of cross-national
management control, and outlines implications for future research.
15.1 Limitations and conclusions for the research question
Limitations of this study are considered firstly in terms of the methodology and
method of how it was done, and secondly in terms of what did not appear in the
findings and substantive theory. This section finishes with conclusions for the
research question.
15.1. I Methodology and method
Ideational view of culture:
This research has taken a predominantly ideational view of national culture. It has
therefore not met the calls by Bhimani (1999) and Harrison and McKinnon (1999)
for abandonment of the ideational approach to researching national culture.
Nevertheless it is maintained that the contributions that can be made by this type of
research are still potentially substantial, so long as research assumptions move away
from the functionalist stance that has dominated most empirical comparative research
in management control.
Static research not dynamic interaction:
Bhimani (1999) suggests that basing empirical research in this field on new
institutional theory (Powell and Dimaggio, 1991) or new history may open
possibilities for inquiry into the social dynamics of how management control
practices diffuse between organisations and are negotiated within them. This study
has not adopted either of these approaches. It is limited by taking a largely static
view of perceptions of management control in a cross-sectional inquiry. It has not
inquired into how management control, or perceptions of management control, might
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have been changed or adapted, or have evolved. This limitation may perhaps be one
reason why the study did not identify differences in attitudes to managing change.
Strauss' not Glaser's version of grounded theory
Adherents to Glaser's (1992) rather than Strauss' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 and
1998) version of grounded theory may take exception to the method adopted here. In
particular they may object to the research question that was taken to the field, rather
than emerged from field data. Accordingly, framing of the research question
'forced' the research down a particular avenue of inquiry. They may argue that
'forcing' of the original research question and the process of open, axial and
selective coding resulted in imposition of the researcher's prior assumptions and
research process upon the grounded theory (Glaser, 1992).
There may be some merit in such objections. However care has been taken to
monitor researcher bias, which is considered below, and to ensure that the research
process does allow managers' perceptions of management control to be well
reflected in the findings (see Chapter 4 including references to columns in Figure 4.1
for Reliability and Validity). More fundamentally, such objections do not address
the fundamental issue of what method would have been most appropriate for the
research problem chosen for this study. It is maintained here (3.3 Grounded theory
case study as middle range approach) that, once the research question was justified,
and the researcher chose to inquire into it, Strauss' version of grounded theory was a
more promising method.
Researcher bias:
This cross-cultural research has been limited by the theoretical sensitivity of a single
researcher. Bias from his own culture was unavoidable. A study that is free of
constraints of Ph.D. research could benefit from wider perspectives and reduced
cultural bias of multi-cultural research teams. However, some bias is always
inevitable. It is the other side of the coin from theoretical sensitivity. It is an
essential ingredient of ideographic research. Examples of where bias of the
researcher could have had considerable impact on the results include identification of
categories and in scaling the opinions of interviewees according to the strength of
their opinion.
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Bias of those researched:
The research set out to be sensitive to the perceptions and views of managers who
were the subjects for this research. Views of some outspoken managers could have
led the study into avenues of inquiry and categories that might be untypical of the
usual control perceptions for managers in MNCs in the 3 locations, or even of views
in CoX and CoY. As a particular example of such respondent bias, the study may
have been swayed by whatever control concerns were topical and at the front of
managers minds when the study was conducted.
However, two safeguards in the design of this study are likely to have considerably
reduced the influence of individuals or of topical concerns on the findings. Firstly,
study of management control perceptions in 2 MNCs will have reduced the influence
of current management control concerns of management in either one of them.
Secondly, inquiry into management control at a generic level of the control
components represented by the 6 key categories will have reduced the influence of
specific incidences, such as bad debts, or specific control weaknesses that managers
were concerned about. Instead, discussion with managers of specific incidences or
concerns has, it is maintained, stretched and tested the grounded theory against their
real world problems of how to provide control assurance in a multi-cultural
environment.
Unrepresentative samples:
Sampling in this study was according to the principles of theoretical sampling
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990 and 1998). Interviewees were therefore selected not
because they were expected to have representative views, but because they were
expected to have a variety of views that could generate, extend and ultimately
support or challenge the emerging grounded theory. Interviewees within CoX and
CoY should not be seen as representative of views within the 6 sites studied. Data
was also included from interviewees from outside CoX and CoY, while interviewees
within these MNCs gave some opinions on practices outside their organisations in
order to illustrate their views on cultural differences and local practices. If this study
had used nomothetic methodology, its findings should be seen as representative only
of those selected for the study. It is maintained however that, in terms of middle
range methodology, the emergent grounded theory is indicative of the views held by
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managers within CoX and CoY in the 6 sites. This claim is based on negative case
analysis, on checking preliminary findings with 7 cross-culturally experienced
managers in CoX and CoY, and on presenting interim findings'l" to senior managers
of the two MNCs.
The patterns of differences in perceptions found here are also likely to be indicative
of the sort of views held by managers in MNCs operating in the UK, Prague and
Beijing. Contingency theory (Otley, 1980; Fisher, 1995) tells us that the
configuration of management accounting or management control in an organisation
depends upon the particular set of contextual variables for the organisation. These
include the external business and market environment, the industry, the
organisation's competitive strategy, the size and structure of the organisation, nature
of its products (or services), its technology, the complexity of its product (or service)
transformation processes, and what knowledge it has of these processes. It is
reasonable to imagine that managers in different MNCs with different management
control systems may have different perceptions of management control. Some
control for these contingency variables has been achieved in this study by studying
managers from two MNCs from different industries, one delivering products and the
other providing services; their organisation structures, technology and transformation
processes are very different. The study has focused on managers' perceptions that
are not appreciably different between the 2 MNCs, but do show major differences
according to the country that managers come from. These patterns of perceptions
within CoX and CoY have been checked against views of other managers and
sources in the 3 locations. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that similar views
may be found in other organisations in these locations, particularly but not
exclusively among managers of other Western MNCs.
Transferability not generalizabillty:
It has been argued here that theoretical sampling used for grounded theory research
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Hammersley, 1989), and analytical generalisation for case study
114 These interim findings were at an advanced stage towards the final grounded theory.
They included or drew on diagrams very similar to Figures 7.1,8.1,9.1, 10.1, 11.1 and 12.1
for the 6 key categories, and were summarised in a diagram similar to Figure 14.2.
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research (Scapens, 1990; Yin, 1994), are insufficient to support statistical inference
as to what may be expected in wider populations (see 4.3.2 Selection of data
sources). Generalisation of findings from field data can be made to a grounded
theory, and a grounded theory may be transferred to specific situations that are seen
to have sufficiently close fit with the substantive area of the research. However, it is
maintained that a grounded theory cannot be generalised, in the positivist sense, to
populations at large. Care must therefore be taken in how the findings and
substantive theory from this research are used. They can be used to explain cultural
differences in perception that practitioners may find when working with people from
a different country. They may be used to illustrate the sort of differences in
perception that practitioner or researchers may find in different countries. But they
cannot be used to predict what will be found in different countries or cultural
settings.
Great care should in particular be taken if this substantive grounded theory is taken
to indicate what may be expected in cultures outside the UK, Czech Republic and
mainland China. Bond (1996, page 225) warns that,
"There is no identifiable constellation of values to all Chinese. Secondly,
these studies reveal considerable variation among so-called Western
nations. "
More fundamentally, Usunier (1998) points out that those who assume similarities
between cultures tend to 'crash down' the complexity of cultural phenomena in order
to find etic commonalities. Instead he argues for cross-cultural knowledge to emerge
as reality of shared meaning at the multi-study level. In other words, it is better to
take an emic approach in each culture and then to seek shared meanings, than to
assume similarity and then to test it.
The grounded theory from this study should be viewed as a skeletal theory
(Laughlin, 1995). Other researchers, or indeed practitioners, may transfer it to other
situations where they judge it applicable. It may then aid understanding and
learning. No claim is made here as to whether exactly the same constellation of
difference in control perceptions would be found in other settings.
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Credit control as starting point:
The field work inquiries developed from questioning axial respondents about credit
control as a specific area of control. Nevertheless discussions moved beyond credit
control and selective coding was concerned with control issues that are generic to
management control. The question arises whether different findings and a different
grounded theory might have been reached from a different starting point. It seems
most unlikely that the findings for each key category in the selective coding would
have been different, apart from possibly external business relations, because
discussion for these key categories was generic to management control. However, it
is possible that a slightly different set of key categories might have emerged had the
fieldwork started from another area of management control.
Company and industry effects:
This study inquired into differences in control perception of managers from different
countries. Differences of perception between CoX and CoY were watched for and
tested in case these appeared as differences by national culture. But differences in
perception between managers of the 2 MNCs were not pursued as part of the study.
Indeed large areas of differences in control perceptions were excluded from the study
because they were expected to represent differences between the MNCs or their
industries. Examples of such differences in perception, excluded from the study,
were quality control for products and services, customer selection and retention,
performance measurement and reward systems, and control of industry specific risks.
It is possible that these company or industry effects interacted with, or even masked,
some differences in perceptions between managers from different countries. It is
also possible that some of these differences between national cultures, which were
therefore not studied here, may be important to perceptions of management control.
Location effects have not been excluded:
Patterns have been identified of differences in control perceptions between managers
from different countries. Explanations for these were found in both national culture
and contextual factors for the location. It was recognised that differences in
perception attributed to national culture might have arisen from location effects
rather than from national culture. Corroborative statistical tests to separate
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differences by managers' country of upbringing from differences by location were
inconclusive. They were inconclusive both because data was gathered on
perceptions of too few expatriate managers, and because of the complex effects that
working away from their home country might have had on expatriate managers'
control perceptions. The alternative hypothesis, that differences in perception
attributed to national culture might have arisen for local social, economic or
institutional factors, has therefore not been conclusively dismissed.
Cultural explanations for patterns of differences in control perceptions therefore rest
upon their plausibility. This plausibility has a number of bases. There was
plausibility to those respondents who suggested cultural explanations. There is
consistency, and in 15 cases significant statistical correlations 11 S, with cultural
dimensions. There is also consistency with more emic cultural characteristics
described by literature for these national cultures. Potential interaction between the
cultural and local factors has been put forward (Figure 14.1). Cultural explanations
are therefore within a context of other social, economic and institutional factors.
Finally these cultural explanations, within this context, have been presented to
experienced cross-cultural managers, senior CoX and CoY managers and academic
conference audiences, all of whom appeared to find the explanations credible. Final
conclusion rests with researchers and practitioners who transfer the findings to other
situations, and who decide for themselves whether the grounded theory is applicable.
Interaction between/actors:
This study has identified a range of cultural and other contextual factors that are
associated with a variety of categories for control perceptions. However, it has not
examined possible interaction between these factors. It has considered that
categories may be related, whether as complements (e.g. transparency and
accountability) or as substitues (e.g. focus on control processes, people or
lIS These correlationswere statistically significantwithin the samples of interviewees.
Significancedoes not infer anythingabout wider populations. There were 15 significant
correlations for the 3 cultural dimensions for which no question remained about their
construct validity, namely Specific- Diffuse, Internal Locus of Control and Achieve -
Ascribed(13.3.4Explanatory power and construct validity of the cultural dimensions).
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opportunities) in contributing to control assurance. This has been done with
qualitative analysis, corroborated with some non-parametric statistics. More rigorous
quantitative research, probably using at least interval data, might be able to throw
more light on such interactions. However, if such an approach requires nomothetic
methodology and positivist epistemology, it might fall into the problems identified
for most of the previous empirical studies in this field (2.5 Mapping the empirical
research to date).
15.1.2 What has not appeared jn the study
Not comprehensive research:
This study cannot claim to be comprehensive of all important differences in
perceptions of management control between managers from the UK, Czech Republic
and mainland China. First of all, as explained above, some important areas of
difference might have been omitted because of the starting point of credit control,
and because of exlusion of differences between the 2 MNCs and their industries.
Secondly, theoretical sampling followed what emerged from inquiry with managers
into their perceptions of management control. This process may have omitted
aspects of management control either because the respondents concentrated their
attention on what was currently of control concern, or because the mode of inquiry
did not lend itself to identifying all differences in control perceptions. An example
of the latter is attitudes to risk, which could have been captured at different levels of
gain or loss with a questionnaire (Emmanuel et al., forthcoming). Therefore, the
absence of a control element from these findings does not imply that it cannot be
subject to major differences in perceptions, even perhaps within the MNCs, sites and
managers studied here. Another perhaps surprising omission was attitudes to change,
in view of cultural differences in attitudes to time (Hall, 1977; Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1997). Risk, uncertainty and change were all identified by many
managers as important parts of the context of management control, but no substantial
differences in these perceptions were identified between managers from different
countries.
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Regional cultures:
No attempt has been made here to identify regional cultures within China, the Czech
Republic and the UK. The cultural survey data was tested, but no significant
differences appeared, between those who described themselves as brought up in
Czechoslovakia as opposed to the Czech Republic. Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming)
find significant differences in trade credit control perceptions between regions within
mainland China and the UK.
15.1.3 Conclusion (or the research question
The research question, as rephrased in light of the core category, is:
What effect does national culture, among other cross-national factors, have
upon differences in how managers perceive management control in terms of
gaining control assurance?
The substantive theory (Chapter 14) shows major differences in how the managers in
this study, from the UK, Czech Republic and mainland China, perceive management
control, in what they see as providing control assurance. These differences (Figure
14.2) have been related to national culture, as well as to a range of other social,
institutional and market factors (Figure 14.1).
Limitations in the substantive theory have been identified. These relate to how the
research was done (ideational view of culture, Strauss' version of grounded theory,
bias of the researcher and those researched), to the scope of the theory (static theory,
credit control as starting point, company and industry effects, interaction between
factors), and to transferability of the theory (unrepresentative samples, location
effects). None of these limitations detract from the conclusion that the substantive
theory answers the research question. There are major cross-national differences in
perceptions of management control between managers in this study. These
perceptual differences have been seen both as an outcome of cross-national factors
and as embedded in a complex socio-cultural-political interaction, in which
perceptions may influence cultural and other factors (14.4 Context of perceptions of
management controls.
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15.2 Contributions to theory
Now that the research question has been answered, the implications can be turned to.
These are explored first of all in terms of contributions to theory. This is done under
headings for the methodology of how cross-national research into management
control can be done, whether knowledge of management control has been advanced,
and the possibility that some existing management control theory may be parochial.
15.2.1 A contribution from middle range methodology
More dimensions than those of Hofstede:
This study has not been tied to one or two cultural dimensions, nor even to the
dimensions of a single theorist. Instead cultural concepts have been drawn from
Trompenaars (1993), Hofstede (1991), Hall (1977), and from literature, history and
philosophy (e.g. Confucius, 1997; Havel, 1991a; Krej~i, 1990; Masaryk, 1978a;
Mencius, 1970; Pynsent, 1994). It has sought also to place the findings in a wider
context than merely cultural factors. In this respect it has met the call of Harrison
and McKinnon (1999) to escape the dominant and now limiting perspectives of
Hofstede's (1984 and 1991) cultural dimensions.
Emic perceptions of management control:
By seeking the perspectives of managers, rather than testing if instances of
management control meet predictions from theory, this study and its findings are
more firmly grounded in emic perceptions and concepts, than are the vast majority of
empirical studies reviewed in Chapter 2. This has at least partially met Bhimani's
(1999) recommendations that cross-national research into management control take a
more contextual approach.
Reflexive management control:
The middle range stance taken here on ontology and human nature of those
researched has allowed management control to be researched as it is perceived rather
than as an objective fact. It has allowed reflexive aspects of management control to
be identified (e.g. 14.7.7 MCS as soft systems). This meets recommendations by
Bhimani (1999) and by Harrison and McKinnon (1999) that research in this field
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move away from a realist and determinist view of management control. However,
this middle range stance also allows patterns to be identified in perceptions of
management control and in attitudes to how people are controlled. It is argued (2.5
Framework for analysis) that these patterns, which might be more difficult with an
extreme voluntarist approach, give more scope for transfer of a skeletal theory.
One of very few holistic studies:
There have been few holistic studies comparing management control in different
countries or national cultures; that is holistic in the sense of inquiry into management
control in general within its contextual setting. Most prior empirical studies have
inquired into a set of control methods or into specific control components. Other
holistic studies in this field are represented only by Horovitz (1980), which compared
management control in British, West German and French companies, and Kreder and
Zeller (1988) reporting on a comparative study with Hoffman (1980 and 1984) into
West German and US companies. Some studies have inquired into management
control in general, but because they use nomothetic methodology could study only a
limited range of variables; examples of these include Daley et al. (1985), Kelly et al.
(1987), Bimberg and Snodgrass (1988), and Harrison et al. (1994). Coates et al.
(1993), although taking a broad view of control methods, inquired into just
performance measurement.
Transferable management control theory:
The substantive theory is designed for transfer (Henwood and Pigeon, 1992) to other
situations as a skeletal theory in order to further learning (Laughlin, 1995). Other
researchers can decide from the research process and context, which has been made
explicit for this study, how far this skeletal theory is applicable and hence
transferable to other situations.
It was argued (Chapter 2) that using middle range approaches to build skeletal theory
in this field may provide a way out of the present impasse, where nomothetic
research, using hypotheses from theory of insufficient empirical grounding, has
created very little consistent knowledge. Whether this research has made a step
towards that potential for building consistent knowledge is left for future researchers
and commentators to judge.
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15,2,2 Knowledge Q/management control
Opened new areas of management control to research.'
An advantage of holistic middle range or ideographic research is that it can identify
new phenomena for study. Nomothetic studies that start from hypotheses may be
blind to what is omitted from their hypotheses. For example, empowerment appears
not to have been included in hypotheses used in prior cross-national research into
management control. Apparently new aspects of management control, which are
identified in this study, include external relationships and contracts, accountability,
the nature of internal relationships, and attitudes to control processes.
Control assurance,'
The study of control assurance also appears to be a new area for cross-national
research. This may be seen as an important topic for research because it is central to
many professional definitions of internal control (COSO, 1994; HA - UK, 1994;
Turnbull, 1999)116. This study provides insight into cross-national differences in
what provides control assurance.
What control is, rather than control methods:
Another advantage of taking a holistic approach is that insight can be gained into
what management control is seen to be. Many prior empirical studies have inquired
into control methods (see Table 2.1). Inquiry into control components moves
towards the more fundamental question of what management control is in different
cultures. This study has moved closer to this fundamental question than less holistic
studies'!", Some answers to this question, of what management control is in different
cultures, may be needed to underpin research into management control methods.
Without this underpinning, research into specific control methods appears to assume
116 Control assurance is also recognised in the UK external auditing standard (APB, 1995,
SAS 300 paragraph 25).
117 This study has not answered the fundamental question of what management control is
seen to be, because it has focused on differences in perception and left the common ground
in these perceptions largely unexplored.
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that management control is the same phenomenon around the world. It looks
particularly vulnerable to charges of ethnocentric bias.
15.2.3 Parochial or culturally dependent management control theorjes
The previous chapter compared the findings and substantive theory of this study to
theory of MCS and of accountability. There is no reason to suspect from this study
that the application of general systems theory to management control theory is
parochial to the English speaking world. In contrast, accountability theory was not
supported by Czech and mainland Chinese perceptions of management control. This
indicates that accountability theory is parochial to the English speaking and Northern
European cultures where it has been developed. If a concept as fundamental to
British views on management control as accountability is not understood by many
managers in 2 other countries, there may be other management control concepts that
receive more lip service than comprehension in other cultures.
Even if a theory is universally valid in all cultures, it may have a different
significance between cultures. This may depend in each culture on its relative
importance among what is seen there as important to management control, or upon
the local meaning and significance of its concepts. That is to say, it may be
culturally dependent. Such differences in relative importance, meaning or
significance were seen here for contracts, responsibility, teams, hierarchy,
information, the rule of law, internal regulations and procedures, and planning.
Identification of any management control theory as having universal validity and
significance might change the way that this theory is viewed by theorists, educators
and practitioners.
A limited number of management control theories, developed within the English
speaking world, are considered here in light of the findings of this study, in order to
identify whether they might be culturally dependent, or even parochial. No attempt
at a review of any of these theories is made, because the purpose is only to identify
potential implications of the findings from this study.
These considerations are speculative, because they have not been supported by
empirical study. Implications of this study for accountability theory were placed on
a firm foundation of findings that were directly relevant to this body of theory. In
constrast, comparison of the findings to general systems theory ran several times into
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speculation, because the grounded theory research did not inquire into whether
perceptions corresponded to general systems theory.
The conclusion concerning transferability of the substantive theory applies to
extending findings across management control theories, as it does to transfering them
to new geographic situations or organisations. It is up to those using the substantive
theory to decide whether it is applicable to the issue they face. These potential
implications are therefore raised as questions, not as conclusions. It is up to theorists
and researchers to answer these questions. In doing so they should bear in mind that
the findings have been grounded in data concerning the core category and key
categories of this study, not in management control theories to which they may want
to transfer insight from these findings. Transferability of insight from these findings
to other management control theories should be verified against empirical data.
Without such verification, problems identified in Chapter 2 of insufficient empirical
grounding for theory could be perpetuated.
A further major caveat applies. Staff and managers who work for western MNCs
may profess to adhere to, indeed to be committed to, the MCS of their employer.
This may be an implicit condition for their career success within the MNC. They
may therefore remain silent about not understanding, not accepting, or not being
committed to the principles and practices of their employer's MCS. In managerial
cultures where western management education and systems are admired,
practitioners and educators may profess adherence to western concepts and theories.
They may perhaps not recognise their own doubts about these concepts and theories.
This does not mean that western management control theories are necessarily
consistent with their cultural values, nor that they would rely on them for gaining
control assurance. Identifying the extent of parochialism may therefore need careful
research 118.
118 Steps were taken in this study to counter the problem of how to identify actual rather than
professed perceptions. Firstly rapport with interviewees was sought and their support for the
inquiry into cultural differences in perception, including what is emic to each of the 3
national cultures. Secondly, there was the array of research techniques used in order to
ensure reliability and validity, which are summarised in Table 4.1.
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Performance measurement and reward theory:
Performance measurement and reward receive prominent attention in textbooks on
management control (Emmanuel et aI., 1990; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998;
Maciariello and Kirby, 1994;Merchant, 1998).
Performance measurement is typically done by reference to objectives (Hopwood,
1974; Flamholtz, 1983), which may be agreed with the person whose performance is
to be measured and rewarded. This may perhaps be consistent with a contractual
approach, involving a clear agreement with someone external to the organisation in
the case of a contractor. Agreement with a subordinate within an organisation on
what is expected to be achieved in the review period, followed by performance
measurement against those objectives and reward according to a previously agreed
formula, may perhaps also be consistent with a contractual approach. In contrast,
regulation by means of relationships between parties, rather than by contract, may
have less clear specification of objectives, expectations and rewards. Therefore, it
may be asked to what extent relationships, in contrast to contracts, are consistent
with established theory of performance measurement and reward.
Performance measurement and reward theory of the English speaking world may
perhaps also imply accountability: the person whose performance is to be measured
and rewarded may be seen as accountable to the manager who appraises the
performance. This theory assumes some reporting of the measured performance to
the appraising manager. Therefore, it might be questioned to what extent this theory
is applicable in cultures where there is relatively little reliance on accountability.
Performance measurement and reward theory might perhaps play a part in ensuring
that control processes work: a metric on past performance might indicate whether the
MCS is operating satisfactorily. Itmight also be involved in a control framework of
checks and balances between multiple control components, among which
performance measurement and reward systems provide control components of
monitoring and motivation. Therefore, it might be asked whether reward for past
performance plays such an important part in control assurance that focuses on future
opportunities.
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Theory of Bureaucratic, Market and Clan control mechanisms:
Theory of Bureaucratic, Market and Clan control mechanisms was developed by
Ouchi (1979). It has been widely used in management control theory and analysis
(Baliger and Jaeger, 1984; Macintosh, 1994; Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1995;
Collin, 1995; Jones and Dugdale, 1995; Hamilton and Kashlak, 1999).
There is existing theory that reliance on these control mechanisms may tend to differ
between national cultures (Ouchi, 1981; Jaeger, 1983; Hofstede, 1991). Existing
research (Boisot and Child, 1988 and 1996) indicates that reliance in mainland China
on relationships more than on contracts is inconsistent with Market control
mechanisms, and that Bureaucratic control mechanisms in mainland China may
differ from what is typical in the English speaking world 119,
Findings in this study add weight to the view that the Bureaucratic control
mechanism may be culturally dependent. This control mechanism is based on
Weber's (1947) theory, in which bureaucracy is based upon roles and internal rules.
It was found here that both roles (14.5.3 British perceptions) and rules (11.9
conclusions on law, rules and procedures) are more consistent with typical British
than Czech or mainland Chinese perceptions of management control. It may be
questioned whether any cultural dependency of Bureaucratic, Market and Clan
control mechanism might affect the sort of corporate control environment (COSO,
1994; CICA, 1994; HA - UK, 1994; APB, 1995; Turnbull, 1999) or controls culture
(FSA, 2000) that is perceived as conducive to effective control. Potential
implications of possible cultural dependency of the Bureaucratic control mechanism
will be explored below for other theories of management control.
Theory of programmed and non-programmed decisions:
The distinction between programmed and non-programmed decision making is well
established in management control theory (Anthony, 1965; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984;
119 See also Parsons (1947) for a historical comparison of Chinese bureaucracy to Weber's
concept of bureaucracy, and Ridding (1996) on the inappropriateness of western bureaucracy
for Chinese family owned firms. McKinnon and Harrison (1985) describe the peculiarly
Japanese role of bureaucracy in the Japanese public sector.
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Emmanuel et al. 1990; Macintosh, 1994). Programmed decisions, "where the
decision situation is sufficiently well understood for a reliable prediction of the
decision outcome" (Emmanuel et al., 1990, page 15), are relatively straight forward.
In comparison, non-programmed situations require assumptions of management
control theory (e.g. predictive models) to be relaxed, and some solutions (e.g.
decision by computation, action controls) become theoretically inapplicable.
A cultural pattern in relative reliance on contracts or on relationships was found
(Chapter 7). Programmed situations are perhaps consistent with a contractual
approach to regulating relations between parties. Contracts specify what is expected
of each party, and typically attempt to specify what is to happen if particular
developments occur. It may perhaps be more difficult to regulate non-programmed
situations with contractual arrangements.
In contrast regulation of affairs with other parties by means of relationship may
perhaps be more consistent only with non-programmed decision making. Focus for
control assurance on a relationship, rather than on a contract, leaves unspecified
objectives, constraints or potential outcomes unspecified: these may be adopted and
modified as events and opportunities unfold.
Furthermore, the level of certainty inherent in situations of programmed decision
making depends upon a level of knowledge. Different attitudes to and availability of
information (Chapter 10) may perhaps have implications for the scope of situations
susceptible to programmed decision making. Equally, low concern for processes by
which outcomes are to be achieved, which was a tendency found for Chinese
managers, may perhaps be inconsistent with programmed decision making.
In so far as Bureaucratic control mechanisms increase certainty, relatively low
emphasis on Bureaucratic control mechanisms may perhaps reduce the level of
certainty available to identify situations appropriate for programmed decision
making. It might perhaps further be argued that the rules, on which Bureaucratic
control mechanisms depend, have less validity in situations of high uncertainty
where only non-programmed decision making is possible.
Therefore, there are a number of reasons for questioning whether the theory of
programmed and non-programmed decision making might be culturally dependent.
In some cultures it may perhaps be questioned whether the scope for programmed
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decision is considerably less than theory maintains for the English speaking world. It
might be questioned whether the distinction with non-programmed decision remains
useful in these cultures for identifying viable modes of management control.
The tendency found here among British managers to expect empowerment of
subordinates (9.2 Contribution or Reliability and 9.3. J British views and
empowerment), as opposed to expecting them to be merely reliable, might perhaps
indicate situations of non-programmed decision making. So these findings might
perhaps indicate reasons for questioning whether the scope for programmed decision
making is diminishing in the UK.
Information and management control theory:
Information is central to management control theory. Cybernetic models of
management control (Otley and Berry 1980; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1983; Willmer,
1983; Emmanuel et a1. 1990, Maciariello and Kirby, 1994) map information flows,
while information feedback or control loops are described as part of management
control by some theorists (Lowe, 1971; Anthony and Govindarajan, 1998).
Information is implicit in all performance measurement and indeed in all forms of
monitoring. Information and in some cases monitoring are singled out as control
components or elements by professional pronouncements on control (COSO, 1994;
CICA, 1994; HA - UK, 1994; Rutteman, 1994; see also Turnbull, 1999).
Information as part of knowledge flows for MNCs is explored by Gupta and
Govindarajan (1991). Information and knowledge flows are also part of Hedlund
and Rolander's (1990) 'heterarchy' and Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1998) 'transnational
solution' for organisational structure, while there is a well established theoretical link
between organisational structure and types of management control (Otley, 1980;
Emmanuel et al., 1990; Maciariello and Kirby, 1994; Fisher 1995; Anthony and
Govindarajan, 1998).
The substantive theory identifies cultural dependency of attitudes to information and
perceptions of what sort of information provides control assurance (Chapter 11). It
therefore seems possible that cultural differences in these perceptions may make a
wide range of management control theory culturally dependent.
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Principal agency theory and the organisational failures framework:
The principal agency theory has been applied in management accounting and control
by Zimmerman (1978), Kaplan and Atkinson (1989) and Macintosh (1994).
Assumptions of this theory include maximising behaviour by individuals, contractual
relationships between individuals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and information
assymetry inherent in moral hazard and adverse selection (Baiman, 1982). The first
two of these assumptions may perhaps depend upon regulation through contracts
rather than relationships and upon self interest, which were found here to tend to be
high among Czech managers and low among Chinese managers (Chapter 7).
Willingness to divulge information was found here to tend to vary from high among
British managers to low among Czech managers (10.5 Internal and interpersonal
availability of information). These findings might raise questions whether principal
agency theory is cultural dependent.
Similarly, the organization failures framework, which have been applied to
management control theory (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Emmanuel et al., 1990),
assumes opportunism and information assymetry or impactedness (Williamson, 1973
and 1975). It might therefore be questioned whether it too might be culturally
dependent, although it does recognise variable reliance on hierarchies.
15.3 Implications for practice ofmanagement control
The potential implications of this and similar research to the practice of management
control is explored here. 'Practice of management control', as used here, refers
firstly to the seeking, or making efforts to provide, some level of control assurance,
secondly to monitoring, assessing, auditing or advising on provision of control
assurance, and thirdly to regulation of, or professional guidance on, management
control. An example of regulation in the UK includes the Combined Code
(Committee on Corporate Governance, 1998) and the Turnbull Guidance (1999),
which are required by the London Stock Exchange for listed UK companies,
including those with overseas operations. Another example is the overview of
banking and other financial services (FSA, 2000), whose jurisdiction includes not
only UK MNCs in the financial sector, but also foreign banks and financial
companies operating in the UK. Professional guidance on internal or management
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control includes UK guidance and standards for Internal Auditors (IIA - UK, 1994;
IIA-UK, 1998), COSO (1994) in the USA, and 'CoCo' in Canada (CICA, 1994).
This section starts with the potential contribution to awareness of differences in
perceptions of management control and to cross-cultural communication. These
potential contributions are then related to Perlmutter's theory of ethnocentrism,
polycentrism and geocentrism as well as to parochialism. This section then
concludes with some implications for regulation.
15.3.1 Awareness and communicatjon
Extensive differences have been shown between British, mainland Chinese and
Czech managers in their perceptions of management control. Some explanation for
these differences has been given in terms of cultural and other contextual factors.
Awareness of the possible extent of differences and why they arise may assist
managers working in a multi-cultural environment. These managers may be
expatriates, local managers working with expatriates, those working within multi-
cultural teams, or managers working with colleagues of another culture in another
location, such as in headquarters or in subsidiaries in different countries. Awareness
may help these managers for a number of reasons. Firstly, it can alert managers who
have little cross-cultural work experience to the possible extent of differences in
control perceptions. Secondly, awareness may be a first step towards respect and
effective two-way communication. Thirdly, it may assist reconciliation of these
differences in perception (Lloyd and Trompenaars, 1993; Hampden-Turner and
Trompenaars, 2000), this is discussed further under 15.3.5 Geocentric Attitudes.
Awareness that other staff and managers may have different perceptions of how
control assurance can be provided, or attitudes to management control, may alter
views on how management control systems should be designed. Improvements in
cross-cultural communication may affect dialogue on MCS design, as well as the
process of MCS implementation. This awareness and good cross-cultural
communication may in turn facilitate monitoring a MeS. For example, without
appreciating the potentially different attitudes by those involved in a MCS to a
control element such as procedures, a manager monitoring the MNC may be
surprised when it fails to provide the control assurance he or she expects. There may
also be surprise when those who use the MCS or are controlled by it have a different
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understanding of control concepts such as empowerment. Without effective
communication, someone auditing or reviewing the control effectiveness of a MCS
may reach a different view from the managers(s) responsible for the MCS as to how
much control effectiveness it provides.
Illustration of differences in perceptions of management control together with
explanation for how these differences might arise, such as provided in this study,
may help managers become aware of the potential extent of cross-cultural
differences. So long as managers do not treat research findings as predictions, this
sort of research may help them become more alert to differences in perceptions. It
may also help them be more perceptive to the meanings intended in cross-cultural
communication, rather than receptive only to the meanings they expect to hear.
15.3.2 Parochial attitude
A model of attitudes to cultural differences is developed in Figure 15.1, based upon
Perlmutter's (1969) theory of ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric attitudes 120.
Parochial attitude is added from comparative management theory (Adler, 1983).
Although these attitudes are illustrated as pure forms, management of any MNC is
unlikely to adopt just one of these pure form attitudes. With the possible exception
of parochialism, they are likely to appear to a greater or lesser extent in any MNC
(Perlmutter, 1969). Nevertheless, a MNC may have a preponderance of one attitude,
which may serve as a label for the prevailing attitude in its management.
"Parochialism is based on ignorance of others' ways" (Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991,
page 263). It is unawareness, or denial, that there are any differences in cultural
attitudes, beliefs or accepted ways of doing things.
120 Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) and Chakravarthy and Perlmutter (1985) include
regiocentrism in their analysis. This is omitted here as it is seen as very similar to
geocentrism, but at a supra-national regional level as opposed to a global level.
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ATIITUDE
PAROCHIAL ETHNO- POLY. GEO-TO CULTURAL CENTRIC CENTRIC CENTRICDIFFERENCES:
UNAWARE, AWARE, RESPECT,
BUT BUT DO NOTOR DENIAL
SUPPRESS UNDERSTAND RECONCILE
I
CONTROL DO NOTHING, STANDARD
RESPONSIVE GLOBALBENEFITS: i.e. CHEAP CONTROL




CONBTROL INEFFECTIVE, LOCAL POOR DIFFICULT
RISKS: INFLEXIBILITY, CO-ORDINATION, TO ACHIEVE,
UNAWARE POOR LOCAL POOR INTERNAT.
OF RISK COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATION HIGH COST
Figure 15.1: Attitudes to cultural differences
This approach has the advantage of being cheap and easy. Nothing different need be
done for management control abroad than is done at home. The risks are twofold.
Firstly, the familiar management control, as implemented at home, may be
ineffective in foreign cultures. Management by objectives (Hofstede, 1991),
performance related pay (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997), or
accountability systems (14.8 The substantive theory and accountability theory,
above), may not have the intended effect when transported to another culture.
Secondly, managers from the home country may be unaware that their control
methods may be less effective than expected, and their monitoring of management
control may not identify control weaknesses.
Although it is argued here that our theory of accountability may be parochial, traders
have probably been aware of differences in national culture from their first ventures
abroad. An early account that traders between Europe and the Orient found each
other to be very different, and to have different practices, was given by Marco Polo
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in 1298 (Wood, 1995)121. Modem cultural accounts of how managers from different
cultures differ in their shared beliefs, attitudes and values, may continue to foster
awareness, hopefully more accurate than that promoted by Marco Polo's
'Descriptions of the world'. The sort of research done in this study may promote
such awareness with respect to management control. This awareness can move
attitudes from parochialism to, if nothing else, ethnocentric attitudes.
15.3.3 Ethnocentric attitude
An ethnocentric attitude is one that applies "standards of one's own society to people
outside that society" (Hofstede, 1991, page 261). Ethnocentric management is aware
of cultural differences, but insists on using the home country MCS everywhere
(Chakravarthy and Perlmutter, 1985). It therefore suppresses local control methods
and what local managers think may provide better control assurance.
An ethnocentric approach to management control has advantages. It tends to lead to
a standardised MCS for a MNC. Standardisation may foster efficiency: learning
curve benefits may be gained from installing a common system, staff gain from
needing to learn only 1 system, and there is less scope for incompatibility and gaps
between different management control systems. A standardised MCS may help
promote the global integration and efficiencies of a global strategy (Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1998; Daniels and Radebaugh, 1998). This standard MCS is typically
installed and maintained by expatriate managers from the MNC's home country, who
can be trusted to maintain the systems, standards and perhaps corporate culture
expected by head office. Jaeger (1983) describes how a US MNC used expatriate
managers, training programmes and cultural control to impose its US MCS in its
Brazilian subsidiary.
Ethnocentric management control has risks of poor local flexibility and
responsiveness. This arises from poor adaptation of the standard MCS to the local
situation, and from poor understanding of the local situation by foreign managers.
There may also be misunderstanding by them of their local managers and staff. This
121 Irrespective of whether Marco Polo ever went to China, his descriptions, from first hand
experience or hearsay from other travellers, does not take away from the curiosity and
interest raised in Europe by his book 'Descriptions of the world' (Wood, 1995).
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can lead to resentment and discord, as described in extreme forms by Conrad (1995)
and Orwell (1989)122.
Misunderstanding is often increased by the tendency for expatriates to stereotype the
local culture (Stenning, 1979; Hofstede, 1991; Usunier, 1998). Local people may
also misperceive expatriate managers in terms of stereotypes rather than as
individuals. This can increase misunderstanding, irrespective of whether the local
people are ethnocentric towards the foreign managers.
Awareness and understanding of different control perceptions are likely to assist
ethnocentric managers in implementing a standard MCS and monitoring its
effectiveness. This is irrespective of whether they suppress these differences.
Two examples from this study may illustrate the dangers of ethnocentric
management control and potential benefits of understanding differences in control
perceptions. Czech staff were seen generally to be reluctant to follow, if not to
actively resist procedures and directives, for which they did not understand the
reasons (11.3.2 Internal procedures). These reactions may be increased where the
procedures or directives are imposed by foreigners or from abroad. The findings
indicate that ethnocentric management may be able to increase the effectiveness of
this imposition by investing time and effort in explaining the reasons for procedures
or directives. This may require greater honesty in communicating the opinions of
local people and potential drawbacks than is perhaps usual in the UK (10.6.2 Czech
attitudes).
It will be remembered that mainland Chinese people may tend to find ways to
mitigate the purpose of procedures or regulation, in ways that maintain their own
agenda. Therefore, in contrast to the typical Czech approach of openly resisting what
is not accepted, Chinese staff or managers may appear to follow what is imposed, but
find ways to avoid its purpose (11.2.7 Mitigating the effect of regulation and
punishment). Furthermore policies, which set broad principles or define areas of
discretion, may tend to be less effective with Chinese managers and staff than is
expected in the UK (11.4.4 Policies and guidelines). Mainland Chinese people may
122 Although these books are fiction, both Conrad and Orwell were writing from first hand
experience of working in the locations that they describe.
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usually be more concerned with opportunities, pragmatic solutions and in avoiding
constraints over freedom of action in particular situations, than in universal
principles (12.2 Chinese attitudes). Potential solutions for ethnocentric management
may be to support a standard MCS with high investment in interpersonal
relationships with key Chinese managers.
It is claimed that different national cultures vary m their propensity towards
ethnocentrism. Hofstede (1991) links strong ethnocentrism to cultures of high
Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity, such as Japanese culture. Maruyama
(1974) and Redding and Martyn-Johns (1979) associate the unidirectional causal
paradigm, which may be typical of US and British thinking, with ethnocentrism.
Usunier (1998) also claims that US culture has a high propensity for ethnocentrism.
Ethnocentric attitudes have no doubt been very successful, particularly in the past. In
1969 Perlmutter claimed that there was a progression of US MNCs from ethnocentric
through polycentric towards geocentric attitudes. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998, page
58) describe the global organisation model as,
"one of the earliest corporate forms, adopted by such pioneers of
internationalization as Henry Ford and John D. Rockefeller as they built
global-scale facilities to produce standard products shipped worldwide
under a tightly controlled central strategy. And it was this organizational
form that underlay the much-studied Japanese model of worldwide
competition in the 1970s and early 1980s".
A weaker form, the international organization model, was typical of US MNCs, with
top management willing to delegate responsibility, yet retaining overall control
through a sophisticated MCS and specialist corporate staff (ibid.). Despite the
success of global and international organisation models, the inherent ethnocentric
lack of understanding by expatriate managers did at times prevent success. Such
problems are described by Ouchi (1981) for US companies that failed to make any
headway in Japan in the 1970's.
15.3.4 Polycentric attitude
A polycentric attitude is one that sees foreigners as very different and difficult to
understand. They are therefore, as far as possible left alone. A polycentric MCS
gives autonomy to local managers to manage their own management control as they
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see fit (Chakravarthy and Perlmutter, 1985), so long as some overall goal such as
profitability is attained. Whereas parochial and ethnocentric attitudes to international
management may be concerned with home country stakeholders, polycentric
attitudes are willing to give sufficient flexibility so that demands of local
stakeholders can be addressed (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979).
Polycentric attitudes probably underlie what Daniels and Radebaugh (1998) call a
'multidomestic strategy', and what Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) term a 'multinational
organization model' 123. These seek high responsiveness to local situations, so that
the needs of local markets and stakeholders can be catered for. According to Bartlett
and Ghoshal (1998, page 56):
"This structure was particularly well suited to the management norms of
many European companies that expanded abroad (before the Second World
War). ... Control and coordination were achieved primarily through the
personal relationship between top corporate management and subsidiary
managers. This social control process was normally supplemented by some
simple financial systems ...each national unit was managed as an
independent entity whose strategic objective was to optimize its situation in
the local environment. "
Duangploy and Gray (1991) provide some evidence from the late 1980s that
European MNCs tended towards polycentrism while US towards ethnocentrism.
They found that European MNCs tended to evaluate their foreign subsidiaries from
the perspective of those subsidiaries, for example in their local currency, whereas US
MNCs tended to take a home country perspective.
A polycentric MCS therefore has advantages of flexibility and local responsiveness.
It is likely to give considerable autonomy to local managers to provide control
assurance in a way that is most compatible to local regulatory, social, market and
cultural factors. Ouchi (1981) describes examples of this approach in how
123 Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989, page 355) acknowledge the influence that Perlmutter's (1969)
typology of ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric attitudes has had on their thinking.
They link ethnocentrism to their centralised hub or global organisation model, polycentrism
to their decentralised federation or 'multinational' organisation model, and geocentrism to
their 'transnational solution'.
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McDonalds and IBM left their Japanese operations to be run as the local Japanese
managers thought best. The US management neither understood what was
happening, nor felt able to intervene.
A polycentric approach however has considerable risks. It may give rise to poor
communication and understanding between headquarters and foreign subsidiaries.
This may lead to poor international co-ordination and hence to low global efficiency.
It may also lead to weak international learning, so that product or process
improvements, made in one country, may not be implemented elsewhere; there may
be poor awareness and use of knowledge. There is also the risk that what is done by
a foreign subsidiary may be unacceptable to headquarters, such as being involved in
bribery. And there is the risk of local operations incurring heavy losses for the
MNC, such as run up by Showa Shell in Japan over 4 years unbeknown to
international management in London (Banaga et al., 1995). That is to say, there is
the risk of the MNC losing control of its foreign subsidiaries.
Research into cultures of management control, such as this study, offer the prospect
of reducing the misunderstanding and poor communication that gives rise to the risks
of polycentric management control.
15.3.5 Geocentric aUitude
A geocentric attitude includes willingness for management from all national cultures
to work together in establishing universal standards and permissible local variations,
and in making allocation decisions (Perlmutter, 1969). While an ethnocentric
concern for home country stakeholders was contrasted with polycentric concern for
local stakeholders, a geocentric approach may be better placed to attend to global
stakeholders (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979; Charkravarthy and Perlmutter, 1985),
The essence of geocentrism is that people and ideas are judged not by the standards
of where they come from, nor by the standards of a single country, but by global
standards for the whole MNC. It implies a reconciliation of what may appear to be
incompatible cultural beliefs, attitudes, values and perceptions. This is illustrated by
Trompenaars and Hampden-Tumer's diagram of how Universalism and
Particularism may be reconciled, which is reproduced here in Figure 15.2
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Figure 15.2: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism
(Trompenaars and Hamden-Turner, 1997, page 44, Figure 4.4)
Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1998) 'transnational solution' is brought into the argument
here because it may require some degree of geocentric attitudes. Their transnational
solution is for achievement of competitive advantages from simultaneous global
efficiency, local responsiveness and exploiting knowledge on a worldwide basis.
According to their prescription, some resources and capabilities may be centralised,
some in the home country and others elsewhere. Other resources and capabilities
may be distributed among some or all of the MNCs locations. This gives a complex
configuration of distributed concentrations of specialised assets and capabilities.
Management of businesses, products and functions are not standardised, but
differentiated for competitive position, the nature of strategic risks, and building
capability for continuing flexibility. This implies considerable sharing of
information throughout the MNC. Bartlett and Ghoshal claim that the corporate
'glue', preventing such an organisation collapsing under its own complexity, is "a
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shared vision and set of values that define a company's common culture" (ibid., page
334).
Bartlettt and Ghoshal's (1998) 'transnational solution' has several similarities to
Hedlund and Rolander's (1990) 'heterarchy'. These similarities include
geographically dispersed headquarter functions giving a strategic role for foreign
subsidiaries, integration through corporate culture, and a 'holograph organization' in
which information is shared throughout the MNC. This sharing of information
enables it to be used by the whole company, in a 'firm as a brain', rather than used
only by the 'brain of the firm'. Although Bartlettt and Ghoshal link their
transnational solution to geocentrism, neither they nor Hedlund and Rolander appear
to name geocentrism as a prerequisite for their solutions to the competitive pressures
faced by MNCs. However, it appears likely that geocentric attitudes may be needed
at least to some extent for the necessary intensive sharing of information throughout
the organisation (Kobrin, 1994) and for building of a corporate culture sufficient to
hold such organisations together (Hill, 1998), both of which are required for these
solutions.
Building geocentrism IS difficult: it may involve learning new languages,
overcoming national pride, the risks and traumas of international careers (Perlmutter,
1979), and not least reaching some reconciliation of potentially competing values.
The human resource management implications alone, of developing an extensive
multi-cultural cadre of international managers, can be very expensive (Hill, 1998)
and time consuming. Yet the benefits from building shared standards and some
common perceptions may be to break down preconceived assumptions. It may also
enable MNCs to create new insights and to open opportunities that were not apparent
from a single culture (Hoeklin, 1995; Morosini, 1998).
Geocentrism and these solutions for growing international competition have
implications for management control. Distributed centres of expertise and specialism
require non-standard approaches to co-ordination and control. Geocentrism involves
adoption of shared standards, not necessarily those from a MNC's home country.
Intensive sharing of information implies a capability to monitor and make judgement
on effectiveness or on performance that is not defined by a position in a traditional
organisational hierarchy. Perhaps Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1993) 'Beyond M-Form'
organisational structure and control mechanisms are a description of a viable control
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structure for a geocentric organisation. Jacque and Lorange (1984) explore the
budgeting implications of MNCs being geocentric in adopting perspectives of both
headquarters and foreign subsidiaries in conditions of hyperinflation and turbulent
exchange rates.
The first step towards geocentrism from either ethnocentrism or polycentrism is
mutual understanding. This is also the first step towards the shared values and
common culture that is part of the 'glue' of for Bartlett and Ghoshal's 'transnational
solution'.
"Cultural advantage can arise from differing values and ways of seeing the
world To realize competitive advantage from them, it is first necessary to
try to understand them" (Hoeklin, 1995, page 18).
Geocentrism is a matter of degree (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979). What is described
here is an extreme version, which probably few MNCs have attained. While CoX
and CoY showed considerable geocentric tendencies, they had some corporate
standards and policies based on home country values that they were not prepared to
compromise (Interview # 18; Presentation # 1263). Geocentrism of something as
important as management control, and moving away from home country preferences
for how control assurance is provided, may be a difficult form of geocentrism to
achieve. It is submitted that mutual understanding and appreciation of different
cultural perceptions of management control, such as offered by this study, are an
essential first step towards geocentric attitudes to management control.
15.3.6 Implications (or regulation. Drafossional guidance and standards
This study has important policy implications for regulation, professional guidance
and standards concerning internal or management control. Turnbull (1999) guidance
and COSO (1994) recommendations, drafted from Anglo-US cultures, may need to
be viewed in light of different perceptions of management control. For example,
authority, responsibility and accountability (Turnbull, 1999, Appendix paragraph 2)
may have different meaning and significance in other cultures. "Established
channels of communication" (Turnbull, 1999, Appendix paragraph 3) may be more
significant in British culture than in, say, Chinese culture where meaningful
communication has a greater tendency to be through informal channels of
communication. Monitoring (Turnbull, 1999, Appendix paragraph 5) may have a
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different meaning to British culture of empowerment and expectation of contribution,
than in, say, Czech or Chinese culture with expectations of staff reliability.
Monitoring may also be seen as less important by Chinese than Czech or British
managers to providing control assurance.
It appears that regulation, professional guidance and standards for internal control, in
at least the UK, are still in a state of parochialism. The UK regulators and
accounting profession therefore face the double risk of issuing ineffective
pronouncements and of being unaware of this ineffectiveness.
15.4 Areas for further research
/5.4. / Extending tbe substantive area
This is exploratory research. The substantive theory would benefit from further
research in order to test it and to extend it to other situations. This might include
other MNCs and indigenous organisations in mainland China, the Czech Republic
and the UK. A start has been made by Emmanuel et al. (forthcoming) who have
inquired into trade credit control perceptions by mainland Chinese and British
managers working for indigenous companies. Their findings on attitudes to
information, in particular, are consistent with the substantive theory developed here.
15.4.2 Further middle range research for a broader foundation
Further research using middle range methodologies could induce management
control theory that is better grounded, than our present theory, in the reality of cross-
national business. This would extend the modest start made by this and other studies
working outside the dominant functionalist research paradigm. It might provide a
better foundation, than what is presently available, for nomothetic research that relies
on existing theory for its hypotheses.
15.4.3 Similarities between DerceDfions Q/managemenf control
The axial coding in this study suggests that there may be substantial common ground
between the three cultures studied in what management control is thought to be. For
example, views seemed to be unanimous that management control involves
information, and all of the 30 respondents saw control in terms of providing
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assurance for achievement of objectives. It would be of considerable interest to
identify what elements are common to control perceptions between two or three
countries, and then to test to what extent these ontrol elements are common to other
cultures.
15.4.4 New institutional theory - researching dynamics ofculture
Future research could heed the call by Bhimani (1999) for use of new
institutionalism and new history, and by Harrison and McKinnon's (1999) for use of
research approaches from sociology and history. Alternative approaches might
include studying culture as a manifestation of organisations (Smircich, 1983; Allaire
and Firsirotu, 1984), and studying how organisations resolve differences in control
perceptions, rather than studying culture as an independent ideational variable.
These various approaches might help show the dynamics of how tensions within
management control are worked out in different cultural settings, and how tensions
between people of different cultural outlooks are worked out in different
management control situations, rather than taking culture and management control as
static phenomena.
The cultural tension of interaction between corporate and national cultures might be
a fruitful area of research. An example of a research question might be how and to
what extent employees either give up the shared values, beliefs and attitudes of their
national culture in adopting corporate cultures of their employers, or alternatively
reconcile tensions between these cultures.
This research agenda might be aided by studies of interrelationships between change
and control assurance. For example, the extent that either change or concern for
control assurance blocks the other, or perhaps depends on the other, could be
researched.
/5.4.5 Ethnocentric, polycentric, and geocentric control
Ideographic research could seek knowledge of how differences in control perception
are in practice managed in ethnocentric or polycentric settings. This might show the
implications of attempts at worldwide regulation concerning internal control.
Alternatively, research could inquire into the ways by which these diverse
perceptions can be reconciled (Lloyd and Trompenaars, 1993; Hampden-Turner and
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Trompenaars, 2000) in geocentric settings!". This might be achieved with action
research into solution of cross-cultural barriers to geocentric understanding. It might
show how advantage can be gained from tensions between different perceptions of
management control, and show how insight can be gained into solutions or
opportunities that would not otherwise be visible from a single cultural perspective.
The results of such research might be valuable for the multi-cultural teams, whether
in transnational corporations (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998), in multi-cultural joint
ventures (Yan and Gray, 1994; Maruyama, 1996) or within multi-cultural supply
chains.
15.4.6 Implications/or existing theories o,[mancw:ment control
Just as empirical research might inquire into similarities between countries in control
perceptions, further research might inquire into differences. A combination of
studiesl25 searching for differences and those searching for similarities might
between them map out how far our present theories of management control are
culturally dependent, or perhaps even parochial to the extent that they are
inapplicable in some cultures.
The questions raised about established management control theories (J j.2.3
Parochial or culturally dependent management control theories) might be addressed
in future research. For this, middle range or ideographic research may be advisable
so as to be sensitive to what is emic within each culture.
Important new management control theories might also be subjected to cross-
national inquiry. These might include Simons' (1995) 'control levers', theories of
control environment (COSO, 1994; CICA, 1994; APB, 1995) and theory of
operational risk management (COSO, 1994; CICA, 1994; McNamee and Selim,
1998; FSA, 2000).
124 Nomothetic research has been done into formation of hybrid cultures during multi-
cultural team formation (Early and Mosakowski, 2000)
125 Usunier (1998) argues that empirical research should not attempt to look for both cultural
similarities and differences in the same study. This is because researchers have a bias
towards finding either similarities or differences, depending on whether they favour an etic
or emic research approach.
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Several technical terms are defined here, in order to explain the meaning with which
they are used in this study dissertation.
Achieved status - "Achievement means that you are judged on what you have
recently accomplished and on your record. Ascription means that status is
attributed to you, by birth, kinship, gender or age, but also by your
connections (who you know) and educational record (a graduate of Tokyo
University or Haute Ecole Polytechnique)" (Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 1997, page 9).
Ascribed status - see 'Achieved status'.
Axial coding - "A set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways
after open coding, by making connections between categories" (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990, page 96). This differs somewhat from Strauss and Corbin's
definition in their 1998 edition, which refers only to relating categories to
sub-categories. Their original meaning is retained because axial coding in
this study focused on relating categories irrespective of whether they were
sub-categories.
Axial respondents - A label used here to identify the 30 respondents whose views on
relationships between control concepts formed the basis for axial coding in
this study. Their views were also included in open and selective coding,
Bureaucratic control mechanism - "Conforms quite closely to the bureaucratic model
described by Weber (1947). The fundamental mechanism of (bureaucratic)
control involves close personal surveillance and direction of subordinates by
superiors. The information necessary for task completion is contained in
rules." This pure form of control mechanism is likely to exist to a greater or
lesser extent alongside Clan and Market control mechanisms in an
organisation. (Ouchi, 1979,page 835)
Category - an abstract grouping of concepts for grounded theory research that
pertains to a phenomenon under study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 and 1998).
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Clan control mechanism - Informal socialisation processes that contribute to control
by inculcating and maintaining shared values within an organisation, so that
organisation members have a deep commitment to the objectives for the
organisation. This pure form of control mechanism is likely to exist to a
greater or lesser extent alongside Bureaucratic and Market control
mechanisms in an organisation. (Ouchi, 1979).
Collectivism - See 'Individualism or Collectivism'
Communitarianism - See 'Individualism or Collectivism'
Confucian dynamism - A dimension of national culture referring to the teaching of
Confucius (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Its long-term orientation is
associated with persistence, ordering relationships by status and observing
this order, thrift and having a sense of shame. Its opposite short term
orientation is associated with personal steadiness and stability, protecting
one's 'face', respect for tradition and reciprocation of greeting, favours and
gifts (Hofstede, 1991)
Control components - generic components of management control. These are the
outcome of control methods and may be expected to provide some control
assurance. For example, implementing systems for performance related
remuneration may create or enhance motivation; implementation of the
systems would represent control methods, the resulting motivation would be
a control component. Control components, such as authority, responsibility,
accountability, information and communication, are largely represented by
the components of, or criteria for assessing, internal control set out in
professional pronouncements (COSO, 1994; CICA, 1994; Rutteman, 1994).
Control element - used here as a generic term to include anything that was included
in axial respondents' diagrams of their perceptions of control. These
elements include control objectives, action taken to achieve those
objectives, components of control produced as a result of that action and
providing assurance towards achievement of the objectives, and contextual
factors or contingencies that affect management control.
Control methods - the means that managers use to provide management control, for
example implementation and use of budgeting, monitoring and reward
443
Appendix A: Glossary of terms
systems. They are largely synonymous with the 'controls' referred to by
Drucker (1964). See also 'control components'.
Cybernetics - "the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in the
machine or in the animal" (Wiener, 1948, page 19). A cybernetic model of
management control is used here to mean one or more information control
loops.
Diffuse - See 'Specific or Diffuse'.
Discriminate sampling - Sampling, Le. selecting data sources, for the purpose of
selective coding in grounded theory research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 and
1998).
Egalitarian or Hierarchical orientation - One of the cultural dimensions by which
Trompenaars (1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) maps
corporate cultures. It refers to "the vertical or hierarchical system of
authority defining superiors and subordinates" (ibid., 1997, page 157). It
appears to be similar in meaning with Hofstede's Power Distance dimension
(defined below), although it is measured with different survey questions and
measures corporate rather than national culture.
Eiffel Tower organisational culture or model of organisation - A culture that is both
Task rather than Person orientated and Hierarchical rather than Egalitarian.
Likely characteristics of such an organisation are that relationships are
Specific and defined by clear roles, status is Ascribed by superior roles,
thinking is logical and analytical, people are seen as human resources,
motivation is through promotion to a larger role within the organisation,
conflict resolution is either by procedures or accusation of irrationality, and
change occurs through changing the roles or procedures (Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1997). This appears to correspond largely with
Hofstede's (1991) Pyramid of People model of high uncertainty avoidance
(UAI) and high power distance (PD).
Ethnocentrism - "Applying the standards of one's own society to people outside that
society" (Hofstede, 1991, page 261). It may be compared to 'Parochialism',
'Polycentrism' and 'Geocentrism' (Adler, 1983).
External Locus of Control- see Locus of Control.
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Family organisational culture or model of organisation - A culture that is both
Person rather than Task orientated and Hierarchical rather than Egalitarian.
Likely characteristics of such an organisation are that relationships are
Diffuse, status is Ascribed, thinking is lateral and holistic, staff are treated
as family members, motivation and reward is by respect and belonging to
the organisation, conflict resolution is through maintaining face and power
games, and change is brought about by the 'paternal' leader (Trompenaars
and Hampden-Turner, 1997).
This appears to correspond with Hofstede's (1991) Family model of low
Uncertainty Avoidance (VAl) and high Power Distance (PD). Hofstede
sees this organisational model as characterised by Ouchi's (1979) Clan
control mechanism.
'Feedback control' - adjusting "future conduct by past performance" (Wiener, 1954,
page 33).
'Feed forward control' - using predictions of expected outcomes for control, rather
than the use of actual outcomes in feedback control (Emmanuel et al.,
1990). However, this meaning is not universally accepted. For example,
Foster (1969) and Rose (1974) use feed forward control to mean adjustment
of inputs, such as changes in quality or specification of inputs, in order to
adjust downstream processes.
Femininity - "The opposite of masculinity; together, they form one of the
dimensions of national cultures. Femininity stands for a society in which
social gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be
modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life" (Hofstede, 1991,
page 261).
Formal theory - see 'Substantive theory'.
Geocentrism - "A collaborative effort between subsidiaries and headquarters to
establish universal standards and permissable local variations, (and) to make
key allocational decisions" (Perlmutter, 1969, page 13). It may be
compared to 'Parochialism', 'Ethnocentrism' and 'Polycentrism' (Adler,
1983).
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Grounded theory - "A grounded theory theory is one that is inductively derived from
the study of the phenomenon it represents. That is, it is discovered,
developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and
analysis of data pertaining to that phenomenon. Therefore, data collection,
analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each other. One
does not begin with a theory, then prove it. Rather, on begins with an area
of study and what is relevant to that area is allowed to emerge" (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990, page 23). According to Strauss and Corbin (1994, page 283)
the central features of grounded theory "are the grounding of theory upon
data through data-theory interplay, the making of constant comparisons, the
asking of theoretically orientated questions, theoretical coding and the
development of theory."
Guan xi *~-Chinese "dyadic relationships that are based implicitly (rather than
explicitly) on mutual interests and benefit. Once guan xi is established
between two people, each can ask a favour of the other with the expectation
that the debt incurred will be repaid sometime in the future." Yang (1994,
page 1)
Guided Missile organisational culture or model of organisation - A culture that is
both Task rather than Person orientated and Egalitarian rather than
Hierarchical. Likely characteristics of such an organisation are that Specific
tasks are targeted on shared objectives, status is Achieved by staff who
contribute to targeted goals, thinking is problem centred, staff are seen as
specialists or experts, motivation is by performance related pay, conflict
resolution is task related with rapid correction of errors, and change is
brought about by changing the objectives (Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 1997). This appears to correspond largely with Hofstede's (1991)
Well-Oiled Machine model of high uncertainty avoidance (UAI) and low
power distance (PD).
Hierarchical orientation - See 'Egalitarian or Hierarchical orientation'.
High-context communication - communication "in which most of the information is
either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while very little
is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low-context ...
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communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is
vested in the explicit code" (Hall, 1977, page 91)
IDV - Individualism index, see Individualism. This is Hofstede's (1984, 1991)
index ofIndividualism based on his IBM research project.
Incubator organisational culture or model of organisation - A culture that is both
Person rather than Task orientated and Egalitarian rather than Hierarchical.
Likely characteristics of such an organisation are that relationships are
Diffuse growing out of shared creative processes, status is Achieved by
individuals through creativity, thinking is process orientated and creative,
people are seen as colleagues or co-creators, motivation is through
participation in the process and enthusiasm, conflict resolution is through
improving creativity or staff resigning, and change occurs through
improvisation and attuning to new situations (Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner, 1997).
Individualism or Collectivism - A dimension of national culture dealing with how
people relate to other people, contrasting a prime orientation to the self, as
opposed to a prime orientation to common goals and objectives
(Trompenaars, 1993, following Parsons and Shils, 1951). Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner (1997) have renamed 'Collectivism' as
'Communitarianism' .
"Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are
loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her
immediate family only..... Collectivism stands for a society in which people
from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which
throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for
unquestioning loyalty." (Hofstede, 1991, pages 260 - 261)
Internal Locus of Control- see Locus of Control.
Locus of Control - refers to where people tend to attribute the cause, or control, of
events. People with an Internal Locus of Control tend to see themselves as
potentially capable of controlling their own world, whereas External Locus
of Control people tend to see themselves subject to external forces
(Trompenaars, 1993; Trompenaars and Hamden-Turner, 1997). External
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Locus of Control is subdivided by Levenson (Kauffman et al., 1995) into
people who tend to see their world as subject to more powerful Other
people, and those who see their world as largely determined by Chance or
fate.
Locus of Control by Chance - a form of External Locus of Control. See Locus of
Control.
Locus of Control by more powerful Others - a form of External Locus of Control.
See Locus of Control.
Low-context communication - see 'High-context communication'
Mainland China - is used here to include the greater part of the People's Republic of
China and to exclude Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan.
Management control - provision by managers of an organisation of some level of
assurance of achieving one or more objectives (standard, goal, objective or
purpose) of the organisation, including avoiding undesirable outcomes
(definition developed in 1.2Management control and control assurance).
Market control mechanism - "prices convey all of the information necessary for
efficient decision making. In frictionless market, where prices exactly
represent the value of a good or service, decision-makers need no other
information. Arbitrary rules ... are unnecessary. In addition to information,
prices provide a mechanism for solving the problem of goal incongruity ....
the firm can simply reward each employee in direct proportion to his
contribution, so that an employee who produces little is paid little, and all
payments, being exactly in proportion to contribution are fair." This pure
form of control mechanism is likely to exist to a greater or lesser extent
alongside Bureaucratic and Clan control mechanisms in an organisation.
(Ouchi, 1979, page 835)
Masculinity - "The opposite of femininity: together, they form one of the dimensions
of national cultures. Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender
roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and
focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest,
tender, and concerned with the quality of life" (Hofstede, 1991, page, 262)
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National culture - shared beliefs, attitudes and values among people living during the
same historical period and brought up in the same country. (Definition
developed in 1.3 National culture)
Open coding - In grounded theory research it is "the process of breaking down,
examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data" (Strauss and
Corbin, 1990, page 61). "The analytical process through which concepts are
identified and their properties and dimensions are discovered in data"
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, page 101).
Open sampling - Sampling, Le. identifying data sources, for the purpose of open
coding in grounded theory research (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 and 1998
Parochialism - "Parochialism is based on ignorance of others' ways" (Boyacigiller
and Adler, 1991, page 263). It is unawareness, or denial, that there are any
differences in cultural attitudes, beliefs or accepted ways of doing things. It
may be compared to 'Ethnocentrism', 'Polycentrism' and 'Geocentrism'
(Adler, 1983).
Particularism - See 'Universalism or Particularism'
PDI - Power Distance Index, see Power Distance. This is Hofstede's (1984, 1991)
index of Power Distance based on his IBM research project.
Person or Task orientation - One of the cultural dimensions by which Trompenaars
(1993; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) maps corporate cultures.
Polycentrism - "The attitude that cultures of various countries are quite dissimilar,
that foreigners are difficult to understand, and that they should be left alone
as long as their work is profitable" (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979, page 20).
It may be compared to 'Parochialism', 'Ethnocentrism' and 'Geocentrism'
(Adler, 1983).
Power distance - "The extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed
unequally"(Hofstede, 1991, page 262).
Pyramid of People - Hofstede's (1991) model of organisation identified by high
Power Distance and high Uncertainty Avoidance. He sees this
organisational model as characterised by control mechanisms based upon
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Oliver Williamson's hierarchy, as opposed to market, transactions. See also
Eiffel Tower organisational culture or model of organisation.
Relational and variational sampling - Sampling, i.e. selecting data sources, for the
purposes of axial coding in grounded theory research (Strauss and Corbin,
1990 and 1998). "During relational and variational sampling, the researcher
is looking for incidents that demonstrate dimensional range of variation of a
concept and the relationships among concepts" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998,
page 210).
Ren qing A1f. - Peculiarly Chinese, guan xi like relationship. It has elements of,
firstly, being based on ethical and emotional feelings between human
beings, secondly, being the proper conduct within a circle of people such as
family, kin and close friends with whom one is bound by emotion and
affection; and, thirdly, being emotional bonds of reciprocity and mutual aid
between two people. While typically appearing within an extended family,
it can arise in long term relationships between Chinese people who share
common experiences such as between classmates from school. (Yang,
1994).
Risk - Un-quantifiable or quantifiable likelihood that something may happen.
Therefore, although the economists' distinction between 'risk' and
'uncertainty' is recognised (Knight, 1933), the prevailing meaning used in
the accounting and auditing professions (COSO, 1994; CICA, 1994; APB,
1995; Turnbull, 1999) is adopted here. This includes the chance that
opportunities may be missed as well as chances of losses or other
undesirable outcomes. Parameters of risk management are usually taken to
be the likelihood that an outcome will occur, the magnitude or impact of this
outcome on the business and its objectives, and what could be done either to
reduce the likelihood of the occurrence or to mitigate its impact (COSO,
1994; E.I.U. with Arthur Andersen, 1995;McNamee and Selim, 1998).
Selective coding - "The process of integrating and refining the theory" (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998, page 143). "The process of selecting the core category,
systematically relating it to other categories, validating those relationships,
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and filling in categories that need further refinement and development"
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, page 116).
Sequential view of time - Time "conceived of as a line of sequential events passing
us at regular intervals" (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997, page
123). This appears to be similar to what Hall (1977) calls 'monochronic
time' .
Specific or Diffuse - A dimension of national culture dealing with how people
relate to other people. This contrasts "the degree to which we engage others
in specific areas of life and single levels of personality, or diffusely in
multiple areas of our lives and at several levels of personality at the same
time." (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997, page 81)
Substantive theory - "A theory for the substantive area on which (the researcher) has
done research" (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, page 114). It is contrasted by
Glaser and Strauss (ibid.) to a formal theory, which draws on many studies
pertaining to an abstract sociological category, and pertains to a conceptual
area.
Synchronous view of time - Time "conceived of as cyclical and repetitive,
compressing past, present and future by what these have in common:
seasons and rhythms" (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997, page 123).
This appears to have some similarities to what Hall (1977) calls
'polychronic time'.
Task orientation - See 'Person or Task orientation'
Theoretical sampling - "Data gathering driven by concepts derived from the
evolving theory" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, page 201).
Theoretical sensitivity - "A personal quality of the researcher. It indicates an
awareness of the subtleties of meaning of data. One can come to the
research situation with varying degrees of sensitivity depending upon
previous reading and experience with or relevant to an area. It can also be
developed during the research process. Theoretical sensitivity refers to the
attribute of having insight, the ability to give meaning to data, the capacity
to understand, and capability to separate the pertinent from that which isn't"
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, pages 41-42). In their 1998 edition, Strauss and
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Corbin refer to this as merely 'sensitivity'. Their original terminology is
retained in this study in order to indicate that it has a technical meaning
distinct from general sensitivity.
Trade credit - "the credit extended to customers by suppliers of goods or services"
(Pike et al., 1998, page v.). Trade credit control is understood in this study
to be a part of management control.
UAl - Uncertainty Avoidance Index, see Uncertainty avoidance.
Uncertainty avoidance - "The extent to which the members of a culture feel
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations" (Hofstede, 1991, page 263).
It is measured in Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)
Universalism or Particularism - A dimension of national culture. "The universalist
approach is roughly: 'What is good and right can be defined and always
applies.' In particularist cultures far greater attention is given to the
obligations of relationships and unique circumstances. For example, instead
of assuming that the one good way must always be followed, the
particularist reasoning is that friendship has special obligations and hence
may come first. Less attention is given to abstract rules." (Trompenaars and
Hampden-Turner, 1997, page 8)
Village market - Hofstede's (1991) model of organisation identified by low Power
Distance and low Uncertainty Avoidance. He sees this organisational model
as characterised by Ouchi's (1979) Market control mechanism.
Well-oiled machine - Hofstede's (1991) model of organisation identified by low
Power Distance and high Uncertainty Avoidance. He sees this
organisational model as characterised by Ouchi's (1979) Bureaucratic
control mechanism. See also Guided Missile organisational culture or
model of organisation.
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APPENDIX B. CASE STUDY DATABASE INDEX
Database Dateof ._
tI. ~ b'l2e Location Description . _
-1' --- 7102/97- Pa-per- -- UK proposidforfieldwo~rk~ .,- I
-2"- 11705197 -Fax - - --UK - Noteso-n-my-fieilwork. including timetable
--3 20105/97 Fax - --UK-TtlOUghtson control issue
--4 23/07176 Phone Southton Policies'~f~o~r.:.:v::e::.rs:.::e.::a.:.:s:::.o:::p:;.:·s:....,fI=-e-xi::-b-:::ili:-ty--:&=-co-n--:t-r071--1
-6 25/04/97 Phone Helsinki Finnsv~Norwe3g!,::ia~n:::s -c-~_.-I
-9 25/04/97 Phone -Pans- Co-ntroTlnE."Europeand Russia, cheque signing
--12 6/05/97 Phone TokYO- Japan vBrasil control attitude ----
-'5 9/05/97 Lunch Southton Controiin-China and:_:G::_a::_:b:_:o::_n:.._,_,...-...,-=----:-_
----:'S S/05/97 Interview Southton Exploratory meeting, communication in Rus~J!._
1---20 5/08/97 Interview SouthiO-n-Possibleareas of control to research----21· -- 2"7/01197 Lunch-- ---'uk-- Frenchb-cinking-·---·--------··--
~~;~~~---1~/62i~j-=~~~:chure r~~~~}~~~~~it~~~~n{~~c-----==~==~
~.2 . -- CBI: Brochure . England CBI: Prompt Payers Code. registered supporters
25.5 Interview UK Hungar.:::ia::_:n:::_s---o-,-- . _
'26.1 1/06/97 Document f Southton Challenge of China
~6.5 2/07/97 Field note -UK-- CreditcOntrol issues
'2'7.1 17107/97 Fax U"t(-- treditin::_su::.:r-=a:...:nce=·~a:-:n:.::d:--c-r-ed7.i.,.,ti=-n-su-r-er-s------I
~7.5 IBrochure I UK Factoring & Invoice discounting
~SH24/07/97wIf.N.J ~~CM: Their credit services
'29:-1- 31IC)7!97TDocument -----ulf--ExplanaUOn of my research into Credit Control
~19.~ ~1/07J~IJ~~~ldnote " -UK'-:Protocol iO'rfieiCEvork--- ----
-i~~~:~:i~~~~r -'-r-~~:-l~~~~il~fttit:~~~ rules .--
36 4/08/97 Interview ===1Iuthton Iintred.. ucto.rymee_ting
39 4/0S/97 Document uthton Finance organisation
1---42 4/08/97 Interview Uttiton Introductlon---------
45 4/08/97 Interview - ; SoutiliOn liitroduction--·---------------
--4S 4/0S/97 IManual lsouihton CreditPolicyManua'-'
---51-'4/087§rf Document iSouthton :Monthly Credii-=R~e~po:;.rt------------
-- -54 -14/08/97 IDocument Southton -Weekfy-AgedOebtre.!:..po::.:rt~ _
--57 ,4/08/97 !Document -SouthtOnApprais-alof new-CU-s'tomer
--60---'4'iOS197 Document -- South!on Recovery-ordebtfr=-o:-m~:::.:c:.:u:.::s:....to-m-e-r----·---
~3 4/08/97 Interview Southton Introduction ---
~4 5/08/97 Interview Southton Initial::_:m:-:e:e~t:':in-g---------
~6 6/0S/97 Interview Northton Introduc:::ti;:-:o:.:n_--o---,_---:----;-c~------1
~9 S/08/97 Phone call UK Credit reference business in UK
72 8/08197 Phone call UK Credit reference business in Czech Republic
~5.1 11108/97 Phone call SouthtOrl ECGOiervices for capital goods exporters





Southton ECGD Yearbo~o:;.:k_..,.,-~_---:- _
r-tS:=-:::_+.--11:-::/0~8O-::/·9~7=+I:.:nt-=e.:.:rv~ie:;.w=--------+~U_~-~mo ~fp~-t~~redit info services
_?9 12/0S/97 Phone call ____!J_~_~~sin~~~n China":~a:.:nd~P~ra:gs!..:::u=_e__:___"7'-_:_:_:__--1
81 13/08/97 Interview Southton Organisation, structure. risk. cost of capital
r-a4 13/08/97 Document Southton Structure -
~7 13/0S/97 Document _Sou!ht~_!l()_r~a~~s_a~i()~-c-h.-a__rt-___--_-.-.::~=-_-. -----_=-:::.-1
~O 13/0S/97 Financial Times _ ~()~tht~~ Q~~era! b~~kgr()u!,~ .__
93 13/08/97 Interview Southton Questions on credit control
--- -,-- -7=-:::-:=-"·----- -------. --.--- .-..-------------f--~~---P3/08~~Z.}~~cu~~_~ - _ r~()~th~~,! ~I]~i~a\~()"- _. .__
1----;99L13/0S/97.Emaii Southto..'!_Ema~~l3_s_~~!t~~since 20/5/97 concerning credit _
102 !13/08/97 Documents Southton Standard contracts x 3
-- --r-,-,-----,-,-,- -------. --r.;_- --- --------------.-.------.-...---,,--------.----
__~~~_ !_~~9S/97 ~terview ----+~~u!h~()~_ ~xar:nple()f_badc~~t().'!'!l~ . _
_ 10~~~ !~erview ._----+Sou~~t()!" Crecj_itcontr?I__ __... .__. ..._
~ 11 13/0S/97 Document I Southt?..'!..~.is~. ~~~~!~ . 1
112 13/08/97 Interview Southton Credit control
r-;-. c-t-::---'---· ..~~-:-:-:--.,......,:__--------I
~_14 13/08/97 Interview I Southt?.!'...~~esti()(l~~r:!_~:..::re:.d:_::i:t_=co=n:;.t::..:ro:;.I _
115 14/08/97 Fax i Southton Assoc Corp Treasurers
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Database Date of=s:': ~ ~ LocatioD Desc[illtioD
r--:r1~ 14/08197 Interview Southton Credit control
~20 14/08/97 Interview Southton Credit control
r-:r21 15/08/97 Phone call UK Trade finance services offered
123 19/08/97 Interview Southton Control
~26 19/08/97 Interview Southton Control
~29 19/08/97 letter Southton Standard letter to customers
~32 19/08/97 Invoice Southton Invoice with payment terms
135 19/08/97 Report Southton Accounts -Receivable balances by manager
138 19/08/97 Report Southton Internal control report
141 19/08/97 Report Southton Internal control report
144 19/08/97 Report Southton Internal control report
r-:r45 19/08197 Notes Southton Input fields for control system
147 20/08/97 Interview Northton Control
150 20/08/97 Authorities Northton Credit authorities
153 20/08/97 Interview Northton Control
156 20/08/97 Interview Northton Forecast cash receipts data
~59 21/08/97 Interview Southton Control
~60 21/08/97 Meeting Southton Sales mgt inel credit
162 21/08/97 lunch Southton Credit control in Northern Ireland
~65 21/08/97 Interview Southton Credit control in Nigeria
~6-a 21/08/97 Southton
~ --
Email Email messages 2/1/96-9/30/96 on credit
r--:ri1 20108/97 letter UK Collection overseas debt
r--:ri2 20/08/97 Brochure uK- NCM credit insurance services
174 19/08/97 Phone call UK NCM services
177 22/08/97 Phone call Southton NCM services
178 24/08/97 Field note UK- NUDISt index tree
180 26/08/97 Interview Northton Basis for control assurance
181 26/08/97 Document Southton Business principles
~83 26/08/97 Authorities Northton Financial authorities
186 26/08/97 Report Northton Credit performance
~8-a 26/08/97 Manual Northton Control guidelines
~89 26/08/97 Manual Northton Financial controls
r--:r90 26/08/97 Phone call Northton Cash receipts timing
~9O- 27/08/97 Phone call Northton Cash receipts timing
192 27/08/97 lunch Southton Global concerns, Egyptian control attitudes
195 27/08/97 Interview Southton Business strategy
~98 27/08/97 Interview Southton Mgt acctg treatment of credit
~01 27/08/97 Audit report Southton Internal audit report
204 27/08/97 Audit report Southton Internal audit report
~06 28/08/97 Field note Southton Characteristics of xxxx approach to control
r-z-07 28/08/97 Interview Southton Control
~10 28/08/97 lunch Southton Control
~13 28/08/97 Phone call Southton Cash flow forecast info sources
~16 29/08/97 Interview Northton Control
219 1/09/97 Interview Southton Control
220 1/09/97 Report Southton Aged debt report
~21 1/09/97 Report Southton Aged debt report
222 1/09/97 Interview Southton Control
223 1/09/97 Phone call Southton Credit recommendations and algorithms
223.5 1/09/97 Phone call Southton Checking for PRC/Cz staff in CoX in UK
224 2/09/97 Document Northton Contract for supply
225 2/09/97 Interview Northton Control
~26 2/09/97 Phone Northton Contact sponsor on return from Beijing
~27 2/09/97 Email Northton Dump of ernails
~28 2/09/97 Manual Northton Credit management guide
~29 2/09/97 Report Northton CCN Business Information report
~30 2/09/97 Report Northton <;:reditreport for a non-limited co.
-231 3/09/97 Interview Northton Control
234 3/09/97 Interview Northton Control
237 3/09/97 Field note Northton Attitude to risk
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Database Date of
tl caQtu.re. ~ LQ~atiQD Oeli~(il2tiQD241 4ibs/97 Document Southton Control
242 4/09197 Document Southton Control
~43 4109197 Interview Southton Control
244 9109197 Phone call li~ ~redif information service
~45 6109197 Field Note lirr- NUD.1ST coding index tree
~46 8109197 Phone call U~rr- Contacts Prague & Beijing
247 9109197 Phone call Vienna Contacts and credit management in Prague
~48 13109197 Field note UK Segregation of duties, comparison CoY & X.
249 11109197 Field note UK Field work queries for CoXU
~50 11109197 Field note UK Some thoughts & queries on CoXU
251 11109197 Field note UK Ideas &~potentTarsuggestions for CoXU
252 11109197 Field note UK Some thoughts & queries on CoYU
253 15109197 Fax Brasil Research into credit control
254 15/09197 Interview Prague Introductory meeting
~55
--- r.:------~
15109197 Interview Prague Control
~5a- '15109197 Document Prague Invoice
~59 77709197 Prague Post Prague Largest foreign owned employers in Cz Rep
~60 17109197 Prague Post Prague Prague Stock Exchange cuts inactive listin~_s__
~61 16109197 Interview Prague Job and background
264 16109197 Interview Prague Problems of cr ctrl in Czech Rep
~67
-~-- r.::-----~ ~
16/09197 Lunch Prague Czech culture and control
~70 16109197 Interview Prague Controf
~73
-"--
r,;,geddebtors report16109197 Report Prague
~i6 f-:jsi09197 Report Prague Net investment report
~i9 16/09197 Interview Prague Czech culture now, Czech control
282 '16]09197 Dinner Prague Corruption in Czech -Republic
285 17109197 Interview Prague Management in Czech Rep.
-288 Tilb9i97 Interview Prague Control
291 17109/97 Interview Prague Control
~94 C:j"7109197 Report Prague Working capital & contribution
~97 17/09197 Report Prague Aged debt and cr limit exceeded report
~60 Prague
f-:-"'-----
17109/97 Report Aged debt and cr limit exceeded report
~03 Prague
r.----~-- ~
17109197 Report Aged debt and cr limit exceeded report
~66 17109197 Report Prague Aged debt and cr limit exceeded report
~69 17109/97 Document Prague Credit Policy
~fo 18109197 Prague Post Prague Communist debts may kill largest industrial firms
~12 18/09197 Interview Prague Control
'"315 18/09197 Document Prague Credit report
~18 18/09197 Interview Prague Control
~21 18/09/97 Document Prague Internal control report
324 19/09/97 Document Prague Internal control report
327 19/09/97 Document Prague Credit report on a Czech co.
330 19/09197 Document Prague Invoice to a customer showing date due
333 19/09197 Document Prague Customer credit request
~~6 19/09197 Report Prague Credit meeting minutes
~39 19/09197 Interview Prague Quick chat to answer some specific q's
342 19/09197 Interview Prague v. brief initial meeting
~43 19/09197 Observation Prague Process chart for purchasing on corridor wall
~45 19/09/97 Notes Prague Notes from loss report
348 19/09/97 Lunch Prague Corp culture
351 19/09197 Interview Prague Control
354 19109197 Interview Prague Services in Czech Republic
357 19/09/97 Document Prague Information report on -a listed co.
~60 21109197 Document Prague Information report on a limited co.• not listed
r--s63 22109197 Drink Prague Chat over drink with xxx & 2 friends
~66 22/09/97 Interview Prague Further thoughts on control
369 22/09/97 Document Prague Mission statement
372 23/09197 Interview Prague View of Czech managers' outlook
375 23/09197 Interview Prague Business and market conditions, control
378 23109197 Interview Prague Business and market conditions, control
~81 23109197 Lunch Prague 1=----Czech people & control weaknesses
384 23109197 Interview Prague Cz -attitude to Western control
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Database Date of
tI. captu~ J¥_~_e LQ!::atiQcOesc[iptiQc~8~ --- References and impressions on Czech culture.24/09/97 Coffee Prague
~90 24/09/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague Czech devaluation, inflation
~~ 24/09/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague Commission for Fighting Econ. & Fin. Crime
396 24/09/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague Moody's rating for Czech Baa 1
r-399 25/09/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague CoX industry
~02 ~5/09/97 Phone call Prague Problems of liquidity, ethics, accountability
405 26/09/97 Lunch Prague Culture of Czech mgrs and business
408 26/09/97 Field note Prague Accountability & responsibility in Cz vs. UK
411 26/09/97 Field note Prague Cultural dimensions: finding SPDI differences
414 26/09/97 Prague Post Prague Comm to Fight Economic Crime, Freedom info
417 26/09/97 Prague Post Prague Bank privatization, National Property Fund
420 26/09/97 Fleet Sheet Prague Tax fraud, Embezzler reelected chairwoman
423 26/09/97 Interview Prague Control
~26 26/09/97 Document Prague Control procedure
~29 26/09/97 Document Prague Control procedure
~32 26/09/97 Document Prague Overview of Debt
~35 28/09/97 Interview Prague Control
~38 29/09/97 Field note Prague Credit limits and complex customers
441 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
444 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
447 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
450 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
~53 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
i---;f56 29/09/97 Report Prague Overdues & Cr Limits exceeded report
~59 29/09/97 Report Prague Example of credit request form
~62 29/09/97 Interview Prague Specific questions answered
'465 29/09/97 Report Prague Capital employed-
'468 29/09/97 Interview "'- Specific questions answeredPrague
471 29/09/97 Interview Prague Control
i---;f74 29/09/97 Document Prague New procedure
477 29/09/97 Document Prague Presentation notes on CHEESE 'investments'
480 29/09/97 Interview Prague Control
i---;f83 30109/97 Interview Prague Control
486 30109/97 Field note Prague Idea on relationships & accountability
489 30/09/97 Interview Prague Questions and discussed mind map
~90 1110/97 Interview Prague Responsibilities, ROACE & strategy
~91 1/10/97 Phone call UK Contact in China
~92 1/10/97 Phone call Prague Progress funding & research
495 1/10/97 Interview Prague Control
498 1/10/97 Interview Prague Some questions answered
~01 1/10/97 Email Prague Example of chasing a manager
504 1/10/97 Document Prague An Introduction to credit risk management
r-s05 2/10/97 Document Prague Strategy
t---s07 2110197 Field note Prague Flavour of the moment; Good prep of mind maps
r-s10 2110/97 Interview Prague Credit
rs13 2110/97 Interview Prague Credit
~16 2110/97 Document Prague Contract with a customer
r-s19 2110/97 Interview Prague Legal options for collecting debts
~22 3/10/97 Document Prague Control
~25 3110197 Interview Prague Control
528 3/10/97 Interview Prague Control
531 3/10/97 Document Prague Letter of Representationrs34 4/10/97 Field note Prague Control process = action + state of control
537 4/10/97 Field note Prague Roles
-s40 4/10/97 Prague Post Prague Tunnelling' and Czech attitudes to law
543 6/10/97 Prague Post Prague Industrial overdue debts & insolvency
546 6/10/97 Interview Prague Clarification of 'People' as basis for assurance
549 6110197 Interview Prague Control
552 7/10/97 Interview Prague Control
rs55 7/10/97 Lunch Prague Culture of Czech managers
rs58 8/10/97 Email Prague Some emails on credit controlrs61tshoi97 Interview Prague Czech business culture
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Database Date of
I--tt ~ ~ LQ~atiQ[] QeS~[illtiQ[]t---sS4 ~/t6/97 Document Prague Coslstructure and realisation
~67 8/10/97 Lunch Prague Cz mgrs' culture and my impressions.
570 9/10107 Interview Prague Specific questions answered
f---571 9/10107 Field note PraQ_~ Points to follow up with CoYP
f---57~ 9/10107 Field note Prague Potential suggestions for CoYP
f---573 9/10107 Prague Post Prague Cz residential construction firms collapsing
tS76 9/10107 Prague Post Prague Cz inflation>10%, interest rates 14.5%
579 9/10107 Prague Post Prague Restitution favoured former communists
---SS2 9/10107 Prague Post -- Banks afraid to foreclose on colateralPrague
585 9/10107 Prague Post Prague Attitudes to taxi regulation and Justice syst~~
588 9/10107 Prague Post Pra{:!u_~ Shortage of labour, skilled & unskilled
590 9/10107 Field note Prague Pointsto follow up in Prague
r-s91 9/10107 Prague Post Prague Widespread tax evasion
C---S92 9/10107 ~ield note Prague Points to follow up CoXP
593 15/10/97 Field note Prag_~ Ideas and potential suggestions for CoXP
~~4 23/09/97 Interview Beijing Credit reference info & collecting debt in PRC
16/10/97 ... -~ -,-,--------------595 China Daily Beijing Jiang Ze Min at 15 National Congress of CPC
f---597 17/10/97 Field note Beijing Aggregation of credit risk~OO 17/10/97 Meeting Beijing Presentation by new employee
~03 17/10/97 Interview Beijing Initial meeting, objectives etc.
~06 17/10/97 Interview Beij_i~ Business and market conditions
C-S09 17/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
~12 17/10/97 Document Beijing Credit management policy - old
~1S 17/10/97 Document Beijing Credit management policy - new
618 17110/97 Interview Beijing Accounting for bad debts etc.
619 18110/97 Document BeijinL -Personnel relations survey~;~18/10/97 Field note Beijin~_ Credit ctrl:M-arket maturitylexpansion mrkt share18/10/97 Far East Economic Review Beijing Modernise Chinese banks, relationship loans623"19/10/97 Far East Economic Review Beijing 15thParty Congress
624 19/10/97 Field note Beijing Case studies for questionnaire62S- f-:t9/10197 Far East Economic Review Beijing ~o's no_transparent, s~ debt, bank speculati~~
627 20/10/97 {;hina Daily ---"'-Beijing Soe reform'-630 ~Oi10/97 Interview Beijing Structure import trade, control weaknesses
~33 20/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
636 20/10/97 Interview Beijing ~trol
"-639 20/10/97 Interview Beijing- Control
~42 21/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
"645 21/10/97 Interview Beijing Res objectives, scope, respondents
~48 21/10/97 Phone call Beijing Legal side of debt collecting
649 21110197 Lunch Beijing SpeCific questions
651 21/10/97 Training meeting Beijing Staff meeting and questioning
652 21110/97 Phone call Beijing Cr services offered. W. co's too ambitious
C-SS4 22110/97 China Daily Beijing GDP, unemployment, inflation. Tight credit policy.
~57 22/10/97 Interview Beijing Specific questions answered
660 22110197 Document Beijing Overdue debtors report
~63 22110/97 Document Beijing Manpower, results & balance sheet
~66 22/10/97 Document Beijing Manpower analysis
669 22110197 Interview Beijing Specfic q's: Credit Policy, Currency riskrs72 22/10/97 Document Beijing Overdue report
"675 "22110197 Document Beijing Payment status for importer
678 22/10/97 Document Beijing Delegated authorities1--"--
._§_81 22/10/97 email Beijing Credit authorities and policy
683 22/10/97 Lunch Beij_ing With department: Regulation v. practice
684 22110/97 Interview Beijing Legal aspects to debt recovery in China
687 22/10/97 China Business Summary Beijing 2 x court cases in China with foreigners~:
690 22110197 Document Beijing Financial authorities for credit.
S-93 22/10/97 Interview Beijing Control'--
~96 22110197 China Daily Beijing CPC bans members who give gifts
699 23/10/97 China Daily Beijing 15th Nat Congress: admin manpower
702 23/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
705 23/10/97 Document Beij~~ ~ochure on cr info~O8 "23/10/97 Document Beijing Business education service
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Database Date of
-11. ~ ~ LocatioD Desc[iptioD
711 23110/97 China Daily Beijing Guanxi in rural economy
~14 23/10/97 China Daily Beijing Interest rates cut
717 23/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
~20 24/10197 Trlierview Beijin-g- Control
~23
-.:.~
Confirmation of orders, deliveries & payment24/10/97 Document Beijing
~26 Beijing
r-:
24/10/97 Document Sales performance (Volumes)
729 24/10/97 Document Beijing Overdue & cr limit exceeded system dump
730 24/10/97 Document Beifing Report on customers with overdue
732 24/10/97 Document Beijing Credit appraisal form
735 24/10/97 Document Beijing Monthly working capital analysis
738 24/10/97 Document Beijing Bad debt provisions
r-r41 25/10/97 Lunch Beijing Chinese approach to law and business
744 25/10/97 Field note Beijing Credit competition and emerging markets
747 27/10/97 Field note Beijing Managing a customer out of a credit situation
750 27/10/97 China Daily Business Weekly Beijing 'Merger and stock market listing of soe's
753 27/10/97 China Daily Business Weekly Beijing Ground breaking for a plant in TianJin
r-r56 27/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
759 27/10/97 Document Beijing Model contract
762 27/10/97 Lunch Beijing Specific questions
765 27/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
768 27/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
769 28/10/97 Publication Beijing Some small & mid sized banks may go bankrupt.
'"771 28/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
~74 28/10/97 Lunch Beijing Control
~i7 28/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
780 29/10/97 Field note Beijing Control of numbers or of business
783 29/10/97 Interview ~eiIlng Control
786 29/10/97 Lunch Beijing Impressions
---Y89 29/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
792 29/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
795 30/10/97 Phone call Beijing Specific question
798 30/10/97 Publication Beijing China should be governed by law
rab"130/10/97 Lunch
..-~
Differences Western and Chinese thinkingBeijing
r-a03 31/10/97 Interview Beijing Tung Chien Hua; Friday night drinking
r-s()4 31/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
r-s()7 31/10/97 Document Beijing WIP report
r-e10 31/10/97 Document Beijing Invoice
-a13 31/10/97 Document Beijing Reminder to pay
--a16 31/10/97 Document Beijing Accounts recievable report
819 31/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
822 31/10/97 Interview Beijing Control
--a23 31/10/97 Field note Beijing Suggestions & ols q's
-a25 1/11197 China Daily Beijing Reform of small s.o.e.'s
-a28 1/11/97 China Daily Beijing New bankruptcy law
831 1/11/97 China Daily Beijing Jian Ze Min at 12th Nat Congress
832 2111197 Lunch Beijing Ranking of Beijing universities
834 3111/97 China Daily Business Weekly Beijing M.E. reform
837 3/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
--a40 3/11/97 Lunch Beijing Control
843 3111197 Interview Beijing Control
846 4/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
849 4/11/97 Document Beijing Business acceptance criteria
852 4/11/97 Document Beijing Standard contract
855 4/11/97 Lunch Beijing Differences in W & PRC views of mgt process
--aS8 5/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
861 5/11/97 Meeting Beijing Working capital meeting
862 5/11197 Document Beijing Presentation material from meeting
864 5/11/97 China Daily 4/11/97 Beijing Fin instit's should tighten mgt, int ctrl & reg's
867 5/11/97 China Daily 4/11/97 Beijing Judge dismissed by for supericial reasons
--s70 5/11/97 China Daily 4/11/97 Beijing Listing of s.o.e.'s per 15th Nat Congress
873 5/11/97 China Daily 4/11/97 Beijing Bosses disappearing to avoid paying debts
r-e76 5/11/97 Lunch Beijing Differences Chinese & Western thinking
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Database Date of
r----tJ. ~ ~ LQcatiQD OescriQtiQD
877 6/11/97- Phone Beijing Sp-ediic question
r--a79 6/11/97 Interview Beijing Cr and business control and mgt process
r-a80 6/11/97 Document Beijing View of 'Strategic Cost Leadership't----a~ 6/11/97 Interview Beijing Specific q's on reports
-a8S BeijinQ
1--7/11/97 Interview Control
888 7/11/97 Lunch Beijing Accountability, responsibility, stereotyping
891 7/11/97 Interview Beijing Responsibility and Accountability.
894 7/11/97 Document Beijing Credit mgt best practice study
897 7/11/97 email Beijing emails within on credit management
t---g00 7/11/97 email Beijing emails
r--g03 7/11/97 Economist Intelligence Unit Beijing Buyer's market as over supply in China markets
906 7/11/97 Economist Intelligence Unit Beijing Gu Fen Zhi as part of s.o.e. reform
t---g09 8/11/97 Economist Intelligence Unit Beijing Steel mills: Hangang and Capital or Sho,:,gang
t---g12 9/11/97 Lunch Beijin_L Close out meeting
r---s1s -=-:--------10/11/97 Interview Beijing Tried out draft new questionnaire
rg18 10/11/97 Lunch Beijing Control
rg19 10/11/97 Economic Intelligence Unit Beijing Weakening demand in China
921 10/11/97 Phone call Beijing Number of active customers
924 10/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
t---g27 11/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
rg30 11/11/97 Interview Bei~!!L Differences Chinese and Western thinking
r--g31 11/11/97 Document Beijing {;hina cultural selection & dev project
r---g32 11/11/97 Document Beijing Recruitment criteria
r---g33 11/11/97 Lunch Beijing Differences Ch and W thinking
t---g34 11/11/97 Document Beijing Example of controls
936 11/11/97 Interview Bei~~ News clippings service on Chinese newspapersr---g37 1=-----11/11/97 Document Beijing Example of controls
r---g38 11/11/97 Document Beijing Example of controls
r---s39 11/11/97 Fax Beijing Press-agenCies for news clippings services
t--s40 11/11/97 Document Beijing Example of controls
941 11/11/97 Document Beijing Example of controls
r---g42 11/11/97 Interview BeijinQ AP and how suppliers collect their debt
r---s43 ------'<-. f----.'---------- ---11/11/97 Document Beijing A Chinese invoice from a supplier
r---s4S 12111197 Interview Beijing Suggestions for their cr mgt
948 12111/97 Questionnaire Beijing Questionnaire on providing mgt assurance
951 12111/97 Interview Beijing Checking my impressions
r---g54 12111/97 Interview Beijing Number of active accounts
957 12111/97 Interview Beijing Trade debtors project
!-g60 12111/97 Interview Beijing Final meeting
963 12111/97 Interview Beijing Study into Chinese culture
966 12/11/97 Document Beijing Credit reference report
969 12111197 Document Beijing Credit reference report
r-g72 13/11/97 Document Beijing A business licence
r---g7S 13/11/97 Interview Beijing Treasury implications of er mgt
t---g78 13/11/97 Interview Beijing Credit reference services
979 13/11/97 Brochure Beijing Credit reference services
r---gS1 13111197 Interview Beijing Final meeting & view of control
982 14/11/97 Far East Economic Review Beijing Slow down, tight credit, tho interest rates falling
r-s84 14/11/97 Interview Beijing Financing charge for working capital
g-87 14/11/97 Interview Beijing Final meeting & view of control
g-90 14/11/97 Interview Beijing Final meeting & view of control
993 14/11/97 Lunch Beijing Differences in Chinese and Western thinking
995 14/11/97 Document Beijing Internal phone list
996 14/11/97 Interview Beijing Close out meeting
'997 14/11/97 Interview Beijing Control is awareness
!-g98 14/11/97 Field note Beijing Suggestion for CoXC
999 16/11/97 Interview Beijing Control
1000.1 16/11/97 Field note Beijing Queries
1-:jQQ0.2 16/11/97 Field note Beijing Sug~estions
r-:roOO.3 16/11/97 Field note Beijing Queries
'1000.4 16/11/97 Field note Beijing Suggestions
1-:jQQ0.6 16/11/97 Field note Beijing Queries
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Database Date of
-11 ~ Dpe LQcaliQD Oelic[ipliQ_D
W02 16111197 Interview Beijing Control
r---:;o03 17/11/97 China Daily Beijing Controls of Agricultural Bank of China
r-:ro65 I.JK :-;20109/97 Document VAT in UK on bad debts
f-fo06 20109197 Economist UK Matsushita in China
~O7- 24/11/97 Economist UK Soe reform, triangular debt
~08 24/11/97 Field note UK Mind map key categories: UK, Chinese, Czech
1011 24/11/97 Publication UK Comment on corporate culture
1014 2112197 Publication U-r Sorting out Czech financial sector
----W15 25/11/97 Letter UK Letter introducing cultural questionnaire for CoXP
1017 27/11/97 Document Southton Key indicators
~18 1/12/97 Interview Southton Feedback E4780n context of cr ctrl
~19 2112197 Interview UK Czech thinking
1020 7112197 Financial Times UK Fall of Klaus, ethical failings & lack of market reg
1021 7/12/97 Prague Business Journal Prague ~owngrade Cz Rep cr rating. Interest rates up
~22 8/12197 Field note Prague Attitude to control
1023 8/12197 Interview Prague A few ideas on differences Cz and W thinking
1024 8/12/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague Justice, rule of law, ownership, truth
f"-:j025 8/12/97 Central European B'ss Wkly ~~:~~Slow paying for agricultural producer-w26 8/12/97 Lunch Differences Cz and VII thinking
r--.w27 8/12/97 Central European B'ss Wkly Prague 1 co accuses another of bribery
~29 8/12/97 Interview Prague Confirming mind map and ideas
1----fo32 9/12/97 Document Prague Policy on Gifts and Conflicts of Interest
'1"035 ~0/12/97 Lunch Prague Czech thinking
~~;f~b/12/97 Field note Prague Attitude to faceless control of people11/12/97 Lunch Prague Czech thinking & confirmation of mind map
1641 11/12/97 Prague Post Prague Effects of bank privitisation in Czech Republic
11/12/97
,.- r.;------------
1044 Prague Post Prague No penalty to enforce political funding reporting
~6.1 11112197 Document Prague Audit Committees
'1046.2 11/12197 Document Pra~ue European Corporate Governance
1046.3 11/12/97 Document Prague Converging cultures




1---:fo53 12112197 Interview Prague Control
1--:jQ52 12112/97 Observation nots Prague Corporate culture - at Reception
~656 15/12/97 Lunch Prague Control
1059 15/12/97 Interview Prague Control
1062 16/12/97 Observation Prague Corporate culture - Teamwork or Informal hier'y
~64 16/12197 Interview Prague Control
~65 16/12/97 Interview Prague Key points for cultural comparisons
1068 16/12/97 Lunch Prague Corporate culture and control
'1071 17/12197 Interview Prague Control
1074 17/12/97 Interview Prague 1st meeting on view of cr control--
Checking on my research impressions1077 17/12/97 Lunch Prague
~80 17112/97 Interview Prague Use of slw
r-:ro83 17112/97 Observation Prague Metro regulations
1086 18/12/97 Field note Prague Factors affecting perceptions
1089 18/12197 Lunch Prague Czech & British culture
r-:w91 18/12197 Field note Prague Main trends Cz UK Ch. Impressions
1092 19/12197 Interview Prague Control
1093 19/12/97 Field note Prague Preparation for mtg - comparison CoX & CoY
~94 19/12197 Field note Prague Suggestions--,.-
Close out meeting. Summary my impressions1095 19/12197 Lunch Prague
'1096 19/12/97 Document Prague Internal phone directory
-W97 19/12197 Field note PraQue Preparation for mtg
1097.3 20/12197 Observation Prague Drink with staff.
1098 20/12197 Prague Post Prague Havel's speech on ousting of Klaus
1099 20/12197 vwm Prague Havel's speach to Czech Parliament, 9/12/97
1101 20/12/97 Prague Post Prague Funding scandal: truth democracy and justice
----:ri04 20/12/97 Prague Post Prague Corruption: Acquittal of alleged spy and financier
'1107 20/12/97 Prague Business Journal Prague Corruption: Cz army tender for computing
~10 20/12197 Prague Post Prague c:oYP industry in Czech Republic
'1113
-~
20/12/97 Confirmation Prague Control
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Database Date of
#I.
~-=- ~e LQ!dItiQD O~5c[il2tiQDr-----rt14 20/12/97 Field note Prague Queries to followed up
'1115 30/12/97 Document Prague Internal phone dire_ctory
1116 30/12/97 Interview England Control
1119 31/12/97 Supper England View of British and Chinese culture
'1122 7/01198 Interview England Control
'1125 Interview '::-:-- Control7101/98 Southton
1128 7101/98 Lunch Southton Views on points for cultural comparisions
1131 8/01/98 Interview Southton Cult comparison points
~34 8/01/98 Interview Southton Control
r--:;-:;37 8/01/98 Interview Southton Field work. Observation of cult reaction
~38 11/01/98 Interview Southton Example of unlearning organisation
r--:;-:;40 14/01/98 Field note UK Risk vs. focus & quantity of control work
~43 14/01/98 Interview Southton Confirm mind map, cultural comparison points
1146 16/01/98 Lunch Southton Cultural comparison points
1149 16/01/98 Interview Southton Control
1152 18/01/98 Interview Southton Control
1155 19/01/98 Lunch Southton Confirm mind map, comparison Ch & Br culture
~58 19/01/98 Interview Northton Confirm mind map, cult comparison points.
~59 20/01/98 Email Northton Email 'Handbags' example
1161 20101/98 Field note Northton Professionalism = v. British?
1164 20101/98 Document Northton New credit manual - Short field guide
t-:r167 20101/98 Document Northton New credit manual- Full manual
1170 20101/98 Lunch Northton Working capital project
1173 21/01/98 Interview Northton Cultural comparison points
1176 22/01/98 Interview Northton Number of active customer accounts
1179 22/01/98 Interview Northton Cultural comparison points
1182 22/01/98 Document Northton Appraisal form, competencies
r-nS5 22/01/98 Document Northton Upward feedback form
r--n88 28/01/98 Interview Northton Confirm mind map & cultural comparison points
~91 28/01/98 Meeting Northton Meeting on sales and credit management
1194 30101/98 Supper Train, UK Views on national culture, Nepa(Rwandar-n96 30101/98 Field note Southton Suggestions for CoXU
'1197 30101/98 Interview Southton Confirm mind map & cultural comparison points
1198 30101/98 Document Southton Definition of management control
r--n99 30101/98 Field note Southton Coding density, small sample size
1200 17101/98 Field note Southton IndividlCollectvsm measured & observed
~O1 7102/98 Economist UK Bad loans by Czech banks
t--".f203 11/02/98 Field note UK System logic as part of model - really grounded?
1206 21102198 Field note UK Future research
1209 22/02/98 Dinner UK Attributes of a subordinate
1212 26/02/98 Interview UK Cultural comparison points
1215 28/02/98 Interview UK Chinese modesty.
'1218 10103/98 Interview UK Typical Chinese attitude to bad parking.
~21 11/03/98 Drink Southton Views on my maps of cultural differences,
~24 11/03/98 Presentation Southton Presentation of interim research findings
1227 11/03/98 Interview Southton Identifying culture with pictures.
1230 11/03/98 Interview Southton Moscow, comparison to my findings for Prague
~31 11/03/98 Interview Southton HR standards: example of Corp culture
1233 11/03/98 Document Southton Conflict of interests, Ethical guidelines
'1236 28/02/98 Document Southton Worldwide facts & figures
1239 3/04/98 Document Southton Team to increase cultural etc diversity
1242 3/04/98 Economist UK Kodak in China
'1245 12/04/98 Document UK Staff Independence Confirmation
t"-:f248 1/05198 Lunch UK Czech for 'Truth will prevail'
t"-:f251 8/05/98 Economist UK Daimler-Benz in China
1254 8/05/98 Economist UK Problems in China's state owned banks
1257 16/05/98 Economist UK Prospects of recession for China
1260 22105198 Document UK Increasing diversity nat, Gender, Age
1263 23/05/98 Presentation UK Presentation of interim findings
~66 30105/98 Economist UK SGS-Thomson's problems in China
~69 10106/98 Economist UK Pain of s.o.e. reform
1271 13/06/98 Field note UK Reconciling cult approaches to control
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Database Date of -..~--------_ .._------_.----_----_._._---- __ .__ ._ ..r--.c·
LQQaliQ[]tJ. ~ ~ DescripliQIl_ _____________ .__ _ ___. _
1272 -- 14/06/98 Field note UK Key method development from r-:se_~~~jo':'.rna~__
1275 -- m06i98 Field note UK Analysis of process·&-researcll_ criteria ___ ._.
1278 1/07/98 Interview If~ Diffe-rencestiandUK cultures
1279 2/07/98 Phone UK Info on cr worthiness in PRC
~280 29/06/98 C;;.; UK- Analysis of meanings foj'Accountabiliti=-=Field note
1281 8/07/98 Phone U·~ Permission to use quote from email
1282 10107/98 Presentation UK- Presentation of interim findings
~83 13/07/98 Meeting UK Analysis of cultural questionnaires
1284 13/07/98 Meeting UK Confirmation of her mind map
1287 14/07/98 Meeting UK Idea for future research.
1290 14/07/98 Presentation UK Presentation of interim findings
1291 14/07/98 Observation UK Tables of Shame'.----
1293 19/07/98 Meeting UK Analysis of cult~al questionnaires
1296 23/08/98 Interview UK CoYU Corporate culture
12972109/98 Interview UK Interpretation of C;HIRU'sstory
1297.1 3/09/98 lunch UK Credit control in CoYU -
1297.2 19/12/97 Interview UK Pravda zvitezi
r--:r299 20101/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of control
1302 4/06198 Correspondence uk- Written confirmation of perception of control
1305 29/05/98 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation of perception of control
~68 29/05/98 ~orrespondence seijmg Written confirmati()n-of pElrceptionofcontrol--·--
r--:,311- 4712i97 Beijing 1:7.- .. --.-- .. - .. - .----- .. ------.- .. ---- ... -. -- ...g_orrespondence Written confirmation of perception of control
1314- 3/02198 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation ofperciiption of contro-I ---
1317-- 4/12197 UK--"-
r.....---.--
Correspondence Written confirmation of perception of control
1320 4/02/98 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation of perception of control
1323 12102/98 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control
1326 5/04/98 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control
1329 3/02198 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perce"tion of control
1332 8/04/98 Correspondence UK- Written confirmation of perception of control
1335 5/04/98 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control
1338 10/12197 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of contro-I ---
1341 2/04/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmatIOn-of perception of control
r--:,344 4/06/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of control
1347 6/02198 Correspondence uk- -;-c- ------.Written confirmation of percep~ionof control
1350 11/06/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of control
1353 3/02198 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control
1356 10102/98 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control
1359 8/12197 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of control--
1362 24/04/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of contro-I --
1365 1/04/98 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of contro-I--
1368 3/02/98 Correspondence Prague Written confirmation of perception of contro-I--··
1371 9/12197 Correspondence UK Written confirmation of perception of eontrol---
1374 15/12/97 Correspondence Prague Written confirmatlonofperceptlonof control
1377 12112/97 Correspondence
-~
Written confirm~t!on of perce~tion of controlPrague
1380 12112197 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation of perception of control
1383 26/03/98 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation of perception of control
1386 6/10198 Correspondence Beijing Written confirmation of perception of control
1389 19/06/00 Fax from Beijing UK Recruitment, internal relations
1392 20/06/00 Analytical note UK Hypotheses tried out with experienced managers
1395 6/08/00 Analytical note UK Axial resp's diagrams not on trade credit contro-I-
1398 10/08/00 Analytical note UK Policy as opposed to procedures
1400 15/08/00 Analytical note UK Feedback loops in credit control diagrams
1403 Analytical note UK 95959: Opportunities/people/system
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APPENDIX C. EXAMPLE OF AN AXIAL RESPONDENT'S
VIEW OF TRADE CREDIT CONTROL
This VIew, In the following diagram, was developed by the researcher from
interviews with a particular axial respondent. It was discussed, further developed
where necessary, and confirmed with the axial respondent to ensure that it captured
his or her views, rather than those of the researcher. The diagram is supported by
notes, taken directly from interview notes, to explain each control element.
Anonymity of the axial respondent and of the organisation has had to be maintained.
Codes are therefore used to hide the identity of axial respondent and particular
aspects of the business. These are shown in capital text, e.g. 'AXRES' and
'CHALK'. Monetary values have been adjusted and coded with a fictional currency
unitM.
The diagram format of related control elements, analysed between objectives, state of
control, control action and contextual factors, was used for all diagrams of axial
respondents' views of management control. It was developed in early stages of
interviewing axial respondents, and was based on formats experimented with during
the pilot study. It provided a convenient means for rapid portrayal of complex views
on management control described by axial respondents. All axial respondents said
that they were happy with this format. Analysis of control elements between
objectives, state of control and control action was abandoned when it appeared not to
add very much to the analysis.
This view comprising 44 control elements, and being of trade credit control as an
example of management control, is typical of those gathered from other axial
respondents.
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Appendix C: Example of an axial respondent's view of trade credit control
These notes give a brief explanation of what AXRES means by each of the following
key concepts concerning credit control, identified with a box on the accompanying
diagram.
Objectives
These are the objectives, standards, goals, directions or purposes that are directly
related to credit control.
Acceptable risk
The degree of risk that shareholders and management are prepared to put up with.
CHALK is a risky business; every year we have a big bad debt. The only way that
will change is if you elect to get out of that market.
Margin; contribution after cost of financing accounts receivable and of bad debt.
Risk.·reward
The objective of having some balance (acceptable, optimum?) between risks and
rewards. Here rewards include profit and also other objectives such as throughput
dictated by the wider business strategy. Risks are those to profit, from bad debt,
excessive outstanding debt, non-achievement of sales objectives etc., and risks to any
other objectives of the business.
Minimum bad debt
Incur no more than a minimum level of bad debt.
Collect cash
So that sales proceeds are received, cost of financing outstanding debt does not grow
and bad debt is avoided.
State of control
These items are the result of Control Action taken; they provide some assurance that
the objectives are being achieved and disasters are being avoided. The most
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Appendix C: Example of an axial respondent's view of trade credit control
important of these items, for giving that assurance, are shown as bolder boxes in the
diagram.
Teamwork
Working together as a team for the business interest and getting on well together. In
the CHEESE TEAM there were people who had a lot of humour; a lot of people
were quite relaxed with each other; they got on quite well; therefore there were
constant informal contacts. So by a curious process everyone knew what was going
on the whole time.
Other examples of how teams might operate:
a Credit Control function that, while being independent, is close to the business,
having good liaison with the business and the field sales force
Sales staff giving Credit Management staff information, such as accounts, bank
reference mandates and visit reports, that may assist forming a view on a customer's
credit worthiness
Credit and Sales staff working as a team together towards selling and collecting sales
proceeds; Credit Management working with Sales to find solutions to credit risk
problems. Joint visits by Sales and Credit Management staff to customers.
Independent objective counterbalance
Credit controllers who are independent, objective, and not in a position to be
overwhelmed or brow beaten. If it is difficult to get the business, a salesman can
very often be so hyped up on the success of getting the customer to buy, at what
might appear to be an attractive price, that he gets into a frame of mind where he
perceives the principal threat as not getting the business. Whereas the principal
threat is not getting the money.
Roles have changed within ORO1. Credit Management used to be advisory; now
they have authority to say yes or no to how much credit is granted, so that Sales have
to push it up the line if they want a different decision.
It requires staff with training and experience, so that their professionalism IS
recognised and brought to business decisions.
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Fruitful tension
This is most important to providing control assurance. An example is the tension
between Sales who are going for business and Credit Management who are
protecting the company's assets. These competing priorities may be negotiated at
senior levels of Finance and Sales Management.
Information
Such as that given by reports, e.g. aged debt and exception reports, Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) such as Payment Variance (PV); also softer informal information
such as that gathered from conversations and observations.
Monitoring
Monitoring both the business and the control system. Monitoring the business
includes constant focus on customers' debt, without which it gets out of hand very
quickly. Monitoring the control system includes internal audit, review of Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs), checking user requirements for reports.
Authorities. empowerment
Empowerment, i.e. Giving people the freedom and authority to get on with their job.
It includes both authority to make a decision and making it clear what people can do.
Authorities as limits to what people can do, but applied flexibly e.g. Sales staff can
always appeal against a decision by Credit Management.
Intervention
Taking action when it is clear from monitoring that something needs to be done.
Intervention with senior management input can help instil real assent to the control
framework, thus helping to build a positive control environment.
Accountability
Accountability. i.e. responsibility, both to your line manager, and equally to your
internal customer to whom you are giving service. Both Sales and Finance are
accountable for credit. Finance are accountable if they give the wrong answer or do
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not pick up warning signs of customer default. Sales are accountable if they fail to
give to Finance information they have.
With the way that ORG2 organisation is going, there will be a significant spotlight
on the accountability of the Sales managers.
Procedures
Procedures setting out what should be done, when and the standards to which it
should be done.
When people are presented with a specific transaction or piece of paper, they need
the confidence to know what to do with it. Those steps will be more efficient and
better, if they are allowed to evolve with people's experience and knowledge, and if
they are confidently updated with the feedback of the people who are constantly
using them. There is no alternative to having a sensible set of procedures. People
dislike intensely not having that framework, because they then have too much left to
their own initiative; they have to spend too much time dealing with XXXX, and they
become frustrated.
Understanding
Understanding the business. One too readily assumes that people have a basic
understanding, the ability to understand what is reasonable and what is not.
For example, in moving operations from SOUTH to NORTH we have lost a lot of
experienced people; we found people putting dates instead of prices into price fields,
producing M 10 million invoices that were corrected before issue. Inexperienced
staff were not doing reasonableness checks. This is a loss of general atmosphere of
understanding the business ..
The Credit Control function needs to have a good understanding of the business, so
that it can be strong, independent and work with the business. It should also
understand and have good intelligence of the industry and markets.
While credit decisions are with the business, business managers must clearly
understand the risks they are taking. That is, they need to have clear understanding
of the balance between risk and reward, so they are equipped to make appropriate
decisions.
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Segregation of duties
If you asked me whether someone could bribe somebody here to quietly write off a
debt, I would think it highly unlikely. Highly unlikely because of procedures and
controls wouldn't allow it, and because of segregation of duties.
Control framework
This is most important to providing control assurance.
Management understanding of the risks and the threats to the business' health,
together with appropriate defences against those risks and threats. An example,
outside credit control, of lack of this understanding was where management of a road
construction company thought that the risks were technical of building a road within
specification and on time. Whereas a bigger risk was that the price of their asphalt
was not locked in; this led to a M 250,000 loss on the road.
Underlying this understanding are a set of assumptions. Whether the assumptions
are formal or informal, they should exist; my view is they should be transparent so
you can know what they are.
The defences against the threats are represented by procedures, activities (Le. the
Control Action below), accountabilities, whether these be formal or informal.
Control environment
The tone at the top and the real ideology that underlies the formal ideology. It is real
assent by people to, and their real understanding of, what they are supposed to be
doing and how they are supposed to be doing it. Without the right informal
corporate culture, the formal procedures may be operated purely mechanically.
People may not buy into controls but will see them as obstacles, and when people see
an obstacle they are like to circumvent it.
In an example, outside credit control, Internal Audit found a substantial fraud in a
division. They found its offices stuffed with manuals, quality manuals and
procedures. But the very simple basics of control were ignored, like segregation of
staff duties, like management being sufficiently on the ball to note that there is
something a bit odd about a M 10,000 a year clerk driving a Cosworth Sierra and
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buying rounds of champagne for his colleagues. Pre-employment checks would have
uncovered his dubious past.
Cash collection
Customers actually paying what they owe.
Clear choices
So that management can decide the extent of exposure that they are prepared to
tolerate and the degree of risk they are prepared to put up with
Risk management
Managing the balance between exposure, risk and reward.
This may be done within the Sales function with information and service provided by
Credit Management. It may be done jointly by Sales and Credit Management, such
as intervention to obtain a parent company guarantee for CONSOLIDATED
CHALK.
It may be better to manage one's way out of a risky exposure to a customer, e.g. by
letting a customer continue to take product on reduced credit terms or for payment up
front, than to cut off an existing customer.
Control action
This is the action taken in order to achieve the objectives.
Visit customer
Joint visits by Sales and Credit Management and conversation with customers are a
key source of information and are useful for resolving credit problems.
Gather credit information
From sources including:
• Customers' management accounts
• Customers' financial accounts
• Credit references agencies
• Bank references
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in an ideal situation, talking to other parts of ORG.
Appraise credit risk
Key work by Credit Management towards setting credit limits and credit ratings.
Sales make a proposal and Credit Controllers either approve it or suggest an
alternative such as reducing the credit term or taking security
Set credit limit
Our credit limit may be anything from a limit to our risk, based upon the assessed
strength of the customer, to a review point used to monitor the level of business with
the customer and their payment performance.
Report
e.g. reports or on-line information on over due balances and balances exceeding
credit limits. Also less formal communication by email, note, word of mouth etc.
Put an effective stop on a customer
A stop may be placed on further business with an existing customer, such as when
they exceed their credit limit, their payments are overdue, or new information puts
their credit strength in doubt.
At present we have difficulties. For example a stop cannot yet be automated in our
CHANNEL S, and we cannot update credit limits fast enough for CHALK business
which tends to go through peaks and troughs.
Use a methodology
I would like us to use a methodology that makes the choices clear, that looks at the
exposures and compares them to the risks and rewards. The problem is that too
many of our customers would fail our criteria.
Check reasonableness
Checking that transactions, balances etc. look reasonable and make sense within the
context of general understanding of the business. Doing these checks builds
understanding of the specific area.
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Management understand risks and threats
Action by management to make sure they understand risks and threats facing the
business.
Supervise
Review of activities to ensure they are carried out properly, that authorities,
standards, procedures are adhered to, and that people are performing as they should.
Monitoring, guiding and coaching staff, so its an-on-the-job training and
development type of activity as well. We underestimate the importance of
supervision and assume that people have a basic understanding of the business.
Set procedures
Providing a set of credit management procedures and standards.
Appraise staff
e.g. against their tasks and targets; so that they are held accountable for their
responsibilities
Assign roles and responsibilities
So people know who is responsible for what. Also for organisational roles such as
Credit Management as an independent objective function, and for segregating duties.
Use direct debit
Direct debit is efficient and gives early warning of credit problems. We are trying to
put all new customers, and get as many of our existing customers as possible, on
direct debit. How much we can do this depends market conditions.
Establish authorities
e.g. for setting credit limits, or for trading above credit limits.
Context of credit control
This is the context of credit control. These are factors that may affect objectives,
control action, and the state of control.
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Corporate culture
Common attitudes, the norms of how things are done, that are shared within the
company. In ORO it includes scrupulous legality and fairness.
Unfortunately it also includes functional silos, Le. lack of communication between
functions.
Apparent contradictions
A threat to the business is loss of market share, loss of critical mass, and inability to
absorb overheads. Yet greater sales volumes can represent bigger risks in the
exposures to customers, and also can lead to breaches in defences against substantial
loss of profit involved in bad debt.
There can be an apparent lack of goal congruence between Sales staff and Credit
Controllers, yet this may be the source of fruitful tension.
'Industry feature'
[This describes a particular feature of the industry, which has been deleted in order to
maintain anonymity for the industry and organisation]
Wider business strategy
Credit control is also part of a much bigger debate of ... [Strategic issues deleted in
order to preserve anonymity].
Markets
We need to have good understanding of the markets that we operate in, so that we
can understand our customers.
The different mentalities of particular markets, as well as some personalities, result
in not all customers being on direct debit. For example in the CHEESE market,
where there are relatively low turnover and exposure but high margins, some
marketers see less need for direct debit. The effect of markets on customer risk, for
example the variable business and low margins of the CDE industry.
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Our industry
We need to have good understanding of the industry that we operate in, so that we
can understand our competitors and the economics that we face.
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APPENDIX D. CULTURALQUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire was edited from Trompenaars' (1997) instrument, in order to
reduce its length, and thus increase the number of responses by busy managers.
Questions 29 and 30 were developed by the researcher in order to distinguish
External Locus of Control by Chance from that by more Power Others (Kauffman,
Welsh and Bushmarin, 1995). It is set out on the following pages. But first an
explanation is given for how measurements of culture were calculated from this
instrument
Indices were constructed as follows for each cultural dimension and for each survey
respondent:
Universalism: average score for questions 1 to 3,
where responses are scored: a = -1, b = 0, c = +1, d = -1, e = +1.
Incubator ideal corporate culture: average score for ideal and current situations,
where responses to questions 4.d, 5.c and 6.b are each scored + 1.
Guided Missile ideal corporate culture: average score for ideal and current situations,
where responses to questions 4.a, 5.a and 6.d are each scored +1.
Eiffel Tower ideal corporate culture: average score for ideal and current situations,
where responses to questions 4.c, 5.b and 6.c are each scored + 1.
Family ideal corporate culture: average score for ideal and current situations,
where responses to questions 4.b, 5.d and 6.a are each scored + 1.
Egalitarianism: Incubator + Guided Missile scores - Family + Eiffel Tower scores
Person orientation: Incubator + Family scores - Guided Missile + Eiffel Tower
scores
Individualism: average score for questions 20 to 22,
where responses are scored: a = 1, b = -1.
Specific: average score for questions 23 to 25,
where responses are score: a = 1, b = -1.
Internal Locus of Control: average score for questions 26 to 30, where responses to
questions 26.b, 27.b, 28.a, 29.c and 30.a are each scored +1, and 30.b is scored
+0.5
External Locus of Control by Chance: average score for questions 26 to 29, where
responses to questions 25.a, 27.a, 28.b and 29.b are each scored + 1.
External Locus of Control by more Powerful Others: average score for questions 29
to 30, where responses to questions 29.a and 30.d are each scored + 1, and 30.c
is scored +0.5
Achieved Status: average score for questions 31 to 33,
where responses are scored: a = -1, b = -0.5, c = 0, d = +0.5, e = + 1.
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Future, Present or Past orientation scored from 0 (weak) to 1 (strong) based on the
relative sizes of circles in question 34.
Synchronic view of time: scored from 0 (sequential) to 1 (synchronous) based on the
number divided by 3 of the sum (maximum 3) of intersections between circles
and number of circles that enclose each other, in question 34.
The score for each question should best be seen as ordinal rather than interval data.
To be strictly correct in averaging scores across several questions, there should be
correspondence between questions in the size of intervals of each scale assumed for
scoring a question. Similarity of the instructions and structure for questions used to
measure each cultural dimension give some support for this assumption.
Accordingly, the index for each cultural dimension calculated for each survey
respondent can be taken as only an approximate ordinal measure.
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Questionnaire
This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which you think or feel about some dilemmas at work
or in everyday life. It is part of a widely used and tested questionnaire for measuring cultural
attitudes. Obviously there are no right or wrong answers. When answering the questions, try not to
be influenced by any previous answers you have given. Some questions on your personal
background are included in order to control in the research for some other factors besides culture that
may affect personal opinions.
Please select a code of up to 5 characters (letters or numbers) for yourself by which your answers
may be coded in the research material in order to ensure confidentiality.
For the following questions, please imagine yourself in the situations described; please select ONE
answer from the alternatives given.
I. You are riding in a car driven by a close friend who hits a pedestrian. You know you were
going at least 60 kilometres per hour (kph) where the maximum speed is 40 kph. Your friend's
lawyer says that if you testify under oath that he/she was only driving at 40 kph, it may save himlher
from serious consequences. There are no other witnesses.
What right has your friend to expect you to protect him/her?
a. As a friend he/she has a definite right to expect me to testify that the speed was only 40 kph
b. As a friend he/she has some right to expect me to testify that the speed was only 40 kph
c. As a friend he/she has no right to expect me to testify that the speed was only 40 kph
Your answer =
CJ
In view of your obligations as a sworn witness and your obligation to your friend, would you





2. You are a journalist who writes a weekly review on newly opened restaurants. A close friend
of yours has sunk all his/her savings in a new restaurant. You have eaten there and you really think
the restaurant is no good.
What right does your friend have to expect you to go easy on his/her restaurant in your review?
a. As a friend he/she has a definite right to expect me to give the restaurant a favourable review.
b. As a friend he/she has some right to expect me to give the restaurant a favourable review.
c. As a friend he/she has no right to expect me to give the restaurant a favourable review.
Your answer =
CJ
In view of your obligations to your readers and your obligation to your friend, would you go




3. You are a doctor for an insurance company. You examine a close friend who needs more
insurance. You find that he/she is in pretty good shape, but you are doubtful on one or two minor
points which are difficult to diagnose.
What right does your friend have to expect you to shade the doubts in his/her favour?
a. As a friend he/she would have a definite right to expect me to shade the doubts in his/her favour.
b. As a friend he/she would have some right to expect me to shade the doubts in his/her favour.
c. As a friend he/she would have no right to expect me to shade the doubts in his/her favour.
Your answer =
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For the following questions please state which of the four descriptions you believe best describes the
CURRENT situation in your organisation, and then what you believe to be the IDEAL situation.
4. Working effectively means:
a. that the individual members and the organisation agree upon objectives and that people are given
freedom to attain the goals;
b. that the manager gives the objectives, and directs the members in fulfilling the various tasks that
need to be done;
c. that the objectives and roles to fulfil them are clearly described, even in cases where this obstructs
individual freedom and inventiveness; or
d. that the individual members feel challenged by the task at hand.
Current situation in my organisation
Ideal situation in my organisation
CJ
CJ
5. You, as an expert, and your boss are making a presentation to a new client:
a. you will do most of the talking on behalf of the company, because - after all - this is the area of
your expertise;
b. your boss does the talking whereby you will always be at hand should he need you;
c. you will decide in discussion with your boss who will most learn and develop from it; the one who
would, will do the presentation; or
d. you expect your boss to do the talking whereby you will not be asked to help, even in cases where
you boss makes unnoticed professional mistakes.
Current situation in my organisation
Ideal situation in my organisation
CJ
CJ
6. My organisation is:
a. a personal place; its like an extended family; people seem to share a lot together;
b. a very dynamic place with lots of space for self-realisation; people are eager to meet new
challenges;
c. a very stable and structured place; bureaucratic procedures generally govern what people do; or
d. a place which is orientated to results and achievement; a major concern is getting the job done.
Current situation in my organisation
Ideal situation in my organisation
The following questions are on your personal background. Please feel free to skip any of them that
you do not wish to answer.
7. The country in which you spent most of your childhood
8. How many years have you lived outside that country
. I
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9. If in your opinion, this country does not adequately describe your national, regional, or ethnic
culture, please state that culture here
10. What level of higher education, if any e.g. HNC, diploma, B.Sc., MBA, have you attained?
11. What was the discipline of your higher education, professional or technical training, if any,
e.g. engineering, economics, arts; if there are several, please give the one that you think most
influences you in your work.
12. What was the principal country in which you did this higher education, professional or
technical training
13. What is the discipline or function of your current job, professional or technical training, e.g.
engineering, marketing, accounting
14. Principal country of your present job
15. Total years of any work experience, including before higher education (please circle your
answer)
a




17. Gender, F for female or M, for male
· I
60 or more
19. What kind of job do you do:
19.1 A job for which normally up to four years of vocational training is required, e.g. skilled worker,
technician)?
· I
19.2 Ajob for which a higher level professional training is required, e.g. graduate engineer,lawyer?
I . I
19.3 A job in which you manage at least one subordinate?
· I
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19.4 If so, do your subordinates themselves manage their own subordinates?
. I
19.5 What is your job title? - Please omit if this would identify you within your organisation.
For the next set of questions, imagine these situations occurring in your organisation where you work.
20. A defect is discovered, caused by negligence of a member of the team. The responsibility
could be carried by the individual alone, or by the team as a whole. What do you experience in your
organisation?
a. The person causing the defect is responsible. Therefore he/she should be called to order by his/her
superiors.
b. Because one happens to work in a team, the responsibility should be carried by the group. This
time one member has made a mistake; next time it could be someone else in the team.
Your answer =
21. In your experience, when a decision has to be made, people will look for:
a. a compromise, as this will save precious time; all the people involved need to vote; or
b. a consensus, even if it takes more time; all the people involved need to carry the outcome.
Your answer =
22. In your experience, which way of working best describes the situation in your organisation:
a. to work as an individual, on one's own. In this case a person is pretty much their own boss. They
each decide most things for themselves and how they each gets along in their own business. Each
person has only to take care of him or herself and does not expect others to look out for them.
b. To work in a group where everybody works together. Everybody has something to say in the
decisions that are made and everyone can count on one another.
Your answer =
The next questions describe relationships between people and at work.
23. People have different opinions about how a job can be done best. Which way do you prefer?
a. The best job will be done if people you work with know you personaIly and accept you the way
you are, both within and outside the organisation.
b. The best job will be done if the people you work with respect the work you are doing, even if they
are not your friends.
Your answer =
24. Imagine that a boss asks a subordinate to help him paint his house. The subordinate
discusses the issue with a colIeague. Which of the two arguments would you support the most?
a. I do not have to paint the boss' house if I do not feel like it. He is my boss in the company.
Outside the company he has little authority.
b. Despite the fact that I do not feel like it, I will paint the house anyway. He is my boss and you
cannot ignore that outside work either.
Your answer =
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25. People have different ideas about what makes a good manager. Which one of these two
descriptions do you prefer?
a. A good manager is a person who gets the job done. He/she takes care of the information, people
and equipment for the execution of tasks. He/she leaves subordinates free to do their part of the
job and intervenes only if necessary.
b. A good manager is a person who gets his/her group of subordinates working well together. He/she
guides them continuously, and helps them solve various problems. He/she is a kind of father.
Your answer =
The next questions concern the way in which results of events unfold. Please choose the answer you
believe to be more in line with reality.
26.
a. Without the right break or opportunity, one cannot be an effective leader; or
b. capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
Your answer =
27.
a. Misfortunes in people's lives are partly due to bad luck; or
h. people's misfortune result from the mistakes they make.
Your answer =
28.
a. In the long run, people get the respect they deserve; or




a. If people follow the instructions of doctors who prescribe the latest discoveries in medicine, they
are likely to live longer;
b. every person has a set time to live and there is not much human beings can do to make the lives of
men and women longer; or
c. people's health and life expectancy reflects how they treat their body. Those that look after
themselves tend to live longer.
Your answer =
30. Feed back information on what is happening in the market place can be used for directing
business operations:
a. to correct deviations from your plan, so that you retain initiative in the market;
b. to measure deviations from plans, so that you can adjust either your operations or your plans to
take best advantage, and maintain some influence, in the market;
c. to listen to customers, competitors and others outside your organisation, so that you can choose a
competitive position in the market for meeting customer demand; or
d. to listen to customers, competitors and others beyond your control, so as to make your business
responsive to what customers want.
Your answer =
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The following statements you may, to a greater or lesser extent, agree or disagree with. Please state
your personal belief.














33. An effective manager is more likely to be a person with very good education, experience and







34. Think of the past, present and future as being in the shape of circles. Please draw three
circles in the space blow, representing past, present and future. Arrange these circles in any way you
want that best shows how you feel about the relationships of the past, present and future. You may
use different size of circles. When you are finished, label each circle to show which one is the past,
the present and the future.
Thank you for your help. Your contribution to this research is much appreciated.
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This appendix lists the selective coding categories with their principal properties and
dimensions'j" at the end of the study. It gives an indication of the 'density' of the
theory and its key categories, which is one of Strauss and Corbin's (1990 and 1998)
criteria for grounded theory research (Table 3.3).
Categories are listed here logically under key categories, each of which is described
in a chapter of this dissertation. The key categories each demonstrate an aspect for
managers of the MNCs of the core category, namely 'differences between national
cultures in gaining control assurance'. The substantive theory was a reorganisation
of findings for the key categories and their sub-categories.
Many properties of categories were in turn explored as categories. The distinction
between categories and properties is therefore largely arbitrary. They are therefore
listed together. Dimensions were generally bipolar, such as important or unimportant
to providing control assurance. Some bipolar dimensions have a mid range value, for
example mutual interest was seen as falling between self interest and mutual interest
as a basis for business relationships. Some dimensions had more than 2 poles, where
multiple possibilities were described by interviewees for a property. An example
was Accountability and its property of what it is seen as consisting of.
These categories and properties do not in all cases correspond to boxes in the
overview diagram given in each of Chapters 7 to 12. The categories and properties
listed here were used for identifying findings concerning differences between
managers from different countries in perceptions of how control assuran~e is gained.
The overview diagrams illustrate findings of differences by indicating characteristics
for each of the 3 national cultures. Whereas the categories and properties cut across
2 or more national cultures, the diagrams attempt to distil what was characteristic for
control perceptions of each national culture. The diagrams therefore do not illustrate
126 'Dimension' is used here according to its general meaning of a measurable extent (Allen,
1990). This is consistent with Strauss and Corbin's definition in their 1998 edition (page
101) "the range along which general properties of a category vary, giving specification to a
category and variation to the theory", although not with the definition in their 1990 edition.
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all categories against each national culture. Some categories are illustrated by more
than 1 characteristic within a national culture.
Categories, sub-categories Dimensions
and 12.ro12erties From: to:
Core category:
Differences between national
cultures in gaining control
assurance
Key category (Chapter 7):
Business relations with
external parties
Relationship or contract Relationship Contract
Basis for relationship:
Property - self or mutual Self interest,low Mutual interest Relianceon other
trust party, high trust
Property - instrumental or Instrumental Feelingsof guan xi
feeling or ren qing
Benefit of taking legal action Take to court to Hesitateto take to Taking to court
to regulate external relations enforcecontracts court to enforce destroys
contracts relationships





Property - importance Importantto control Unimportantto
assurance control assurance
Property - type Personal Unspecified Individual
responsibility responsibility
Property - basis Basedon shame Unspecified Basedon guilt
Understand individual Importantto control Unimportant
morality assurance
Reluctance to accept Reluctant Not reluctant
responsibility
Accountability:
Property - importance Importantto control Unimportantto
assurance controlassurance
Property - whether Sameas Differentfrom
distinguished from responsibility responsibility
responsibility
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Explanation on fulfilling Part of Not part of
responsibility accountability accountability
Roles of being responsible Part of Not part of
and to whom responsibility is accountability accountability
owed
Key category (Chapter 9):
Internal relations
Staff expected to be reliable Contribution Reliability
or to make a wider
contribution
Empowerment Important to control Unimportant to
assurance control assurance
How bosses are expected to Coach and
behave towards their develop staff, or




Property - to whom or what Their boss, or
Their team I
organisation
Property - contingent or Contingent Unconditional
unconditional
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Categories. sub-categories Dimensions
and Qro12.erties From: to.·
Trust within organisation: Between boss and
types of trust subordinate at



















Key category (Chapter 10):
Information
Personal attention Avoid Do not avoid
Availability of information Available, prefer Unavailable, prefer
transparency secrecy




Relationship or transparency Relationship Transparency
Key category (Chapter 11):
Law, rules and procedures
Attitude to rule of law:
Property - respect for Respected Not respected, e.g.
rule of law people more
important than
rules
Property - basis for attitude Individual morality Communal
morality
Process for resolving Confrontational Private mediation
disputes legal process, using and agreement
lawyers and courts using relationships
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Property - contribute Contribute to Do not contribute
to control assuance control assurance to control
assurance
Property - how many Propensity to issue Unlikely to issue
regulations or procedures many regulations or many regulations
procedures or procedures
Property - basis for Accompanied by
usefulness and feeling, or
acceptability of Accompanied by
internal rules reason and






Property - mitigation Mitigation Mitigation not
(managers gain control important to control important to
assurance against assurance, e.g. control assuranceflexible
undesirable consequences) interpretation or
ambiguity
Policies Important to control Not important to
assurance control assurance
Key category (Chapter 12):
Systems logic
View of time and planning Sequential Synchronous
Long term planning Important Futile




Thinking Conceptual and Contextual and
reductionist synthesising
Relati ve importance of General principles Pragmatic solutions
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